The Pakistan Stock Exchange’s benchmark index on Monday rose 4,000 points during intraday trade.

The KSE-100 index gained 4,170 points to reach 167,164.26 points from the previous close of 162,994.17 points at 11:29pm.

According to Mettis Global, the sharp rally came as investors reacted positively to developments surrounding rising tensions between Iran and the United States, alongside efforts to stabilise the situation in key global energy routes.

Global oil prices eased on Monday after US President Donald Trump said the country would begin an effort to free up ships stranded in the Strait of Hormuz, although the lack of a US–Iran peace deal kept prices supported above $100.

Monday’s rally comes after the stock market ended its fourth consecutive session on a jittery note. The fall reflected investor nervousness over geopolitical tensions and surging oil prices, clouding the economic outlook.

Analysts have warned that Pakistan’s inflation is likely to remain in double digits if the surge in oil prices persists amid the unresolved Middle East conflict, adding that rising costs and disrupted imports are already straining the country’s external position.

Vote counting in key Indian state elections was underway on Monday under tight security, with the focus on West Bengal, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party is hoping for crucial gains.

Elections in five states and territories took place in April and May, and Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party in the national parliament, is hoping to make inroads into opposition-held states.

In West Bengal, the Hindu-nationalist BJP waged an aggressive bid to dislodge Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, the firebrand leader of the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), in power in the state of 100 million people since 2011.

Exit polls last week predicted the BJP has a slight edge over TMC, although exit polls have a patchy record in India.

“The entire country has its eyes on this state’s election results,” political analyst Biswanath Chakraborty told AFP, in the main city Kolkata.

“The contest can tilt the balance of power.”

The campaign this time was marked by protests over the removal of millions of names from voter rolls, billed as removing ineligible voters, but which critics said was skewed against marginalised and minority communities.

Banerjee, speaking ahead of the count, insisted her TMC would win.

“The BJP is not coming, take my word for it,” she said. “Be patient till the last.”

But West Bengal’s BJP chief Samik Bhattacharya told AFP he was confident of a win.

“It was an election of rejection,” he said. “People of the state want change. The ruling Trinamool Congress will be defeated.”

Past elections have resulted in violence in the state.

In the southern state of Tamil Nadu, a key industrial hub with more than 80 million people, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) under Chief Minister MK Stalin is widely expected to be re-elected.

Votes are also being counted in Assam, an eastern state of more than 31 million, which the BJP is widely expected to maintain control of, and the small coastal territory of Puducherry, where the BJP is part of a ruling coalition.

In Kerala, the tightly contested race in the southern state of approximately 36 million, exit polls suggest the Congress party-led alliance is tipped to oust the Communist party.

Wins in the state elections would put Modi on a stronger footing while battling a series of economic and foreign policy challenges, including high unemployment rate and a pending US trade deal.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, with the regional situation and Pakistan’s ongoing diplomatic efforts coming under discussion, the Foreign Office (FO) said on Monday.

“Discussion focused on the regional situation and Pakistan’s ongoing diplomatic efforts for peace and stability in the region,” the FO said, adding that the call took place late Sunday night.

It added that the Iranian foreign minister appreciated Pakistan for its “constructive role and sincere mediation efforts between the parties”.

The FO said that Dar reaffirmed Pakistan’s continued commitment to promoting constructive engagement and underscored that “dialogue and diplomacy remain the only viable path toward the peaceful resolution of issues and achieving lasting peace and stability in the region and beyond”.

The development comes after Tehran said on Sunday that the United States had responded to its new peace proposal. Iranian state media said Washington had conveyed its response to Iran’s 14-point proposal via Pakistan, and that Tehran was now reviewing it.

Subsequently, US President Donald Trump said that his representatives were having “very positive discussions” with Iran that could “lead to something very positive for all”.

Negotiations between the US and Iran had been deadlocked since a ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, came into effect on April 8, with only one round of direct peace talks held in Islamabad so far.

US news website Axios reported, citing two sources briefed on the proposal, that it set “a one-month deadline for negotiations on a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, end the US naval blockade and permanently end the war in Iran and in Lebanon”.

Separately, Al Jazeera reported, citing sources, that the proposal envisaged three main stages, aiming to “transform the ceasefire into an end to the war within 30 days”.

According to the report, the proposal “envisions a pledge of nonaggression, including from Israel, to ensure there’s no return to war and an end to fighting throughout the Middle East”.

It said the proposal suggested the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in the first phase, as well as lifting the US blockade of Iranian ports.

Under the proposed plan, Tehran would take charge of dealing with sea mines, the report said.

It added that the second phase was proposed to include “Iran’s return to uranium enrichment after the time limit at 3.6 per cent in accordance with the ‘zero-storage principle’“.

