MAY 14 — The arrival of the Lockheed Martin Typhon missile system in the Indo-Pacific is not merely another chapter in the modernization of military hardware. 

It is a strategic signal that the region has entered a far more compressed era of geopolitical competition, where deterrence, long-range strike capability, and alliance interoperability are increasingly fused into one integrated military architecture.

The Typhon system, capable of launching both the Tomahawk missile and SM-6 missile, represents a profound shift in the military balance of the Indo-Pacific. Unlike conventional defensive missile systems designed solely for interception, Typhon is dual-capable in strategic logic. 

It can conduct deep precision strikes while also strengthening layered air and missile defense. In effect, it compresses offensive reach and defensive resilience into a mobile land-based platform.

Its dispatch to the Philippines, Australia, and Japan reveals how rapidly the Indo-Pacific security landscape is evolving under the pressure of multiple simultaneous crises. 

The war in West Asia, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, continued militarization in the South China Sea, and the race for AI-enabled warfare are no longer isolated theatres. 

They are converging into one interconnected strategic ecosystem.

The Indo-Pacific is therefore witnessing the rise of what can be termed “distributed deterrence.”

Rather than relying on a handful of massive American bases concentrated in Northeast Asia, the United States and its allies are increasingly dispersing military capabilities across allied territories. 

Typhon is perfectly suited for this doctrine because it is mobile, difficult to target and capable of operating from multiple dispersed locations.

This development carries enormous implications for Asean.

For decades, Southeast Asia largely benefited from strategic ambiguity. Asean states could deepen economic engagement with China while simultaneously maintaining security ties with the United States and its allies. 

Yet the arrival of systems like Typhon suggests that ambiguity itself is shrinking.

The Philippines has already moved furthest in embracing closer security integration with Washington. 

Under increasingly intense maritime pressure in the South China Sea, Manila now views advanced deterrence systems as essential to national survival. 

The deployment of Typhon on Philippine territory therefore, symbolizes not simply alliance maintenance but alliance transformation.

Japan, meanwhile, has undergone one of the most remarkable strategic shifts since the end of the Second World War. 

Tokyo’s gradual reinterpretation of its security posture, especially after unlocking broader defense export capabilities and enhancing counterstrike doctrines, reflects the recognition that the regional environment has fundamentally changed.

When Japan modernizes, the ripple effects are inevitably felt across the Indo-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia.

Australia too has accelerated defense modernization at a pace unseen in decades. 

Yet Canberra’s strategic emphasis increasingly revolves around deeper operational coordination with regional partners through the Reciprocal Access Agreement framework with Japan and expanded interoperability with the United States. 

The RAA is steadily evolving into a practical mechanism that allows faster deployment, military exercises, logistical coordination and strategic synchronization between two of America’s closest Indo-Pacific partners.

The cumulative effect is unmistakable: the Indo-Pacific is entering an era of integrated missile deterrence.

Yet this transformation is not occurring in a vacuum. It is unfolding amidst profound uncertainty in the global order itself. 

The rules-based order that many states relied upon after 1945 is increasingly under strain. Major powers now openly compete across trade, technology, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and maritime access. 

Military modernization is thus no longer confined to tanks and fighter jets alone. It now encompasses algorithmic warfare, satellite integration, autonomous systems, and precision missile ecosystems.

Typhon sits precisely at the intersection of these changes.

The system’s ability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles introduces the prospect of conventional long-range precision strike capability from land bases deep within allied territory. 

Its compatibility with SM-6 missiles further enables anti-air, anti-ship, and even limited ballistic missile defense functions. 

A Chinese navy ship with bow number 525 monitors a Philippine navy ship, Andres Bonifacio, near the Philippine-occupied island of Thitu during a maritime patrol in the disputed South China Sea on June 6, 2025. — AFP pic

Such flexibility gives commanders substantial operational adaptability in crisis scenarios.

But with greater deterrence also comes greater risk.

