The United States hosted its first World Cup in 1994.

Soccer has changed dramatically in many ways since then – on and off the pitch.

As the US (with Mexico and Canada) gets set to host the mega-event once again, more than anything, the tournament’s defining change since 1994 is its sheer scale-up.

The scale-up

This scale-up can be clearly quantified. The 1994 tournament featured 52 matches across 32 days with 24 teams. By contrast, the 2026 event (the first three-nation World Cup) will involve 78 matches in the US alone, over 39 days.

The competition’s 48 teams are divided into 12 groups, with progression to the knockout stage awarded to the top two teams in each group along with the eight best third-placed teams.

In terms of games, the tournament has doubled in size since 1994.

The scale-up is not accidental. It has been driven by the twin forces of globalisation and commodification, alongside a deliberate strategy by FIFA president Gianni Infantino to both protect and extend football’s commercial dominance.

Central to this has been expanding the tournament into non-traditional markets, most notably the US – the world’s largest sports economy – thereby generating substantial financial returns and commercial interest.

Infantino and FIFA have faced sustained criticism in global media – ranging from controversial symbolic gestures involving Donald Trump to concerns over ticket pricing. But the broader outcome is clear: the World Cup has become more expansive and commercially powerful than ever.

Read more: Why Trump and FIFA are perfect bedfellows as the World Cup heads to the US

At the same time, FIFA has deepened its claim to global reach by incorporating smaller nations such as Cape Verde and Curaçao, whose combined populations are well under one million.

The scale-up rests on two core dynamics. First, more matches mean more broadcast content, and media rights remain FIFA’s largest revenue stream. Expanding to 104 matches significantly increases the value of rights deals, particularly across participating nations.

Second, expansion broadens FIFA’s political base. By granting more countries access, it strengthens the influence of nations previously on the margins of global soccer.

Within FIFA’s voting structure, each member association carries equal weight: the vote of powerhouse Brazil counts the same as that of Curaçao, a recent entrant with a population around 150,000.

At the same time, a larger tournament increases the likelihood that major population centres and emerging consumer markets (such as China, India, and Southeast Asia) will participate, further expanding the World Cup’s commercial reach.

The unresolved question for FIFA is one of limits: how far can expansion go before it dilutes the exclusivity and premium value of the World Cup?

The World Game in the US

Soccer in the US has grown markedly since the 1994 event. In many ways, this growth reflects the original intent behind awarding the 1994 World Cup to the States.

The 1994 tournament was still the best-attended in history, largely due to the use of National Football League (NFL) venues. It was granted on the condition that a viable professional league be reestablished following the collapse of the North American Soccer League in 1984.

Major League Soccer (MLS), launched in 1996, is now firmly established within the US sporting landscape.

The pathway has also strengthened, with college athletes feeding into MLS and increasingly major European leagues, alongside the expansion of secondary professional and semi-professional tiers.

Growth has been especially strong in the women’s game thanks to significant new investment.

The US men’s team, currently ranked 16th in the world, could plausibly make a deep run in 2026.

As in 1994, matches this year will largely be staged in football stadiums to maximise capacity.

Rule changes and technology

FIFA’s rule changes are largely designed to keep the ball in play and increase the tempo of matches. Measures addressing time-wasting – from stricter control of throw-ins and goal kicks to tighter management of added time – reflect this objective.

The 1994 World Cup introduced major reforms, including a ban on back-passes to goalkeepers and awarding three points for a win to encourage attacking play.

Looking to the 2026 event, technological oversight will expand, with Video Assistant Referee (VAR) technology applied more broadly to decisions such as second yellow cards and corner calls.

Player welfare has also become more prominent: after the extreme heat issues of 1994, mandated drinks breaks will be introduced – one in each half around the 22-minute mark.

Substitution rules have also evolved significantly, increasing from two in 1994 to five regular substitutions, along with an additional allowance for concussion replacements.

Same game, different scale

Since its codification and even in early filmed matches more than a century ago, soccer’s simplicity has been the foundation of its global dominance.

The sport’s continuity bridges generations. The leading players of the 1994 World Cup, such as Italy’s Roberto Baggio and Brazil’s Romário, could plausibly compete in the modern game, even if today’s players are generally more physically developed.

Ultimately, despite the scale, global reach and commercialisation of tournaments like the World Cup, soccer’s enduring success lies in its consistency.

The game played on the world’s biggest stage remains fundamentally the same as that played in parks, schools and local grounds; simple, universal and instantly recognisable.