Moreover, the plan includes the US and Israel refraining from attacking Iran and its allies in exchange for Iran refraining from launching strikes, the report said, adding that Iran had also rejected “dismantling nuclear infrastructure or destroying Iran’s facilities”.

“Lifting sanctions includes the gradual release of frozen funds,” it said.

In the third phase, Tehran proposed to enter “into a strategic dialogue with Arab neighbours and building a security system that includes the entire Middle East”, the report stated.

• Establishment Division transfers ‘encadred’ officers, many of whom are close to retirement, to KP and Balochistan
• Under rotation policy, these postings were supposed to go to younger officers
• IGP says matter will be taken up with Islamabad
• Estab secretary claims rotation policy ‘suspended’ at provinces’ request

LAHORE: The Establish­ment Division has transferred 10 police officers from Punjab to ‘hard areas’ in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan for a mandatory period of one year, despite concerns about their advanced age and health, Dawn has learnt.

The term ‘hard areas’ refers to designated regions in the country that are recognised for being challenging to live or work in due to factors like rem­oteness, lack of infrastructure, harsh terrain, or security thr­eats. Officers posted to these areas are usually given incentives, such as a special allowance.

A senior police officer told Dawn that in line with the policy announced by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, younger officers were previously posted to the hard areas in KP and Balochistan for a mandatory one year, in order to better prepare them for the rigours of public service.

According to documents regarding officers’ nominations for transfer and the 2020 rotation policy, officers from the 48th common batch were transferred to these two provinces in light of the PM’s order, the officer said.

In line with this policy, this time around, it was expected that officers from the 49th common would be called up to fill the ASP posts, following the completion of the one-year mandatory period.

However, the officers now nominated for these postings include those who were encadered from the provincial service to the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) in 2020 and 2021, and have three to five years of service left.

Separate notifications issued by the Establishment Division stated that BS-18 officers nominated for the postings in Balochistan include Imran Razaq, Tahir Mustafa, Imtiaz Ahmad Khan, Naeem Shahid, and Javed Ahmad Khan, whereas Arshad Zahid, Khalid Mehmood Afzal, Irfan Amir, Jalil Imran Khan, and Taimoor Khan are being considered for the KP postings.

The transfer list shared by the Establishment Division with Punjab also contains the names of four officers, currently enrolled in the pre-promotion ‘Mid-Career Training Course’, which will be completed on June 5. These include Javed Ahmad Khan, Rana Arshad Zahid, Imtiaz Ahmad Khan, and Khalid Mehmood Afzal.

Departmental unease

“Mr Arshad Zahid, a BS-18 officer of Police Service of Pakistan, presently posted under the government of the Punjab, is transferred and his services are placed at the disposal of government of Khyber Pakht­unkhwa, with immediate effect,” reads one of the notifications issued by the Establishment Division.

The notification says that the officers in question will be relieved by the Punjab government immediately, so they may join the KP government.

“The officer will serve in the province for an active period of 365 days excluding all types of leaves, training and deputation etc and upon completion of 365 days’ active service in government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and will stand relieved for joining government of the Punjab,” the notification says.

When contacted, Punjab police chief Rao Abdul Kareem confirmed that his department had received the names of police officers, who were recently encadred to the federal service (PSP) and nominated for the hard areas of KP and Balochistan, from the Establishment Division. He said the matter was discussed at his office, where the officers in question raised serious concerns about their transfer.

“My department is taking up the matter with the Establishment Division in light of the rotation policy and the serious concerns expressed by the police officers nominated for posting to the hard areas,” the IGP said.

‘Seasoned’ officers unwilling

An officer, whose name is in the transfer list under the rotation policy, claimed these transfers were made under the 2020 rotation policy, which clearly stated that it would apply to those officers who would join the service through CSS after 2020.

Seeking anonymity, he said that Section 11 of the rotation policy 2020 stated, “Policy provisions regarding posting of the officers, this section of the policy, shall apply to batches who are inducted in PAS/PSP through CSS examination held in the year 2020 and onwards”.

According to the officer, the decision, particularly, puts those officers who have joined the promotion course in a bind; as both orders, regarding the promotion course and postings to hard areas, have come from the Establishment Division.

The officer said the transfer order created a “tricky situation” for the recently encadered ‘seasoned officers’, as it ignored the fact that a majority of them were near retirement, with only a few years of service left.

He further claimed many police officers nominated for Balochistan and KP faced various medical issues, which rendered them “almost unable” to take up assignments in the restive provinces. The order was also in contrast to the PM’s announcement in 2024, which said young officers (from 49th common) would be deputed, he added.

Rotation policy ‘suspended’

However, Establishment Division Secretary Nabeel Awan told Dawn the transfer of officers ‘encadered’ from provincial services to the PSPs had nothing to do with the rotation policy, since it has been suspended.

