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The US supreme court has published its opinions, but none of the cases we’ve been watching for were part of the decisions today.

In comments reported by NBC News, House speaker Mike Johnson has said it is “stunning” to him that “House Democrat leadership has put out a statement saying that they’re willing to allow the number one national security tool to go dark over some political disagreement over a very short-term temporary appointment”.

An elderly Hong Kong taxi driver has appeared in court over dangerous driving that killed two pedestrians in Ngau Tau Kok.

Ng Kam-cheong, 70, wore a mask and sunglasses when he appeared at the Kwun Tong Magistrates’ Court on Thursday, Court News reported.

He was charged with one count of dangerous driving causing death and three counts of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm.

Ng was arrested on May 13 after a fatal traffic incident in Ngau Tau Kok on the same day.

He was driving downhill along Chun Wah Road when his taxi went out of control, mounted the pavement and a sitting-out area on Choi Ha Road, and hit two female pedestrians.

One woman was certified dead at hospital around 40 minutes after the crash. The other pedestrian died in hospital on Monday, five days after the accident.

The two passengers in the taxi suffered chest, back and neck injuries – they were in stable condition as of Monday.

The taxi driver himself sustained chest injuries.

The case was adjourned to August 13.

The defendant was granted bail of HK$50,000 on the condition that he must surrender all travel documents, be barred from leaving Hong Kong, hand over his driving licence, refrain from driving any class of vehicle, and report to a police station every week.

The offence of dangerous driving causing death carries up to 10 years’ imprisonment in Hong Kong, while the offence of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm is punishable by up to 7 years in jail.

A Hong Kong court has upheld the conviction and sentence of a journalist and former head of a press union for obstructing police while reporting.

Veteran journalist Ronson Chan began serving his five-day sentence on Friday after Deputy High Court Judge Lily Wong upheld a lower court’s conviction over an incident in September 2022, when Chan refused to show his ID card to a police officer while reporting on a homeowners’ meeting.

In her written judgment, which was not read out in court on Friday, Wong shot down Chan’s argument that the police officer’s demand was unlawful and found that the journalist had obstructed the police by wilfully delaying the presentation of his identification.

According to case details, Chan was covering the meeting at MacPherson Stadium in Mong Kok, where he was stopped by a plainclothes police officer who said he was acting “suspiciously” and asked to see his identification card.

He was arrested on suspicion of obstructing a police officer after allegedly failing to comply with demands to produce his ID card despite multiple warnings.

At trial, Chan said that he refused to present his identification due to privacy concerns, referring to an incident during the 2019 protests when a police officer showed his ID card in front of his camera, which was live-streamed to thousands of viewers.

The West Kowloon Magistrates’ Courts found Chan guilty in September 2023, a year after he was arrested.

The trial judge, Leung Ka-kie, said Chan deliberately stopped the police officer from carrying out her duties and that his persistent questioning of officers when they asked for his identification was “reckless and unreasonable.”

‘Social climate’

Noting online calls to protest at the homeowners’ meeting, Judge Wong also concurred with the trial judge’s ruling that the police officers were justified in their actions to maintain public order.

“As the Magistrate ruled… given the social climate at the time, observing the rules and maintaining order in public places in Hong Kong was both important and commendable,” Judge Wong wrote.

Chan repeatedly questioned the officers and ignored warnings to calm down, and only offered an opaque cardholder, which constituted wilful obstruction, the judge added.

Chan’s barrister, Steven Kwan, told the court that he would seek a certificate from the appellate court to take the journalist’s appeal to the city’s apex court, but did not submit a bail application.

With the certificate, Chan would be able to seek permission for a final chance to appeal his conviction and sentence.

Reactions from press groups

Chan, who was elected as chair of the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) in June 2021, stepped down at the end of his term in June 2024, citing increasing pressure against him and the press union.

In a statement issued on Friday, the HKJA expressed “deep regret” over the court’s decision and raised concerns about the ruling’s impact on journalists’ work.

“Citing the exercise of constitutionally protected fundamental rights as grounds for a search is legally untenable, and today’s ruling failed to directly address this contradiction,” the HKJA said.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) said on Friday that it “is outraged by the imprisonment of Ronson Chan.”

“The verdict sets a dangerous precedent, effectively giving the police a free hand and further eroding already dismantled press freedoms,” said Aleksandra Bielakowska, advocacy manager of RSF Asia Pacific.

