THE electoral process in Gilgit-Baltistan has concluded peacefully, despite initial concerns ari­sing from the violent protests that erupted after the US and Israeli strikes on Iran.

In contrast, de­­velopments in Pakistani Kashmir are concerning, particularly as the region approaches elections scheduled for July 27. The GB case was managed with a combination of political engagement and coercive measures. Kashmir, however, has emer­g­­ed as a poorly managed case in which dialogue and political processes were eventually suspen­ded, and the state relied on coercive measures.

Though both peripheral regions are part of a similar constitutional framework, Kashmir is exceptionally sensitive, both geopolitically and strategically. Handling political disputes in such a region requires utmost vigilance, patience and care. The ongoing confrontation surrounding the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee illustrates how the failure of political management can quickly turn a constitutional issue into a broader crisis.

The central demand of the JAAC concerns the 12 seats reserved for refugees from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir who settled in mainland Pakistan after 1947. Local Kashmiris and the JAAC argue that these seats distort local democracy because the voters for these constituencies do not actually reside in Azad Kashmir.

Although none of the mainstream political parties in Pakistan or AJK support the JAAC’s stance that the 12 refugee seats be abolished, the demand has public support. During negotiations between the government and the JAAC, these seats remained the principal stumbling block. The federal government’s negotiating team included representatives from both coalition partners, the PML-N and the PPP, both of which opposed abolition.

The situation became even more complicated when the AJK Supreme Court, in its opinion on a presidential reference, validated the government’s position. The court rejected the politics of street protests and linked any legislative changes to the elected assembly, effectively ruling that the newly elected House would decide the future of these seats.

Despite insisting that the dispute be resolved through democratic means, the government effec­­­tively abandoned dialogue, and instead, ban­ned the JAAC this month, a move that escalated tensions. The JAAC’s long march continues, and dozens of casualties among protesters and law enf­­orcement personnel have already been reported.

If there is political will to find a solution, numerous options can be explored.

The JAAC leadership appears convinced that neither the government nor the establishment intends to abolish the disputed seats, and that negotiations would yield little beyond assurances and promises. Interestingly, voters associated with the 12 refugee seats, many of whom are settled in different parts of mainland Pakistan, have not demonstrated strong opposition to the proposal to abolish these seats. This has further emboldened the JAAC, as has support from the Kashmiri diaspora, segments of which are politically aligned with the PTI.

Renewed protests in AJK have once again energised the Kashmiri diaspora, a development that has caused consternation in officialdom. There is also a perception within the government that India is attempting to exploit the unrest and internationalise the issue.

A question worth asking is whether an alternative arrangement can satisfactorily address the dispute. Suppose the government abolished the refugee seats while allowing Kashmiris residing in Pakistan to register as voters in the AJK constituencies or districts from which they or their ancestors originally migrated. Would such a me­­chanism help resolve the issue?

This may appear to be a simplistic proposition, but the broader point remains: if there is political will to find a solution, numerous options can be explored. A mindset that treats coercion as the only available instrument of governance inevitably complicates political disputes rather than resolving them.

There is also a perception within power circles that since the government managed to suppress dissent associated with movements such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and Haq Do Tehreek (HDT), it can similarly control the situation in Kashmir. This assumption deserves serious reconsideration.

Bans, arrests and terrorism-related charges may temporarily suppress mobilisation, but they rarely eliminate underlying grievances. The resentment remains alive beneath the surface. It persists in Balochistan and the tribal districts of KP and is likely to persist in AJK as well, even if the JAAC is eventually crushed.

But would such an outcome truly constitute a success for the state? If similar movements continue to re-emerge, the state will remain under constant pressure, compelled to invest ever greater resources in strengthening security infrastructure.

Yet increased securitisation often produces greater insecurity for both state and society and increases the gap between them, thus generating feelings of alienation among citizens who begin to see themselves not as rights-bearing members of a political community but merely as subjects of state authority. In many ways, the JAAC, BYC, PTM and HDT reflect manifestations of this broader alienation, even though their agendas differ significantly.

The PTM and BYC primarily articulate demands related to fundamental human rights, whereas the JAAC, HDT and even the action committees that have periodically emerged in GB focus largely on economic and constitutional rights. Yet beneath these diverse demands lies a common grievance: the perception that a powerful elite seeks to govern peripheral regions without adequately addressing their political aspirations and sense of citizenship.

State institutions often aggravate public grievances through poorly crafted counter-narrative strategies. Instead of using social and mainstream media to facilitate constructive and inclusive debate, segments of these platforms are mobilised to delegitimise dissenting communities. Such approaches deepen mistrust rather than build national cohesion.

The AJK protests provide a recent example. A segment of social media discourse began stigmatising Kashmiris, portraying them as ‘parasites’ and as an ungrateful population that had disproportionately benefited from the state. This approach will not resolve matters.