“Presently, this policy stands suspended at the request of the provinces,” he said, adding that the transfer of officers to the hard areas of Balochistan and KP followed the policy decision recently announced by the federal government.

He said that after induction from provincial service to the PSPs, the officers would be called ‘federal employees’ and may be transferred to any province as per the policy decision.

Mr Awan rejected the allegations of ‘pick and choose’ and described the transfers as a ‘stopgap arrangement’ for a period of one year. He said the officers would have to follow the orders in letter and spirit as employees of the federal government.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

An Iranian ship that was seized by the United States after it “failed to comply” with the blockade imposed by the country on Iranian ports has been transferred to Pakistan for repatriation, American outlet ABC News reported on Monday.

“US forces completed the transfer of 22 crew members of M/V Touska to Pakistan for repatriation,“ the report quoted US Central Command Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins as saying.

“Six other passengers were already transferred to a regional country for repatriation last week,” he said.

According to the report, Iranian state media identified the six as family members of some of the crew.

“Custody of Touska is currently being transferred back to its original ownership after the ship was intercepted and seized when attempting to violate the US naval blockade against Iran last month,” Hawkins said.

The ship was boarded and seized by US forces on April 19. The small container ship, which was part of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) group that has been hit with US sanctions, was boarded off the coast of Iran’s Chabahar port in the Gulf of Oman.

At the time, the US Central Command said the ship’s crew “failed to comply with repeated warnings over a six-hour period”.

“American forces issued multiple warnings and informed the Iranian-flagged vessel it was in violation of the US blockade,” it said.

Iran’s foreign ministry had condemned the incident as “unlawful and a violation” of international law and demanded the immediate release of the vessel, its sailors and their families. Iran’s military had said the ship had been travelling from China and accused ​the US of “armed piracy”.

Hormuz, a key shipping lane off the coast of Iran, has been virtually blocked by Tehran since the United States and Israel started bombing Iran on February 28.

Some vessels attempting to transit the Strait have reported being fired on, and Iran seized several other ships. Last month, the US imposed its own blockade of ships from Iranian ports.

US President Donald Trump said on Sunday that the country would start helping free ships stranded in the Gulf.

Trump provided few details about the plan, dubbed “Operation Freedom”, which he said would start on Monday to aid ships and their crews that have been “locked up” in the vital waterway and are running low on food and other supplies.

“We have told these Countries that we will guide their Ships safely out of these restricted Waterways, so that they can freely and ably get on with their business,” Trump said in a post on his Truth Social site.

Hundreds of ships and as many as 20,000 seafarers have been unable to transit the strait during the conflict, according to the International Maritime Organisation.

US Central Command said it would support the effort with 15,000 US military personnel, more than 100 land and sea-based aircraft along with warships and drones. The operation aims to “restore freedom of navigation for commercial shipping” through the strait, it said in a statement.

In response to Trump’s announcement, a senior Iranian official warned on Monday that Tehran would consider any US attempt to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz a breach of the ongoing ceasefire.

“Any American interference in the new maritime regime of the Strait of Hormuz will be considered a violation of the ceasefire,” Ebrahim Azizi, head of the national security commission in Iran’s parliament, posted on X.

PAKISTAN is beginning to confront a question it can no longer defer: how to AI-proof its future. Artificial intelligence is no longer a distant ambition. It is an immediate necessity. In recent months, Pakistan has announced a nationwide AI training programme, committed $1 billion in investment by 2030, and outlined plans to train a large segment of its workforce in AI-related skills.

These commitments, reflected in the Islamabad AI Declaration unveiled during Indus AI Week 2026, signal that Pakistan is no longer merely observing the AI transition from the sidelines. Delay now carries consequences the country can no longer afford.

That recognition, however, is only the starting point. Pakistan’s response remains primarily at the level of intent. AI, on the other hand, rewards preparation, speed and continuity. Intent has rarely been Pakistan’s problem. It has been execution. Announcements create momentum, but only sustained implementation creates outcomes.

Pakistan does not suffer from a shortage of ambition. It suffers from a shortage of follow-through. And it is precisely at that point, between announcement and execution, that momentum in Pakistan has historically thinned out.

Pakistan has approximately 60 per cent of its population under 30, but this is not an advantage unless its youth are equipped and trained. Millions remain outside the education system, and many within it lack usable skills while at the same time, entry-level jobs are being automated or redefined.

The global conversation surrounding AI has already shifted. Unesco insists on embedding AI literacy across education systems. The ILO warns about large-scale reskilling. UNDP emphasises a widening capability gap. Taken together, these are not isolated concerns but signals of a shared direction. Without sustained intervention, inequ­a­lity is likely to deepen. This is not just a technological transition. It is a reordering of skills and opportunity, and its effects will not be evenly distributed.