Allen v. Milligan, an Alabama redistricting case that is now before the Supreme Court for the third time, is a face-palm, wrapped in a head-desk, wrapped in some of the most incompetent legislative draftsmanship that has ever been presented to the justices. If Alabama Republicans have any sense, they will fire all of their lawyers.

About a month ago, the Supreme Court decided Louisiana v. Callais, gutting the federal Voting Rights Act’s safeguards against legislative maps that lock voters of color out of power in the process. Callais effectively repealed a 1982 amendment to the VRA, which prohibited many state laws that have a negative impact of nonwhite voters, even if those laws were not drawn with racist intent.

After Callais, a plaintiff challenging a state’s legislative maps on racial grounds may only prevail “when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.”

As a practical matter, this is a very difficult bar for voting rights plaintiffs to overcome. Lawyers and judges are not mind readers. And state lawmakers normally aren’t foolish enough to state openly that they drew a particular map in a particular way because they wanted to maximize white power and minimize the voting power of nonwhite voters.

And yet, Alabama’s Republican-controlled legislature managed to enact congressional redistricting legislation that openly praises the European American character of much of the state.

Allen turns on congressional maps that the state enacted in a 2023 law, but which have never actually been used in an election. Much of the case turns on the law’s disparate treatment of two regions in the state: the Gulf Coast region of Alabama, and the state’s Black Belt.

While the Black Belt is actually named after the dark-colored soil in that region, it has a high African American population because many enslaved people were brought to the Black Belt prior to the Civil War. The Gulf Coast region, meanwhile, is predominantly white. As a lower court decision that struck down the 2023 maps explains, those maps keep “the Gulf Coast whole,” while simultaneously splitting the Black Belt in a way that shunts many of its Black voters into a majority-white district.

The mere fact that Alabama cracked up the Black Belt while keeping the Gulf Coast intact does not endanger its maps, at least under Callais. The decision is very favorable to gerrymandering, and permits states to draw maps that diminish Black representation so long as the state claims that it is doing so to dilute the votes of Democrats.

But here’s the rub: The 2023 law doesn’t just preserve the white-majority Gulf Coast region intact; it also praises the “shared culture” of that region which stems “from its French and Spanish colonial heritage.” France and Spain, of course, are European countries made up predominantly of white people.

The state legislature, in other words, didn’t just give the Gulf Coast more favorable treatment than it did the Black Belt. It explicitly referenced the Gulf Coast’s shared European culture when it did so. That sure gives rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred!

Will that be enough to persuade this Supreme Court to rule against Alabama’s maps? Who knows? The Court’s most recent gerrymandering decisions appear designed to permit states to draw whatever maps they want, without any federal judicial oversight whatsoever. And a decision in favor of Alabama’s 2023 maps would also benefit the Republican Party.

Six of the Supreme Court’s nine seats are held by Republicans.

But, even after Callais, one of the few things that states should not be allowed to do is draw maps for the explicit purpose of favoring European Americans, while simultaneously disfavoring African Americans. And yet Alabama’s maps may not be able to clear even this very low bar.

Two Hong Kong women convicted of money laundering have been jailed for over three years for transporting over HK$280 million cash from mainland China to Hong Kong between 2018 and 2019.

Luo Xiaoping was sentenced to four years and ten months at the District Court, while Xiang Yurong was jailed for three years, local media reported.

The two were convicted after a trial, in which they pleaded not guilty to a total of four counts of money laundering.

Luo was accused of bringing cash through border checkpoints, with over 100 instances during which she carried more than HK$1 million per trip, the court heard. She was accused of smuggling around HK$270 million cash.

Xiang brought money into Hong Kong an average of 10 times per month during the period of the offence, carrying around 200,000 to 300,000 RMB each time. She transported cash to Hong Kong as many as three times in a single day.

In total, the two of them handled over HK$280 million of illicit cash, the court heard.

District Court Deputy Judge Lily Wong said she accepted the fact that Xiang and Luo were just “mules,” but their offence inevitably brought a negative impact on Hong Kong and mainland China’s financial systems.

The two were arrested in September 2019, but were only charged in April 2023.

The defense argued that there was a delay in prosecution. They said that customs officers could have stopped Luo much earlier, yet they only took action after she had successfully transported cash into Hong Kong numerous times.

However, Judge Wong disagreed with this argument, describing Luo as “acting with a gambler’s mindset” and committing the crimes out of pure greed, Ming Pao reported.