The contrast between GB and Kashmir offers an important lesson. Peripheral regions do not seek perpetual confrontation; they seek recognition, participation, and dignity within the political order. Ignoring these aspirations may produce temporary calm, but it rarely delivers lasting stability.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 14th, 2026

LAST week, Russian President Vladimir Putin talked on several geopolitical issues in St Petersburg, which also define Moscow’s approach to China, India and Pakistan.

The most interesting statement he made was that he does not believe Pakistan was under the control of China; he said that Pakistan is a large country that has multifaceted ties with different states. Perhaps he was trying to justify Moscow’s recent defence-related talks, which the Taliban regime’s defence minister, Mullah Yaqoob, used as a counter-response to the Pakistani air strikes inside Afghanistan.

Putin’s message between the lines was that, as Pakistan has multifaceted ties with China, the US, and even Russia, Moscow takes the same approach in engaging with nations. After all, Russia is the only country in the world that has recognised the Taliban regime.

There is little doubt that Pakistan has found its geopolitical strength through cultivating a multi-vector approach and hardly portrays itself as a passive client in its relations with the US or any other power. But every policy has two sides, and nothing comes without a cost. Maintaining a strategic equilibrium requires winning and maintaining trust at a certain level with divergent partners.

For instance, Pakistan-China relations, which Putin mentioned, have entered a new domain. Formally, this became evident on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of bilateral relations between the two countries, when Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership visited Beijing and signed several MoUs.

This speaks volumes: Sino-Pak relations have entered a critical new strategic phase, with these ties deepening. China is increasingly seeking to keep Pakistan firmly within its sphere of influence, shifting away from purely economic projects like CPEC towards enhanced defence and security cooperation. CPEC, which was once central to their bilateral relations, has become a lower priority, even in the context of counterterrorism cooperation.

Ultimately, while China reaffirmed its commitment to provide a robust security shield, Pakistan remains responsible for its own internal economic stability and administrative reforms. While China offers significant guarantees of Pakistan’s national sovereignty, this transition creates a complex dilemma for Pakistan as it attempts to balance its ties with Western powers such as the US.

Unlike Russia, China is playing more smartly to project itself as a major global power and to engage nations of the Global South through several initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative and Global Governance Initiative.

While engaging nations in such initiatives, it develops bilateral frameworks of cooperation that bind countries into its broader political partnership. There should be no harm in this, but through such initiatives, China is challenging the existing Western political and security order without provoking direct confrontation. Pakistan has recently signed all the MoUs under these initiatives, which Beijing depicts as Pakistan agreeing to remain within its sphere of influence. This is the tricky part. A nation that maintains multifaceted relationships hardly follows such ideologically driven political initiatives.

Putin finds Pakistan another window through which to engage and send messages to Washington.

Russia also maintains multifaceted ties and is seeking to maintain equilibrium with China, India and Pakistan. However, what is common to China and Russia is the challenge posed by the US. As long as the US remains engaged in West Asia, both China and Russia benefit, as this increases their economic and political strength, while weakening US interests. Most importantly, President Donald Trump’s attention may not turn to Afghanistan, especially the Bagram base, which he has his eyes on. In this context, Pakistan is perceived as a US partner, but Beijing has its apprehensions.

If Russia-Taliban cooperation deepens, the US might need to rethink Afghanistan’s status, including sanctions on Taliban assets and its counterterrorism strategy. However, one view is that Washington now has limited leverage, and that maintaining good ties with Pakistan remains its main avenue for influencing Afghan affairs.

If not Cuba, or even after Cuba, Trump would certainly create an uproar around the Bagram base, and Russia is talking about a defence deal with the Taliban, even if initially it is related only to repairing old equipment under the May 27, 2026, agreement on “military-technical cooperation” signed between Russia and the Taliban.

However, any defence deal with the Taliban will be viewed suspiciously, as a stronger Taliban could mean more terrorism in Pakistan. Though Russia is also concerned about terrorist networks in Afghanistan, it may prefer the broader strategic advantage.

Paradoxically, Pakistan has gradually become important to Moscow for another reason — its proactive role in the ongoing mediation between Iran and the US. Putin finds Pakistan another window through which to engage and send messages to Washington.

Russia has improved ties with Pakistan without endangering its core relationship with India. Yet, in recent years, Russia has cautiously courted Pakistan. Pakistan views Russia from a longer geopolitical perspective and knows that until Russia’s strategic and defence partnership with India weakens sufficiently, or India’s defence and strategic alliance with the US increases to a level that forces Moscow to review its India policy, Pakistan can afford to wait and see how this equilibrium is maintained.

The perception is accurate that Pakistan is not fully under China’s control, and Beijing also wants to keep Pakistan within its sphere of influence. However, their strategic partnership will outlast economic collaborations, during which both sides will continue to pursue divergent policies.

Pakistan will remain relevant to the US and Europe while maintaining close ties with West Asia, and China will continue to view these relations with suspicion. But, in the end, their strategic and geopolitical partnership will remain constant. Russia does not enjoy such privilege in India’s case.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 7th, 2026