Pakistan needs to ensure that AI is integrated into the national ecosystem.

To its credit, Pakistan is no longer absent from this conversation. Its National Artificial Intelligence Policy Framework approved by the federal cabinet in July 2025 signals initiative. However, a closer look reveals structural weaknesses. One assessment described the policy as ambitious but lacking legal teeth and overly reliant on optimism. In effect, Pakistan’s framework gestures in the right direction but stops short of creating binding obligations.

Another gap emerges in Pakistan’s legal and regulatory landscape. The Prevention of Ele­c­t­r­onic Crimes Act provides a baseline for cyber offences, while the proposed Personal Data Prot­ection Bill remains pending. The State Bank of Pakistan’s digital banking regulations cover some automated processes such as fraud detection and onboarding, but the underlying legal foundation dates back to 2007, well before generative AI. This leaves unanswered questions around liability and accountability. These are not peripheral. They sit at the core of how AI systems will operate.

Then there is the question of what to do with the bodies already created to manage AI such as the National Centre of Artificial Intelligence, set up in 2018, which functions as a hub for research, training, and knowledge transfer.

However, as a non-regulatory institutional initiative, it does not possess enforcement powers. More recently, institutional mechanisms introduced under the National Artificial Intelligence Policy 2025, including proposed coordination and oversight structures, have begun to emerge, but their regulatory authority and practical impact remain limited and are still evolving.

Questions of liability further complicate matters. Pakistan’s legal system rests on actus reus (guilty act) and mens rea (guilty mind). Autonomous systems disrupt both. When an AI system produces harm, the act is identifiable, but the mind behind it is not. The question then becomes who bears liability. The developer, the deployer, or the institution relying on the system? Pakistan’s laws offer no coherent answer. Without clear standards, business innovation slows and responsibility diffuses.

Education — and by extension AI education — is now a provincial subject after the 18th Amendment to the Constitution. Provincial governments control curricula and training, while the federal role is largely coordination. This makes alignment essential, yet current efforts remain fragmented. What is missing is a mechanism that requires coordination rather than merely encouraging it. Without it, even well-designed initiatives risk working at cross purposes.

In addition to resolving legal and regulatory gaps, Pakistan needs to ensure that AI is integrated into the national ecosystem.

Skills training must lead to demonstrable ability, not just certification. Final-year students should complete industry projects, and a portion of course credits should come from laboratory work. The government should also publish an annual skills gap analysis mapping curricula to employer needs.

The private sector must also be integrated within the state’s efforts. Companies cannot remain passive consumers of trained talent. The state should offer tax credits for certified apprenticeships, create a national internship platform, and require firms bidding for public contracts to demonstrate AI training pipelines. Without this linkage, training and employment will remain disconnected.

Access must also be addressed. Without deliberate effort, AI’s benefits will remain concentrated in major cities. Equipment grants should prioritise rural institutions, and training programmes should reserve seats for underserved districts. If access follows existing infrastructure, the divide will only widen.

Execution is not about a single reform and ultimately depends on alignment across education, industry, infrastructure, and law. If one lags, the rest will not hold. The challenge is systemic. It demands coordination, discipline, and sustained political will, not isolated bursts of effort or short-lived initiatives.

AI will not wait for Pakistan’s readiness, nor will it adjust to its pace. It will move forward regardless, redistributing advantage in real time. The question is whether Pakistan moves with it, deliberately and with conviction, or watches from the sidelines. That choice is no longer theoretical, and it is no longer comfortably distant. It is already unfolding. And the consequences of getting it wrong will not be gradual. They will be decisive, felt across generations, and exceedingly difficult to reverse.

The writer is an international law practitioner and a graduate of Harvard Law School.

veritas@post.harvard.edu

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

IT is becoming increasingly uncertain how long the Iran war, now in its third month, will last. Until recently, it seemed American and Iranian interests aligned in wanting to avoid a protracted conflict, although Israel’s didn’t. That impression gained strength when they held their first, and so far only, face-to-face talks in Islamabad last month.

After that the peace process faltered and a second round of negotiations proved elusive, despite intense efforts by Pakistan, supported by key regional states. Pakistan’s active mediation subsequently involved exchanging messages and negotiating proposals between Tehran and Washington. That process continues.

The ceasefire has held, which is positive. But it is a precarious truce in a volatile environment. The hardening public postures of both sides have impeded the search for an off-ramp from the crisis. President Donald Trump has oscillated between threatening to restart military operations and signalling openness to talks.

This has made it difficult to ascertain what he really wants. It is one thing to use threats to mount pressure, but quite another when actions such as aggressive US enforcement of the blockade heighten the risk of renewed military confrontation. It also doesn’t help when he makes disingenuous claims such as Iran telling him it is in a “state of collapse”. Trump turned down the Iranian offer of a three-step plan to end the war as it sets aside the nuclear issue at the start to be addressed later. He has also rejected Tehran’s revised proposal.