According to the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, “dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of indictable offence,” or “money laundering,” is punishable by a maximum penalty up to 14 years’ imprisonment and a fine of HK$5 million.

Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department said in a statement on Thursday that this is the first money laundering conviction involving travellers transporting large amount of cash-related items across the border since the Cross-boundary Movement of Physical Currency and Bearer Negotiable Instruments Ordinance came into effect in July 2018.

Under the ordinance, anyone carrying over HK$120,000 in cash into Hong Kong must declare the sum to customs officers.

JUNE 13 — In the case of Haris Fatillah bin Mohd Ibrahim v Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia [2017], Haris Fatillah (Appellant) had made an application to the Election Commission of Malaysia (Respondent) for the relevant information (Information) pertaining to the proposed delimitation of Parliamentary and State Constituencies (Delimitation Exercise) to be supplied to the Appellant. The respondent had failed and or neglected to supply the Information to the Appellant.

Consequently, the Appellant commenced an action in the High Court by way of Originating Summons (OS) against the Respondent. In the OS, the Appellant averred that he was a registered voter in the parliamentary constituency of Petaling Jaya Selatan (P105) and the state constituency of the State Legislative Assembly of Bukit Gasing.

By the OS, the Appellant sought for declaratory reliefs or declarations, among others:

(a) that all affected persons had the right to all information in relation to changes made to parliamentary and state constituencies where these people were registered voters;

(b) that the Information included the recommendations or proposed recommendations, map or maps of the constituency, voting areas and the reasons for the proposed changes including all relevant documents used in support and/or justification of the proposed changes;

(c) that all the affected persons be conferred with the right to the Information in the form which would enable all the affected persons to make effective representations pertaining to the recommendations under Section 5 of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution; and

(d) that the Information, including the publication of the information in digital form available via the Respondent’s web page or copies of the same, be made available to the affected persons, whether living in Malaysia or outside Malaysia at nominal costs, to enable the affected persons to make effective representations within the time provided by Section 4(b) of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution.

The author argues that the doctrine of ‘locus standi’ remains a critical threshold in Malaysian public interest litigation. — Pexels pic

The OS was filed by the Appellant pursuant to Order 15 rule 16 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC). The High Court had dismissed the OS on the ground that the Appellant had no locus standi and that the reliefs sought in the OS, if granted, would have the effect of declaring the Respondent to do something which the Respondent was not required to do under the Federal Constitution.

Dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The issues for determination were whether the Appellant had the requisite locus standi to bring the proceedings and whether the application for the declarations sought in the OS ought to be granted.

In dismissing the appeal and affirming the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal ruled, among others, that in the OS, the Appellant had merely identified himself as a registered voter of the respective parliamentary and state constituencies. The Appellant had not pleaded that there was any interference with his public right such that it also interfered with his private right or that he had suffered some special damage peculiar to himself from such interference.

Nowhere in his cause papers did the Appellant identify a controversy or a ripe issue between himself and the Respondent or that his constitutional right had been infringed.

Clearly, there was no controversy between the Appellant and the Respondent, whether of the facts or in law.

The Appellant’s action was flawed and without merit. It was seeking a ‘clocked declaration’ – that is, a declaration for a collateral purpose or with improper motive.

Central to the decision was whether the Appellant had the requisite locus standi to bring the action against the Respondent.

Judge of Court of Appeal Zamani A Rahim (as he then was) said:

“The issue of locus standi is a threshold issue to be decided as to whether the Appellant can institute and maintain any action, be it a private matter or a public interest litigation.

“The Appellant seeks a series of declarations in relation to the review of the division of the Federation and the States into constituencies (delimitation of parliamentary/state constituencies) to be undertaken by the Respondent.

“The Respondent contends that the Appellant lacks locus standi to come to court for the reliefs prayed for as there is no controversy between the Appellant and the Respondent as the Appellant’s right has not been affected.

 “The most important feature of a declaratory judgment is that it is a discretionary remedy and as such, the court must carefully consider the circumstances and terms upon which the relief is sought.”

According to the learned judge, the discretion should be exercised ‘sparingly’, ‘with care and jealousy’ and ‘with extreme caution’. The expressions themselves may give little guidance, but what has been established in a long line of decisions is that the party seeking declaratory reliefs must first show to the court that he has the necessary locus standi or standing in that he has a proper or tangible interest to seek the declarations.

In other words, a real or genuine interest.