Steve Georgakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

When Football Australia (FA) announced the Socceroos’ squad for the FIFA World Cup, there was plenty of interest on the mix of experienced and new players.

Tony Popovic’s squad features 17 players selected for a World Cup for the first time. At the other end of the scale, Mat Ryan and Mathew Leckie were chosen for a fourth World Cup, matching the national record held by Tim Cahill and Mark Milligan.

But looking at the squad more broadly, what does its makeup tell us about Australia’s junior talent pathways and development?

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Some states and territories shine – others don’t

The junior clubs of the 2026 Socceroos reveal several notable patterns.

New South Wales (seven) and Victoria (six) produced 13 of the 25 players selected. This dominance is unsurprising given the population size of the states and their extensive network of junior clubs and elite development pathways.

The state performing above expectations is South Australia (five players). Western Australia also performed strongly with three, while the ACT was a notable contributor with two.

But the Northern Territory and Tasmania were unrepresented – unsurprisingly, given their smaller populations and limited development pathways. This is made even harder by the absence of A-League representation in the Northern Territory and Tasmania.

Cities versus non-metropolitan areas

Unlike codes such as Australian rules football – where governing bodies and talent systems have been more effective in identifying and developing regional and remote athletes – soccer in Australia has not consistently harnessed talent outside major cities.

Almost all of the 2026 Socceroos played their junior soccer in major metropolitan centres. The only club that can be clearly classified as regional is South Cardiff, located in the Newcastle-Lake Macquarie region of NSW.

This showcases the longstanding dominance of Australia’s major cities in elite soccer development. The well-known “Wagga Effect” (in which a disproportionately high number of elite athletes come from regional cities) may occur in sports such as rugby league and Australian rules football, but not soccer.

This is because in these rural areas, soccer was never the dominant football code, which affected participation and development.

What else can we learn from the squad?

Something else that became apparent in analysing the squad was the dominance of Western Sydney, which produced five Socceroos: Paul Okon Engstler, Cristian Volpato, Mat Ryan, Milos Degenek and Patrick Beach.

From the first official soccer match in Australia until now, Western Sydney has been a central cog in producing Socceroos.

The area has long been a centre of junior player development, particularly through migrant-supported clubs such as Sydney United 58 (formerly Sydney Croatia) and Marconi Stallions, both of which continue to exert a strong influence.

Eastern Sydney, with its large associations and conglomeration of academies and elite pathways, such as the Sydney FC academy, has no representation.

The path from junior soccer to Socceroo

The players’ junior clubs are in most cases simply the locations where they started playing soccer – at younger ages, there is generally no formal talent identification process.

Then, around the age of 12 and 13, players with significant potential often transition to the academies of A-League clubs or the junior programs of National Premier League (NPL) teams (the level underneath the A-League).

It is typically those who display exceptional ability and commitment who progress into these development pathways. It is important to note, however, that many highly regarded junior players eventually leave the system due burnout, injury or the relative age effect – a phenomenon where being born early in the year holds a distinct advantage in junior sport.

Once they are identified as talented – or when parents, coaches, or others believe they are ready for the next level – they often move to NPL clubs, which generally charge much higher participation fees. This has attracted criticism, with some arguing costs can be prohibitive and create barriers for talented players from less affluent backgrounds.

Conversely, some players of more modest ability remain in the pathway because coaches identify long-term potential, or through the persistence and support of their families.

As a result, most of the players in the squad do not spend a significant period at their original junior club.

Every journey is different. One example is Ajdin Hrustic, who began at Victoria’s Heatherton United at the age of five and, by age 12, had joined the South Melbourne SC academy (which at the time was overseen by Ange Postecoglou). Demonstrating significant potential, he moved to England at 15 and established a professional career.

Similarly, Nestory Irankunda began at Adelaide Croatia before moving to Adelaide United, where he made his A-League debut at 15. Okon Engstler commenced at Marconi Stallions before progressing to the Western Sydney Wanderers academy.

There are, however, some exceptions. Mat Ryan, for example, began at Blacktown City and remained there until making his first-grade debut, before subsequently moving to the Central Coast Mariners.

Read more: World Cup 2026 quiz

A system that punches above its weight

Australia’s junior soccer system is a marvel. The sport’s huge participation numbers are sustained by a vast network of community clubs, associations and volunteers.

What makes it extraordinary is it evolved organically and continues to flourish without the same financial backing and institutional support afforded to the AFL and NRL through their television broadcast deals.

If more can be done to identify and nourish talent outside metropolitan areas, the Australian national teams should only improve.

Steve Georgakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.