Meanwhile, Iran has used its leverage of control of the Strait of Hormuz to raise the costs of the war for the US, its Gulf allies and for the global economy. It has demonstrated it can wage an effective asymmetric war and absorb a high degree of pain from US-Israeli military strikes.

Both the US and Iran are reluctant to demonstrate flexibility lest the other side construes that as weakness and a ‘win’ for itself. This is a recipe for the diplomatic impasse to persist and presents an obstacle for a swift way out of the conflict. If both sides perceive they have more to lose in showing accommodation than by continuing with the present fraught situation this diminishes chances of an early end to the war.

Both sides should have a common interest in averting a protracted conflict but the impasse persists.

Washington and Tehran have given different time frames for ending the war. President Trump has often declared it would end in a few weeks, even days. But more recently, he ruled out an “early” end, saying four weeks of war is nothing compared to the long conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq. Iranian leaders have said they are prepared to end the conflict but want guarantees against future aggression. So, while both say they want the war to end, they have set terms the other side have so far found unacceptable.

It is hard to say which of the two has an incentive to prolong the war. Some analysts have argued that Iran does. Writing in the Financial Times, Edward Luce suggests that by keeping the strategic waterway closed for a long time, Iran can impose greater costs on the US, especially as Trump has made reopening the strait his principal war goal.

It can also be argued that Iran believes time is on its side and by holding out, roiling global energy markets and raising the political and economic costs for Trump, it can secure a better deal in negotiations down the road. A prolonged conflict will, however, compound Iran’s economic troubles. Inflation is already at a record level. While its threshold for pain may be high Iran’s declining capability to export oil will cost it dearly.

As for the US, Trump believes Iran can be forced to agree to a deal on his terms by prolonging the blockade. He has repeatedly said he intends to continue this for months as it will compel Iran to negotiate. This would rule out an early end to the conflict.

Washington’s assumption is that gunboat diplomacy would economically strangulate Iran, prevent it from exporting oil and create shortages of everyday commodities. Tehran will then have no choice but to capitulate to US demands. But dragging out the blockade will be contrary to Trump’s key goal of keeping fuel prices and inflation down at home.

So, while the nature of the conflict has changed to acts of economic coercion by both, neither side seems ready to back down yet although it should be in their economic interest to swiftly end the war. The danger is of prolonged confrontation, with no active hostilities, except when reignited periodically, but no resolution of conflict. This would make for a highly unstable situation, prone to miscalculation by either side and with the heightened risk of relapsing into full-scale war. Israel would, of course, welcome a return to hostilities.

The economic consequences of a protracted conflict will be far-reaching for the global economy and countries across the world, especially in the Global South. Energy markets have been in turmoil from what is described as “the biggest oil supply shock in history”. Oil prices have surged amid concerns of prolonged supply disruption and dwindling of global stockpiles. Shortage of liquified natural gas has driven up prices.

The energy disruption is fuelling global inflation, will dampen economic growth and threatens a recession. Global supplies of other key commodities have also been disrupted, which include fertiliser, helium, aluminum and petrochemicals. This is having a damaging impact on global food production and will increase food prices particularly in poorer countries. Rise in fuel and food prices will drive millions into poverty, according to a UN report.

The US economy is not immune to the economic fallout of prolonged conflict. Fuel prices have already risen to create inflationary pressures while slower growth is forecast. This ahead of mid-term Congressional elections can exact a political price for Trump whose public approval ratings have plunged in the wake of cost-of-living anxieties. Only 30 per cent of voters approve his handling of the economy while the latest Washington Post-Ipsos poll found 61pc of people believe attacking Iran was a mistake.

One of the immutable lessons of history is that wars are easy to start but hard to end. The Iran crisis is the latest testimony to that.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

ACROSS the Middle East, three main hotspots should remain cause for concern for the international community: the ‘frozen’ Iran war, the Lebanese conflict, and the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza.

All these crises are interlinked as they involve either direct US military intervention or Washington-backed aggression by Israel. Therefore, in the interests of peace, America must refrain from further militaristic adventurism, while also restraining its bellicose ally Israel. Short of this, it is difficult to see these conflicts being resolved peacefully.

Instead of external actors, such as the US, playing the role of imperial saviour and invading and bombing the affected countries into ‘freedom’, regional states should take the lead and resolve their differences themselves. The situation vis-à-vis the US-Israeli war on Iran remains tense, with hostilities likely to resume if the diplomatic process fails. Similarly, the ceasefire in Lebanon reached last month is a truce only in name. Israel has continued its aggression against the Arab state, while the pro-Iran Lebanese group Hezbollah has responded to Israeli attacks forcefully.