The above explains why the High Court on Friday (June 12) dismissed a challenge by Ipoh mother M. Indira Gandhi and 13 others against state laws that allow children under age 18 to be converted to Islam without both parents’ consent.

Court of Appeal Judge Aliza Sulaiman, who was a High Court Judge when this case was heard, said that all 14 of them had failed to show they have locus standi, meaning the legal standing, to pursue their court challenge.

The learned judge also said they had failed to show that they have a “real or genuine interest” in the matter.

* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh is a Republican. He served in a Republican White House, typically votes with the Court’s other Republicans, and even sometimes sides with President Donald Trump in major cases that divide the Republican Party. He’s not the sort of person you’d expect to carry a torch for a liberal cause for nearly four full decades.

But, well, he did. In Kavanaugh’s majority opinion in Pitchford v. Cain, which was handed down on Thursday, the justice more or less implemented a proposal for how to prevent racism from infecting jury selection that he first proposed in a 1989 piece that he published when he was still a law student.

To be clear, Kavanaugh’s Pitchford opinion doesn’t really break much new ground. It involves a straightforward violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court’s most important precedent governing race in jury selection, and rules in favor of the person on death row who brought this fairly clear-cut violation to the Supreme Court’s attention.

Still, Pitchford was a 5-4 decision, with four of Kavanaugh’s fellow Republicans joining a dissent by Justice Neil Gorsuch. So the decision could have easily come down the other way if one of the Republican justices hadn’t developed a liberal approach to Batson before he started his legal career. Sometimes, even Supreme Court justices — arguably the most highly vetted political appointees in the entire federal government — contain multitudes.

Again, Pitchford is a fairly easy case. In a less ideological Supreme Court, the incarcerated person at the heart of this case might have won unanimously. But the decision does suggest that left-leaning advocates can sometimes prevail in this Court by appealing to the idiosyncratic views of some of the Republican justices.

Kavanaugh’s long-standing approach to race in jury selection, explained

In 1989, Kavanaugh published a “note” in the Yale Law Journal. Notes are student-authored works of legal scholarship, which often examine an important recent legal development. High-achieving law students frequently choose to write these notes because it gives them a published exemplar of their own legal writing skills that they can share with potential employers.

The surprising twist is that in his 1989 note, Kavanaugh — who, of course, would go on to become one of the most powerful Republicans in the United States — chose to advocate for a cause that is ordinarily associated with liberals. Published three years after the Supreme Court handed down Batson, Kavanaugh’s note, which is titled “Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings,” argued that the Court’s recent decision protecting against racism in jury selection should be read to include certain procedural protections for criminal defendants.

In criminal trials, both the prosecution and the defense often get a limited number of “peremptory challenges,” which they can use to remove a potential juror from the jury pool for virtually any reason. These peremptory strikes may be used to remove a juror because the prosecutor doesn’t like the juror’s haircut, because the defense counsel thinks a juror looked at their client suspiciously, or because counsel doesn’t like having jurors whose name begins with the letter “M.” 

But the Constitution prohibits prosecutors from removing a juror because of that juror’s race. 

As Kavanaugh explains in his Pitchford opinion, Batson sets up a three-step process to determine whether prosecutors did, in fact, remove a juror for impermissible racial reasons. After the defense counsel objects to the removal of a particular juror or group of jurors (step one), the prosecutor typically must give a race-neutral explanation for why they wanted the juror removed (step two). At step three, Kavanaugh writes, “defense counsel has an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason as pretextual,” and then the judge has to decide who is telling the truth.

Kavanaugh’s 1989 note argues that courts must ensure that this third step is complied with; he wrote at the time that “the defense should have an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s reasons before the trial judge decides whether to allow the prosecutor’s peremptories.” His opinion in Pitchford makes a very similar argument.

In Pitchford, prosecutors in a Mississippi murder case used their peremptory challenges to remove four of five potential Black jurors from defendant Terry Pitchford’s jury pool. Defense counsel objected on Batson grounds, and the prosecutor gave race-neutral explanations for targeting these jurors. (The prosecution claimed that one juror was removed because they arrived late to court, two because they had brothers convicted of violent offenses, and one because he, like the defendant, was a young father.) 

But the trial judge never gave defense counsel an opportunity to rebut these explanations. The judge simply deemed the prosecutor’s explanations acceptable and moved on.

This, Kavanaugh writes in Pitchford, is not allowed. In a sentence that mirrors the argument he made in 1989, the justice writes that “after a prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual.”