China will almost certainly interpret the proliferation of systems like Typhon as part of a wider encirclement architecture. Beijing has long opposed the deployment of intermediate-range missile systems near its strategic periphery, especially after the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces framework. 

From China’s perspective, mobile launch systems distributed across allied territories complicate its military calculations and potentially reduce warning times during crises.

This dynamic risks intensifying the classic security dilemma, which Malaysia must avoid.  

One side modernizes for deterrence; the other perceives encirclement and responds with further military buildup. The cycle then reinforces itself.

Asean must therefore tread carefully.

Southeast Asia cannot afford to become merely a passive theatre for major power rivalry. Nor can it remain strategically stagnant while the military balance around it changes at extraordinary speed

Asean states will increasingly need to modernize selectively, strengthen maritime domain awareness, enhance cyber resilience, and improve interoperability in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations without necessarily sliding into rigid bloc politics.

Defense modernization in Southeast Asia must thus remain calibrated rather than reactionary.

The lesson from the Typhon deployment is not that every Asean state should pursue offensive missile capabilities. Rather, the deeper lesson is that strategic preparedness can no longer be postponed. 

The region is entering an age where technological superiority, rapid deployment capability and networked deterrence will shape geopolitical outcomes far more than sheer numerical force alone.

At the same time, Asean’s greatest strength remains diplomacy.

Military modernization without diplomatic architecture creates instability. 

This is why mechanisms such as the Asean Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus remain indispensable.

Even amid intensifying rivalry, channels for dialogue, confidence-building measures, and crisis management must continue to expand.

The Indo-Pacific does not need a new Cold War. But neither can it escape the realities of intensifying strategic competition.

The arrival of Typhon ultimately symbolizes something larger than a missile system. 

It marks the acceleration of a new geopolitical era where the boundaries between deterrence, technology, and alliance politics are becoming increasingly blurred. 

The geopolitical storm gathering across the Indo-Pacific is therefore not solely about war. 

It is about who can adapt fastest to a rapidly changing strategic environment without allowing competition to spiral into catastrophe.

In this new era, rapid defense modernization may be unavoidable. 

The true challenge, however, lies in ensuring that modernization strengthens stability rather than undermines it.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.  

MAY 8 — Since the end of Second World War, Tokyo maintained a strictly defensive doctrine and avoided being seen as a military power. But the world has since changed significantly, and security framework of Japan has been updated continuously, while defensive and rules-based posture remained unchanged.

Revision of 2022 National Security Strategy, pledged by Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, further formalise this shift by strengthening defence capacity and expanding security cooperation with partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

Among Asean countries, The Philippines is the most advanced and active partner in Japan, where cooperation has moved from diplomatic signalling to operational military integration and tangible capability transfer.

The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) is the most powerful framework as it has enabled both countries to deploy forces on the territory of each other. But more importantly, observers also see rapid shift towards higher level of defence cooperation in military assets and joint operations.

The potential transfer of Japanese defence equipment, including Abukuma-class destroyers and TC-90 maritime patrol aircraft marks a significant departure from Japan’s traditionally restrictive arms export posture, to enhance the maritime and surveillance capabilities of The Philippines in the South China Sea.

Thanks to this RAA, the recent Balikatan 2026 exercise see unprecedented level of participation from the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), with around 1400 personnel took part in the drills. JSDF able to bring in high-tech equipment and engaging in higher-end, combat-oriented training alongside Philippine and allied forces, including live-fire maritime strike scenarios using Type 88 anti-ship missiles.

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi shakes hands with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Le Minh Hung during a welcoming ceremony in Hanoi, Vietnam on May 2, 2026. — Reuters pic

The implication is clear – a shift from traditional humanitarian-focused role to one that includes credible warfighting capabilities.

The Philippines–Japan defence relationship is not just defined by shared strategic concerns, but real interoperability, equipment transfer, and joint operational planning.

After the Philippines, Singapore represents a highly structured and technologically aligned model of defence cooperation with Japan, in which the Strategic Partnership enables precision interoperability, advanced training, and defence technology exchange.