In Gaza, the occupied Strip’s people are still feeling the trauma from the Israeli genocide. The humanitarian situation remains appalling, but Gaza is no longer in the headlines with other regional conflicts taking its place. Yet nearly 1.4m people are living in squalid conditions, susceptible to rodent attacks, while the sanitation situation remains poor. The reconstruction and rehabilitation promised at the time of last year’s ceasefire is nowhere to be seen. In all these situations, the international community has failed to hold the US and Israel to account for launching illegal wars, and causing massive humanitarian suffering.

We stand at a precipice. If this irresponsible behaviour continues, these wars may spread across the region, taking an even heavier human and economic toll. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused global pain. If the fighting spreads, the economic impact will be even greater, especially for countries that are struggling to hold their finances together.

The other option before the US is to end its destructive interventions, and stop Israel from causing havoc in the region. America has plenty of options in its toolkit to ensure that Israel behaves itself — such as stopping the billions of dollars of aid it gives the Zionist state annually, and halting weapons transfers to it.

Instead of these malign external influences, let the states of the region come together and reach a modus vivendi. For example, the Saudis and Iranians ended a running feud in 2023, thanks largely to Chinese facilitation. Even during the current hostilities, Riyadh and Tehran have kept diplomatic channels open. It is time the Arab and Muslim states of the region took control of their destiny, and worked together to establish a lasting peace.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

The future of energy is closely tied to efficient batteries, not only for e-bikes and electric vehicles (EVs) but also for domestic and commercial power banks for solar energy. The current game-changer is the lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery, set to replace wet and dry lead-acid batteries.

Pakistan’s battery demand is low, but if EVs, solar storage, and grid applications take off, total demand across sectors could grow to tens of GWh over the next decade.

However, currently, Pakistan’s Lithium-ion ecosystem is structurally shallow, with less than 20 per cent domestic value addition and heavy reliance on imports — most of the batteries used in e-bikes and EVs are imported, though there are a number of battery assemblers in the country.

Meanwhile, one group — ‘Wavetec’, through its subsidiaries, EV Technologies and Atom Power — is set to start assembling Li-ion battery cells in Karachi within six months. “EV adoption cannot scale sustainably without a strong battery ecosystem,” said Huma Khattak, CEO of Atom Power and EV Technologies.

‘If we do not localise, we risk replacing our dependence on oil imports with dependence on battery imports’

She added that Atom Power is also working to support Pakistan’s broader battery and energy storage needs. “If we do not localise, we risk replacing our dependence on oil imports with dependence on battery imports. After the implementation of lithium-ion cell manufacturing, the next phase will be gradual localisation of battery raw materials and upstream processing.”

According to Khattak, Pakistan needs to focus on battery energy storage systems to support growing demand from solar, grid and industrial applications. Li-ion battery imports in Pakistan have increased from approximately 1.25 GWh in 2024 to 2.5-3.0 GWh in 2025. Looking ahead, total demand is expected to grow rapidly over the coming decade. This growth is driven by electric mobility, solar-linked storage, and the need for reliable backup power.

At the same time, global battery costs have declined significantly from over $700 per kWh in 2015 to around $140 per kWh in 2024, making adoption more viable. There is now a clear push from the government to ensure that this demand translates into local industrial capacity rather than continued reliance on imports.

Unfortunately, a lack of policy often leads to a lack of standardisation, resulting in accidents and a loss of consumer trust in the product. Currently, there is no formal policy for Li-ion batteries, and without proper standards, there is a risk of low-quality products entering the market, especially in batteries where safety depends on cell quality, thermal management and system integration.

Apart from the policy, a key gap in Pakistan’s standardisation is the lack of a robust local testing and certification infrastructure. “We need accredited laboratories within the country that can test battery safety and performance, certify products against international standards, and act as a reliable, independent source for vetting quality,” Khattak said, adding that without this, enforcement becomes difficult, and the market risks being driven by price rather than safety.

As the government of Pakistan, too, is striving to promote e-bikes, their affordability and operating costs matter far more than premium features for users. Motorcycles in Pakistan are primarily used because they are affordable, reliable, and economical to run.

“Electric motorcycles must compete on these same fundamentals; the e-bike manufacturers have to focus on not just the technology, but on making electric mobility economically viable for the user,” Khattak stressed.

Though the e-bikes offer significantly lower running costs and minimal maintenance due to fewer moving parts, the key challenges are upfront cost and customer trust. Advancements in technology have made charging e-bikes simpler without a large-scale public charging infrastructure. However, in the long term, the solution will be a mix of home and workplace charging, distributed charging points, and battery-swapping models for commercial users.

The direction the government is taking also supports battery swapping and integration into urban infrastructure, which aligns well with local usage patterns. But as the usage of Li-ion batteries continues to grow, there is a need to plan for the critical issue of proper disposal of dead batteries.