So how did this easy case produce a four-justice dissent?

To be clear, it’s not exactly a stretch for Kavanaugh to argue that, when Batson said that courts must use a three-step process to resolve jury discrimination claims, all three steps are mandatory. At most, Pitchford makes explicit something that was already implicit in US law.

But Pitchford was complicated by a federal law, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), that makes it difficult for convicted offenders to challenge their convictions or sentences in federal court if they were first tried in state court. To prevail in such a federal challenge, Pitchford must show that state courts handed down a decision that “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

Given this high bar placed in front of people who wish to challenge state-level convictions or sentences, a federal judge who wants to leave the state court’s decision in place will almost always be able to find a way to do so. And Gorsuch’s opinion does just that. 

The dissent’s primary argument is that Pitchford waived his Batson argument because, while his lawyers raised it in the trial court, they did not provide enough detail about how, specifically, the trial judge violated Batson when they raised this objection. As a general rule, lawyers may not raise an argument on appeal unless they also raised that argument in the trial court.

That’s not a very good argument, because, as Kavanaugh explains, defense counsel raised their Batson argument multiple times at trial. And, after one of these objections, the trial judge “explicitly assured Pitchford’s counsel that the Batson objection was preserved.” So it would have been odd — and could have potentially antagonized the judge — if defense counsel had elaborated further on their Batson argument after the judge effectively told them to drop the issue and take it up in the appeals courts.

But the fact remains that Pitchford barely prevailed in the Supreme Court. And, if not for the fact that Kavanaugh appears to have developed the view that all three prongs of Batson’s process are mandatory in law school, this case would have likely come out the other way.

Liberal victories aren’t exactly common in this Court, but they also aren’t so rare that they are unimaginable. In this case, one of the justices appears to have formed an opinion on a politically contentious issue before he fully embraced the broader worldview that he needed to have in order to score political appointments in a Republican administration. And that means that, at least in cases involving jury discrimination, criminal defense lawyers will sometimes find a sympathetic bench in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court announced on Thursday that it will not decide Hamm v. Smith, a case involving a genuinely difficult constitutional question about whether an Alabama inmate may lawfully be executed.

The immediate upshot of this decision is that Joseph Clifton Smith, who’s at the heart of this case, will not be killed. Smith prevailed in the federal appeals court that previously heard his case. And the fact that the justices decided not to decide Hamm — they dismissed it “as improvidently granted,” to use the Court’s precise legal terminology — means that Smith’s victory in the lower court stands.

Though the full Court issued no opinion in Hamm, six justices joined at least one of three concurring or dissenting opinions revealing how they thought the case should have been decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opinion offers a likely explanation for why her Court chose to make this case go away. Meanwhile, Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito’s dissenting opinions reveal some riffs among the Court’s Republicans.

In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to execute someone with an intellectual disability. The Hamm case largely turned on whether Smith’s IQ is low enough that he qualifies as intellectually disabled. But most of the justices appear to have thrown up their hands and determined that they are not well-positioned to determine Smith’s IQ.

Sotomayor’s opinion suggests that Alabama may have lost this case because of inept lawyering. Among other things, she points out that none of the expert witnesses that testified in a lower court, including Alabama’s own expert, used the same methods to determine Smith’s IQ “that Alabama now claims is necessary.” 

Because the Supreme Court has the final word on questions of constitutional law, the justices are supposed to be reluctant to decide questions that are not fully vetted by lower courts, due to the risk that the Court could hand down an uncorrectable error if it decides a case too hastily. Thus, Sotomayor argues that her Court was right to “exercise caution” by not handing down the definitive word on a constitutional question that was not fully aired in other forums.

Meanwhile, at least some of the Republican justices appear to have backed away from more hardline positions that they took in the past. That means that at least some constitutional protections against capital punishment are probably safe, for now.

Most of the Republican justices appear to have made peace with Atkins

The Court’s right flank has historically opposed Atkins altogether. The late Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, claimed in Atkins that only “severely or profoundly” disabled people — perhaps those with an IQ of 25 or lower — are protected from execution. But, under the Atkins framework, people with an IQ of 70 or below are often ineligible for the death penalty. And people who test slightly higher than 70, such as Smith himself, may also sometimes show that they are intellectually disabled by pointing to other factors besides IQ.

But only Thomas, who wrote a dissenting opinion in Hamm that was joined by no one else, called for Atkins to be overruled.