On the operational side, the Singapore Armed Forces and the JSDF are regular in naval interactions ranging from bilateral passage exercises to complex multinational drills. For example, Exercise Pacific Reach involves submarine and rescue ship from JSDF.

Vietnam, which as a close tie with China, does not have a formal defence relationship with Japan. However, the recent visit of Sanae Takaichi to Vietnam provides a quiet but expanding military collaboration. Both countries have anchored in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2023) and “2+2” foreign and defence consultations, with defence cooperation broadening into areas such as maritime security, training, military medicine, and search-and-rescue (SAR), reflecting a significant emphasis on capacity-building.

At the strategic level, Japan shall be happy with Vietnamese’s acceptance of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. No wonder Tokyo explicitly positioning Vietnam as a key regional partner in strengthening resilience and supply chain security in easing geopolitical risk.

Turning to Indonesia, the Defence Cooperation Arrangement (DCA) signed between defence ministers from both countries on 4th May, representing a different model of engagement – less operational but strategically significant in terms of defence industrial cooperation and regional positioning.

This agreement is timely as it comes shortly after Japan further relaxed its restrictions on defence equipment exports. The potential procurement of Mogami-class frigate and co-building of 4 other vessels in PT PAL shipyard in Indonesia will further boosting the defence technology capabilities of Indonesia.

Mogami class frigate is a bright star that we shall have a close look. A 5500 tonnes frigate with crew size of 90, which is exceptionally low compared to peers of similar tonnage.

Hence, Indonesia not merely as a recipient but a partner in defence industrial integration, aligning with the ambition of indonesia to develop a more self-reliant military capability.

In fact, the collaboration between Japan and Indonesia is far beyond than defence and security. Both countries sit on the Pacific Ring of Fire and facing similar disaster risks such as earthquake, tsunami and etc, but Japan is more technologically-driven and systematised preparedness model, which makes its experience especially useful for Indonesia.

Following the donation of the retired Garibaldi light aircraft carrier from Itali, Jakarta has sees it as potentially useful for aid distribution in disasters.

Japan has vast and practical experience in using its Izumo-class helicopter destroyers in this kind of role. The Japanese MOD says JS Kaga is a multi-purpose operation destroyer that the assigned missions including disaster relief, and JS Izumo also presented its disaster-response function and joint relief operations.

In other words, while the Indonesian carrier transfer is not relevant to Japan, it would be natural for Indonesia to study and train on Izumo-class helicopter destroyers.  Large-deck disaster-relief procedures are complex and requires seamless coordination during emergencies. Hence rather than developing its own procedures, which could take years, adopting the working methods and procedures from Japan will be a short-cut, but reliable path for Indonesia. By doing so, both navies can operate similar vessels in coordinated humanitarian missions.

Asean countries, in overall, have been benefited from Japan since the introduction of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which was further upgraded in Official Security Assistance (OSA) in 2023. The Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, even Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have all receiving second hand vessels to enhance maritime security.

While Asean countries are building closer and more concrete relationships with Japan, Malaysia shall do the same too.

Malaysia shall tap the opportunity on OSA for capability, particularly in maritime security where operational gaps remain a significant challenge. Hence Malaysia can target naval assets, such as retired Abukuma-class destroyer, older P‑3C maritime patrol aircraft, or coastal surveillance radars, which would significantly enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca at minimal acquisition cost.

As Japan deepening its ties with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, other Asean countries such as Laos and Cambodia, shall not be left out. An Asean divided along geopolitical lines will not be conducive to regional or Japan’s interest. Tokyo commitment to rule-based international order and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy must be matched by inclusivity beyond capacity-building, development assistance, and non-traditional security cooperation to all Asean members, regardless of their strategic alignment.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director of the Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. Jitkai Chin is a professor in the Department of Chemical Engineering at Universiti Teknologi Petronas and an expert committee member at Centre of Strategic Regional Studies.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.