Li-ion batteries have a lifecycle of six to 10 years, and Pakistan is expected to start seeing significant end-of-life volumes from around 2029 onwards. The upcoming battery policy must include a structured collection and second-life usage or recycling mechanism to avoid making the country a jumble of expired lithium-ion batteries. This could help the recovery of valuable materials and a new industrial segment around recycling and refurbishment.

Simultaneously, significant work is underway globally on next-generation battery technologies, such as sodium-ion and solid-state batteries. However, Li-ion will likely remain dominant in the near to medium term, especially for mobility applications.

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, May 4th, 2026

QUETTA: Federal Planning and Development Minister Ahsan Iqbal has convened a meeting of the authorities concerned on Monday in Islamabad to review the situation created by a Chinese company’s sudden announcement of closing all its operations in Pakistan and China as well as a factory in Gwadar.

The management of the company, Han Geng Group, issued a statement on Friday citing administrative, policy and other hurdles in running its business.

However, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the planning minister took notice of the company’s announcement and immediately directed the authorities concerned to review its grievances and ensure their immediate resolution.

Mr Iqbal sent a clear message that all operational and bureaucratic hurdles faced by companies investing under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would be removed on a priority basis to maintain investor confidence.

Ahsan Iqbal calls meeting after Chinese firm’s shutdown announcement

After the assurance and swift action, the Chinese company withdrew its announcement and decided to continue its operations in Pakistan and China.

In its announcement regarding the closure of operations, the company said the extreme decision was taken due to

“persistent non-market factors and administrative obstacles”, which had made it impossible to continue business operations.

According to the company, its facilities fully met strict China’s Customs inspections and international food safety standards. However, despite this compliance, it had “consistently failed to obtain the necessary approvals required for exports”.

For the past three months, the statement noted, the company had shown cooperation and patience at every level, but during this period it suffered heavy financial losses due to employees’ salaries, electricity bills, contractual penalties and container demurrage charges.

The company expressed serious concern that despite being part of major projects such as Gwadar Port and CPEC, it continued to face “challenges beyond the capacity of any private enterprise”. The statement identified “administrative uncertainty and hurdles in policy implementation” as the primary reasons behind the shutdown.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

ISLAMABAD: At a pre-budget consultation on structural reforms in the dairy sector, the government was urged to reduce the general sales tax on milk as safe milk is essential for child development.

Minister for National Food Security and Research Rana Tanveer Hussain, while participating in the consultations, organised by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute and the Pakistan Dairy Association, claimed that reducing GST on milk was not difficult and called for tax rationalisation and structural reforms to boost the dairy sector.

Dairy association chairman says 18pc GST led to 27pc decline in dairy sector

These measures would improve affordability and ensure safe nutrition besides supporting farmers across the country.

Safe milk cities proposal

He said proposals, like pilot projects for pasteurisation and the establishment of ‘safe milk cities’, were under consideration. Improving milk quality and formalising the sector would be key priorities going forward, he added.

According to the minister, livestock accounts for nearly 60 per cent of the agriculture sector and holds significant potential for both domestic nutrition and exports. He acknowledged that taxation policies, particularly sales tax on dairy products, affected production and growth. “Softening of tax regime can help increase both production and revenue,” he suggested.

In his welcome remarks, SDPI Executive Director Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri suggested multiple taxation scenarios and called for placing processed milk in a ‘third schedule’. He warned that rural milk collection centres were shutting down since the pricing of processed milk directly hits loose milk markets.

Public health

Pakistan Dairy Association Chairman Usman Zaheer Ahmad highlighted that 40pc of children in Pakistan suffered from stunting due to malnutrition, despite milk being the most widely consumed animal protein. The sector remains 98pc informal, with limited quality controls, he said.

He warned that 18pc GST in 2024 caused a 27pc decline in the formal dairy sector. He proposed reducing GST to 10pc and bringing part of the informal economy into the tax net, which could generate up to Rs250 billion in revenue.

Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) Country Director Farrah Naz said malnutrition costs Pakistan around 3pc of GDP annually, with over 40pc of children under five stunted.

She advocated reducing GST on milk from 18pc to 5pc. She also stressed the need for strengthening formal dairy systems, expanding processing capacity, and utilising by-products.

Published in Dawn, May 4th, 2026

Two years ago, the Punjab government decided, in principle, to discontinue direct wheat procurement from farmers. This decision was driven by the mounting financial burden of outstanding debt — incurred for wheat procurement but compounded by delayed repayments — which had surged to Rs680 billion by June 2023. Consequently, annual interest payments alone reached approximately Rs110bn in 2023–24. This raised serious concerns about the sustainability of the government-led procurement system.