It’s particularly surprising that Justice Neil Gorsuch, who previously has expressed very hardline views in death penalty cases, appeared to chart a more moderate course in Hamm. Gorsuch seemed to suggest in Bucklew v. Precythe (2019) that his Court should toss out the entirety of its past 60 years worth of cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, and instead adopt a new rule that would allow the government to impose very high penalties for minor crimes. 

But, of the three Hamm opinions, only Thomas cited Bucklew. And Gorsuch neither joined Thomas’s opinion nor did he join some parts of Alito’s opinion, which called for harsher rules in Atkins cases. So it appears that Gorsuch’s Bucklew opinion may be an orphan.

Alito, meanwhile, wrote a bifurcated opinion, major parts of which were joined by a total of four justices — Alito, Chief Justice John Roberts, Thomas, and Gorsuch. But only Thomas joined the part of Alito’s opinion which called for the most limits on Atkins.

The parts of Alito’s opinion that were joined by four justices largely concern the unusual facts present in Hamm. 

It’s safe to say that Smith’s claim that he is intellectually disabled is marginal. While courts consider whether a capital defendant’s IQ is below 70 in order to determine if that defendant is intellectually disabled, Smith took several tests that measured his IQ somewhere in the 70s — and none of them showed that he has an IQ of 70 or below.

Under the Court’s previous death penalty cases, the fact that a death row inmate tests slightly above 70 is not fatal to his Atkins case — in part because IQ tests have a margin of error and may overestimate a test subject’s IQ. But Alito essentially argues that someone like Smith, who took multiple tests that showed him with an IQ above 70, may be executed.

In the part of his opinion joined only by Thomas, meanwhile, Alito claims that “‘higher scores are likely to be more indicative’ of a person’s intelligence than the lower scores,” a rule that would potentially doom capital defendants with a wide range of scores, some of which are below 70.

Still, it’s notable that Alito focused his opinion so closely on the minutiae of the Hamm case, without making broader attacks on Atkins or on the general rule that intellectually disabled people may not be executed. It is tough to evaluate where the full Court stands on Atkins, as three justices — Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett — were silent in Hamm. But it now appears likely that the Court’s current majority does not plan a wholesale assault on Atkins, or on the Court’s broader framework for determining which punishments are impermissible. That’s good news for inmates whose lives could be spared by Atkins and similar cases.

The Court’s Republican majority is often hostile to past precedents that were decided by more liberal justices. Indeed, at times, they appear to have been going through a checklist, overruling decisions where the Court’s right flank lost and transforming dissents by justices like Scalia or Thomas into majority opinions. But, for now, at least, it appears that Atkins is not on this Court’s checklist.

MANILA, June 3 — Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos warned today that important laws may be derailed as senators backing Vice President Sara Duterte stopped attending sessions ahead of her impeachment trial next month.

Pro-Duterte lawmakers began a Senate boycott this week after losing majority control, with one lawmaker arrested for large-scale corruption and another in hiding to avoid arrest by the International Criminal Court.

“The legislature is now in disarray,” Marcos told reporters.

“Get back to work because it’s important; we have a lot of work to do... We have to pass a lot of laws.”

Marcos said his team was looking at possible laws and amendments to aid Filipinos as the Middle East war sends shockwaves through the global economy.

“We are trying to achieve some form of stability so that people can go on with their lives and plan ahead for their future; so that people can count on the assistance of government during this time of an emergency,” the president said.

“We cannot do that if the legislature decides to stay at home and have a vacation.”

The Philippine Constitution states that the executive is co-equal to the legislature, limiting Marcos’s options.

“We cannot tell them what to do; we cannot punish them for what they are doing. They have to regulate themselves. And they haven’t been doing much of a good job right now,” Marcos said.

Last month, the 13 lawmakers allied with Duterte took control of the 24-seat Senate just hours before the majority of the House of Representatives voted to impeach the vice president.

Four days later, Duterte ally Ronald Dela Rosa fled after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him.

Another pro-Duterte senator, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, was arrested on Monday for allegedly receiving kickbacks worth more than 573 million pesos (RM36,964) over a flood control project.

The resulting 11-11 deadlock means it is difficult to pass a bill into law unless senators cross party lines.

Duterte ally and Senate President Alan Peter Cayetano justified the boycott by saying the body is being “held by the throat” and that majority members are being eliminated.

The vice president’s Senate impeachment trial is expected to begin on July 6. — AFP