Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and ASEAN each face mounting environmental crises, yet these three countries’ governments and their regional organisation consistently respond by strengthening state control as well as rescaling state power at regional level instead of addressing root causes. Drawing on comparative analysis across these three countries and ASEAN, Syed Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied argues that environmental governance in maritime Southeast Asia is designed to manage political pressure, protect business interests and marginalise communities while allowing civil society activism within constrained parameters.

In September 2023, thick haze filled Kuala Lumpur environment pushing air quality into hazardous territory and forcing school closures across several states. The cause of the haze is the all too familiar phenomenon of fires burning across Sumatra and Kalimantan which were set to clear land for palm oil and pulpwood plantations. Indonesian officials however blamed the weather while Malaysian politicians demanded action. Yet, these fires kept returning because the economic incentives that drive them remain firmly in place.

This continuous cycle of environmental as well as health crisis and public condemnation is not a failure of governance as it is meant to work the way it always has. Across maritime Southeast Asia, governments have become increasingly deft at appearing to take environmental action while preserving the development-first priorities that cause environmental harm. Even though Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia differ significantly in their political systems, ranging from Singapore’s tightly managed competitive yet gerrymandered democracy, Malaysia’s competitive electoral democracy to Indonesia’s more open but contestable democratic system, yet all three share a strikingly similar approach in using environmental policy to extend as well as rescale state authority, co-opt civil society and insulate economic elites from accountability.

The State as Manager and Regulator

In Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, the state is not a neutral referee between economic growth and environmental protection. It is a direct stakeholder in the industries causing the most environmental damage and health crisis across Southeast Asia.

Malaysian government-linked companies dominate palm oil, petroleum and mining industries that are simultaneously the country’s most environmentally destructive and most economically significant state economic enterprises. The state is both manager and regulator, creating an inherent conflict of interest that shapes environmental policy decisions. When the Malaysian government must choose between enforcing forest protection rules and preserving the revenue streams of state-linked enterprises, the latter is given priority.

Indonesia’s post-Suharto political system has formalised what might be called an oligarchy-led economy wherein governors, regents (bupati), mayors, and capitalists are embedded in networks that profit from land clearance, logging and extraction. Decentralisation, which is intended to bring governance closer to local communities, has instead created multiple entry points for business interests to secure licenses and concessions and to avoid environmental review. President Jokowi’s decision to merge the body responsible for overseeing forest carbon programmes into the mainstream Environment and Forestry Ministry eliminated its independent oversight role, one of the clearest examples of institutional restructuring that has weakened environmental accountability while appearing to streamline it.

Singapore presents a different version of the same pattern. With no significant domestic natural resources to exploit, the Singaporean government positioned itself as a regional hub for green finance and carbon trading, thereby commodifying environmental governance and generating economic value from climate concern while simultaneously hosting one of Asia’s largest petrochemical refining complexes on Jurong Island. The Singaporean government’s Green Plan 2030 is long on targets and technology solutions but falls short of any fundamental challenge to the city-state status as a global trading and consumption hub.

The Role of Civil Society

Each of these Southeast Asian states has developed sophisticated mechanisms for managing civil society engagement on environmental issues with mechanisms that create the appearance of consultation without permitting genuine influence over reforms.

The Singaporean government’s feedback portal REACH and the Singapore Environment Council (SEC) provide structured channels for public input. But these processes operate within parameters already set by the state, and they have never produced policy outcomes that challenge core development priorities. Dissenting voices are tolerated but they are rarely heard.

Malaysia’s semi-democratic system allows more civil society contestation. The 15,000-person campaign against the Lynas rare earth processing facility in Pahang, which raised concerns about radioactive waste, successfully pressured the federal government to delay licensing and commission a safety review. This is an example of civil society influence but it is also an exception. Routine enforcement failures on illegal logging, river pollution and forest encroachment proceed with minimal accountability because they involve state-linked interests.

Indonesia WALHI, the country’s largest environmental advocacy network, has documented forest destruction, filed legal challenges, and mobilised communities for decades. Yet WALHI and similar organisations were excluded from key international climate negotiations even as Indonesia positioned itself as a global leader on reforestation-based carbon credit projects . Domestic activism is tolerated as long as it does not disrupt the oligarchy patronage networks that bind political and business elites together.

At the regional level, ASEAN’s toothless regulatory approach compounds these problems. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, the primary regional instrument for addressing the fires that blanket the region each dry season, has no enforcement mechanism. Under the “ASEAN Way” of non-interference and consensus, member states cannot be compelled to act. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, which brings together hundreds of organisations from across the region, produces recommendations that are formally received but hardly enforced.

Human Rights and Indigenous Communities

Indigenous communities in Sumatra, Malaysia and Borneo bear the heaviest consequences of these environmental degradations as they have lost lands, livelihoods and legal standing as forest concessions for businesses expand. Their customary land rights remain unrecognised in most national legal frameworks, even as their territories are cited in international conservation agreements as critical biodiversity zones.

Urban poor communities in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and smaller industrial cities live alongside polluting industries, breathe the worst air, and have negligible access to the legal resources which are needed to challenge environmental violations. Furthermore, the green bonds, carbon credits and sustainability certifications generated by the same industries that displace them are traded on international markets and absorbed into corporate Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) reports.

Voluntary certification schemes such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) which is the Indonesian government national ISPO standard have been repeatedly shown to be insufficient safeguards. Independent evaluations have documented the role of RSPO-certified plantations in ongoing deforestation, labour abuses and community land conflicts. These schemes serve primarily to maintain market access for exports, not to transform practices on the ground.

The Way Forward

The environmental challenges facing Southeast Asia are real and urgent, from the loss of some of the world most biodiverse forests to accelerating coastal erosion driven by climate change. Incremental improvements in monitoring, certification and policy language are insufficient.

First of all, genuine reform would require regional enforcement mechanisms with real power which means revisiting the non-interference principles that have protected governments from accountability within ASEAN. Second, genuine reform would require civil society participation that goes beyond consultation and allows indigenous communities to veto projects that violate their rights. Third, genuine reform would require legal recognition of indigenous land rights, which would simultaneously protect biodiversity and give forest communities the standing to preserve their territories. Fourth and finally, genuine reform would require a willingness to challenge the commodification of environmental governance with the assumption that market mechanisms and green investment can solve problems rooted in political economy and power favouring state and capitalist at the expense of human and land rights and environment.  

Conclusion

The haze will return, forests will continue to shrink, and environmental commitments made in regional as well as international forums will continue to diverge from practices on the ground. Southeast Asian governments do not lack the capacity to act differently, as the Singaporean government, for instance, has demonstrated extraordinary state capacity to act when it chooses to. Inaction stems from the political and economic structures that currently prevail in the region and consistently reward environmental harm and penalise those who challenge it. Understanding these state-society political dynamics helps to explain how and why environmental governance in Southeast Asia lacks transparency and accountability, solidifies state power and entrenches business interests at the expense of civil rights.

*The views expressed in the blog are those of the author alone. They do not reflect the position of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre, nor that of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

*Banner photo by mandylin on Unsplash

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