Aiming to improve the situation, the government last year placed significant emphasis on introducing the Electronic Warehouse Receipt (EWR) system. However, it failed to deliver the intended outcomes. As a result, a new private-sector-led procurement system has been introduced this year.

The initiative seeks to achieve three key objectives: maintaining strategic reserves of three million tonnes, stabilising the wheat market, and ensuring farmers receive Rs3,500 per 40 kg — close to import parity prices, though not fully aligned with rising production costs. However, this marks a clear contrast with last year, when farmers were compelled to sell at Rs2,000–2,200.

Nevertheless, the newly designed system — built around a few selected private companies — failed to take off in time. Even by mid-April — when roughly 40 per cent of the crop was harvested, market arrivals peaked, and prices fell to around Rs3,000 per 40 kg — farmers remained exposed, forcing many into distress sales.

As prices recover and farmers begin to receive better returns, the government is resorting to measures that run counter to market economy and deregulation principles

In fact, the government overlooked the changing dynamics of wheat harvesting. With the increasing use of combine harvesters and the growing risk of erratic rainfall in March and April, farmers now rush to complete harvesting as early as possible. As a result, the harvesting window in any given district has narrowed to barely a month. This leads to a sudden surge in market arrivals, temporarily disrupting the demand-supply balance, followed by a sharp decline within days. Such conditions require a well-prepared, agile, and timely response from any government-supported intervention in the wheat sector.

This delayed execution drew strong criticism from stakeholders. Farmers, in particular, feared yet another failed intervention following the EWR experiment — especially as the 3m tonne procurement target itself appeared too small to effectively stabilise the market.

The delay, however, was followed by an unexpected shift in market dynamics. Wheat prices began to rise in the third week of April. By the fourth week, prices in several grain markets had crossed Rs3,500, with premium-quality lots fetching even higher rates for domestic consumption.

Several factors are driving this upward trend. First, reported yields in various districts are three to five maunds (40 kg) per acre lower than last year. A heatwave shrivelled the grain, while untimely rains in March caused lodging, adversely affecting both yields and grain quality.

Second, last year’s sharp price differential between April–May and December–January — nearly doubling within eight months — has encouraged stockists (licensed or otherwise) and flour mills to aggressively procure wheat in anticipation of similar windfall gains as last year. Moreover, farmers with holding capacity are opting to retain their produce, releasing only limited quantities to meet immediate financial needs.

This behaviour is further reinforced by lower crop yields and a sharp decline in the country’s opening wheat stocks at the time of harvest — around 2m tonnes this year, compared to over 4m tonnes last year. Therefore, according to conservative estimates, the country may face a wheat shortage of 2-4m tonnes this year.

Third, their expectations are further shaped by global uncertainties. The ongoing war in Iran and disruptions in fertiliser supplies across several countries may reduce global production of crops that serve as substitutes for wheat, potentially pushing wheat prices higher. World Bank commodity price data shows that wheat prices have already risen from $250 to $276 per tonne between January and March 2026.

Against this backdrop, the government now faces a fresh challenge: achieving its procurement target of 3m tonnes. With procurement centres becoming operational too late and harvesting now drawing to a close, the target appears increasingly difficult — especially when farmers are receiving Rs3,500 per 40 kg at the farm gate.

To keep prices in check, the government has reportedly resorted to heavy-handed administrative measures in several districts after April 29. This raises an important question: when wheat prices fell close to Rs3,000 — causing losses to farmers — the government remained largely inactive. Now, as prices recover and farmers begin to receive better returns, it is resorting to measures that run counter to market economy and deregulation principles.

A similar pattern was observed last year. In the initial months, district-specific price controls (Rs2,800 – 2,900) were imposed, and legal action was taken against those violating them. However, when prices surged even beyond Rs4,500 in December and January, and large stockists offloaded their inventories, the government largely tolerated the situation.

Under these circumstances, farmers fear that, in a bid to meet procurement targets, the government may resort to coercive measures, including the forced seizure of their stocks — a troubling scenario in which producers, despite duly verified output through crop ‘Girdawari’, could be compelled to sell against their will.

This raises a fundamental question: has the government’s procurement policy failed? Many believe it is not a failure; rather, it could not be properly tested this year, as it was primarily designed to ensure that farmers receive Rs3,500 per 40 kg. However, market forces — beyond the government’s expectations — had already pushed prices to that level.

Nevertheless, these developments underscore the need for the government to develop its analytical capacity — grounded in computer-based scientific modelling rather than a simplistic incremental approach — to estimate supply, demand, and future prices, while properly accounting for a wide range of interrelated national and international variables in formulating policy and strategy.

Khalid Wattoo is a development professional and a farmer, and Dr Waqar Ahmad is a former associate professor at the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad.

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, May 4th, 2026