MAY 5 — With the recent exchange of words and fire between the United States and Iran, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not improving any time soon.
The Nikkei Asia report on Asean’s shift toward alternative oil suppliers — from Brunei to Libya, even Kazakhstan, indeed, the United States too — signals a region that is adapting with urgency to a rapidly deteriorating global energy environment.
At first glance, this diversification appears reassuring. Asean is not standing still as the Strait of Hormuz becomes increasingly volatile amid the ongoing US conflict with Iran; with the Israel Lebanon conflict still not abating.
Thus the crisis surround the Strait of Hormuz, if not the Red Sea too, is spreading risk, sourcing crude from multiple regions, and reducing overdependence on any single choke point.
Yet, beneath this adaptive strategy lies a deeper and more troubling reality: Asean cannot insulate itself from the wider disruptions affecting critical industrial and agricultural inputs that also pass through the same maritime arteries.
In other words, while Asean may be cushioning the impact of oil shocks, it is far from escaping the systemic vulnerabilities embedded in the global supply chain.
The Nikkei Asia article rightly highlights the rise of alternative oil imports. Indonesia and Thailand are diversifying supply contracts.
Brunei has emerged as a stable intra-Asean partner. Libya offers an additional non-Gulf source, while the United States continues to expand its export footprint due to shale production.
Singapore, for example, has increased its oil imports from the US.
This reflects a clear doctrine — never allow energy dependence to become a single point of failure.
However, oil is only one part of the equation.
Far less discussed, but equally critical, is Asean’s dependence on the uninterrupted flow of industrial gases such as helium.
Nearly one-third of the world’s helium supply — vital for advanced medical imaging like CT scans and MRI systems, as well as semiconductor manufacturing — transits through routes linked to the Gulf region.
Helium is not a commodity that can be easily substituted. Without it, hospitals across Asean would face severe disruptions in diagnostic capabilities.
More critically, semiconductor fabrication — already strained by global supply chain fragmentation — would be further compromised.
The author argues that Asean’s diversification efforts cannot shield it from broader global supply chain vulnerabilities. — Picture by Raymond Manuel
For economies like Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, which are deeply embedded in the global electronics value chain, this represents a strategic vulnerability of the highest order.The same applies to fertilizers.
Approximately one-third of global fertilizer components, particularly urea and ammonia, are tied to production and transit routes connected to the Middle East.
Any disruption to these flows has immediate consequences for agricultural output across Asean.
Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines — both major rice producers and consumers — are especially exposed.
Rice is not merely a staple; it is a political commodity.
Price instability or shortages can trigger inflation, social unrest, and policy crises. Fertilizer shortages, in turn, reduce crop yields, tighten supply, and elevate food insecurity risks across the region.
Thus, the energy crisis is no longer confined to fuel alone. It is cascading into food systems, healthcare, and high-technology industries.
This is the essence of what may be termed a “polycrisis” — a convergence of interlocking disruptions where one shock amplifies another.
Even as Asean diversifies oil imports, it remains structurally exposed to these broader systemic shocks.
Oil can be sourced from the United States or Africa, but helium and fertilizer supply chains are far less flexible.
Moreover, these commodities are subject to the same global pricing mechanisms. Disruptions in one region inevitably raise costs worldwide, regardless of the source of supply. Asean, therefore, is not eliminating risk — it is redistributing it.
There are also geopolitical implications to consider. Increased reliance on US energy exports, while offering short-term stability, introduces new strategic dependencies. Similarly, sourcing from politically fragile states like Libya carries inherent risks.
Diversification, while necessary, is not without trade-offs.
Compounding this challenge is Asean’s rising demand profile. Rapid urbanisation, industrial growth, and a burgeoning middle class are driving energy and food consumption upward.
At the same time, domestic production capacities — whether in oil, fertilizers, or industrial gases — remain limited.
This structural imbalance ensures that Asean will remain exposed to external shocks for the foreseeable future.
Yet, it would be a mistake to view Asean’s position as entirely reactive.
There are signs of proactive adaptation. Regional cooperation mechanisms are being strengthened. Strategic reserves are under consideration. Supply chain diversification is accelerating not just in energy but across critical sectors.
More importantly, Asean is beginning to recognise the need for a dual-track approach: short-term resilience coupled with long-term transformation.
On the latter, renewable energy and technological innovation offer a pathway forward. Investments in green hydrogen, biofuels, and alternative fertilizers could gradually reduce dependence on volatile external suppliers.
Similarly, advancements in semiconductor manufacturing and recycling technologies may alleviate some pressure on helium demand over time.
However, these solutions require sustained political will, financial commitment, and regional coordination.
This brings us to the diplomatic dimension.
Asean cannot simply adapt to crises; it must also shape the conditions that generate them. As long as conflicts persist in key production and transit regions, the cycle of disruption will continue.
Malaysia, having served as Asean Chair in 2025 and now coordinating Asean-China relations, is well placed to advocate for a rules-based, multilateral order anchored in the United Nations system.
De-escalation in the Middle East, freedom of navigation, and respect for international law are not abstract principles — they are essential conditions for Asean’s economic survival.
In conclusion, Asean’s shift toward alternative oil suppliers is both necessary and commendable.
It reflects a region that is learning to navigate an increasingly uncertain world with pragmatism and foresight.
Yet, the broader reality remains sobering.
The disruption of helium supplies threatens healthcare and high-tech industries.
Fertilizer shortages endanger food security and agricultural stability. Oil diversification, while helpful, addresses only part of a much larger challenge.
Asean is cushioning the impact — but it is not spared from the shock.
To move beyond resilience toward genuine security, the region must deepen cooperation, accelerate innovation, and champion a more stable international order.
Only then can Asean hope to withstand — not just absorb — the cascading crises of the 21st century. In this context, what Asean needs is not merely a rules based order (RBO) but an immediate return to rules back international trading and diplomatic systems of international relations.
* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia.
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
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