The celebrations in Ivangorod drew crowds of spectators in neighboring Narva, who gathered on the embankment of the river dividing the cities

Crowds of people gathered in the Estonian city of Narva to watch the Victory Day concert and fireworks display held in Russia’s Ivangorod, situated just across the border.

The Estonian authorities banned Victory Day celebrations on May 9, penalizing anyone seen with Soviet or Russian-themed symbols, such as the Ribbon of Saint George.

One of the spectators on the Estonian side of the Narva river told RT on Sunday that compared to previous years, even more people had come to the embankment to see the event. The person said that Victory Day “has always been the most important holiday for us, no matter what.”

Victory Day celebrations across Russia and the world: As it happened (PHOTOS, VIDEOS)

The person added that his boss at work had objected to him going to watch the Victory Day concert, but he went anyway. He explained to RT that his own relatives had fought against Nazi Germany, adding that the “desire to pay homage to our heroes beats fear of any potential punishment” from the Estonian authorities.

As the celebrations unfolded across the river, some Narva residents lit lanterns in greeting to their neighbors in Ivangorod, according to footage sent to RT by a subscriber. She said the gesture has become a local tradition dating back to the coronavirus pandemic, when border crossings became difficult.

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The municipal authorities in Ivangorod told TASS that people across the border were able to watch the event, named ‘The Riverbanks of Victory’ thanks to a large screen mounted on the Russian side of the river. Similar concerts have been held in Ivangorod since 2023.

According to the news agency, citing Ivangorod and Narva residents, many people in Estonia spent several hours in lines at the border just to watch the celebrations on the Russian side.

Aleksandr Drozdenko, the governor of Leningrad Region, where Ivangorod is located, previously told TASS that it was particularly important to the regional authorities that the “concert is also being heard on the other side of the Narva River.”

“We know that there are people there, to whom Victory Day is just as important, and they are waiting for this day,” the Russian official said. According to Drozdenko, “on both riverbanks, people are singing our common songs familiar from childhood,” in what he described as “people’s karaoke.”

The celebration culminated in a bright fireworks display over Ivangorod, watched from both banks of the river.

Meanwhile, the Estonian police reported that at least 20 administrative cases related to Victory Day celebrations were initiated on Sunday, as reported by Delfi media outlet. Most of those involved displays of banned symbols.

The Russian president has said he could meet with Vladimir Zelensky once final agreements have been reached

Victory Day celebrations across Russia and around the world concluded on May 9, while President Vladimir Putin wrapped up a series of meetings with foreign leaders who came to Moscow and spoke to journalists about the Ukraine conflict, Russia-China ties, and other international issues.

“I think the matter is heading towards the completion of the Ukrainian conflict,” the Russian leader said while answering questions from the press. He also did not rule out a possible meeting with Vladimir Zelensky in a third country once final agreements on a settlement are reached.

Here are some further highlights from Putin’s remarks:

Western elites fighting Russia with Ukrainian hands

Putin stated that it is the globalist faction of Western elites that is effectively waging war against Russia, using Ukrainians as proxies.

“We need to make sure that no one is threatening us. This is our goal,” Putin said when asked about the parameters of peace negotiations. He emphasized that Moscow is well aware of Western assistance to Ukraine, particularly with drone technology, but noted that the other side is now looking for ways to establish contact, fully understanding that further escalation could be very costly.

Trump supported Victory Day ceasefire

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US President Donald Trump recalled the common struggle against Nazism during the leaders’ last phone call in late April, when Putin informed him of Russia’s plan to declare a ceasefire for May 8 and 9.

“President Trump supported it,” Putin said. Russia publicly announced the truce, but Kiev instead proposed a ceasefire starting on May 6, which it apparently had no intention of upholding.

The Ukrainian military violated the Victory Day ceasefire on 8,970 occasions after Moscow ordered all of its troops along the front line in Ukraine to halt combat operations and remain in their positions, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.

Moscow warned partners about possible retaliatory strike on Kiev

The Russian leader emphasized that Moscow has no desire to escalate or worsen relations with anyone, and that it repeatedly warned its foreign partners about the possible consequences of Kiev’s provocations on Victory Day.

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After Zelensky issued several veiled threats, the Russian Defense Ministry warned that a retaliatory strike on central Kiev would be carried out if attempts were made to disrupt Victory Day events in Moscow, and urged residents and diplomats to leave the Ukrainian capital in advance.

Putin pointed out that all key Ukrainian government and military decision-making centers are located in central Kiev, in close proximity to dozens of foreign diplomatic missions. He said Russia clearly outlined the potential scenario that could unfold, first warning key partners such as China and India.

Moscow also informed Washington about the possible consequences, which Putin believes contributed to Trump’s extended ceasefire initiative.

Ukraine yet to respond to Trump’s POW exchange initiative

Moscow sent Kiev a list of 500 Ukrainian prisoners of war and proposed an exchange back on May 5, but has yet to receive a response, Putin said. When Trump later announced an even larger 1,000-for-1,000 POW swap, “we supported it right away,” Putin added.

According to the Russian president, Ukraine said it needed time to review the proposal and later stated that it was “not prepared” for the exchange.

Putin explains absence of military vehicles at Victory Day parade

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Putin confirmed that this year’s Victory Day parade in Moscow featured no military equipment primarily so that the Russian Armed Forces could fully concentrate on achieving the final defeat of the Ukrainian army.

“We decided that we would definitely hold festive events, but without the demonstration of military equipment. Not only due to security concerns, but above all because the armed forces must focus their attention on the final defeat of the enemy,” Putin said.

The president added that the decision was taken long before any provocative statements from the Ukrainian authorities. The parade on May 9 still included marching servicemen and an aviation flyover.

Putin hopes for restoration of ties with West in future

Putin expressed confidence that Russia would restore relations with many Western countries in the future, even as he blamed Western politicians for triggering the Ukraine conflict.

Seeking to use Ukraine as an instrument of their geopolitical goals, these Western figures deceived everyone, and they’re now publicly admitting it... And they began deceiving us about the West’s eastward expansion back in the early 1990s... All of this, taken together, provoked today’s situation.

The Russian leader stressed that Moscow had never closed the door to negotiations with the EU or Ukraine and mentioned former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as a preferred intermediary for dialogue.

Russia offered help on Iran nuclear issue

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Moscow had proposed assisting in resolving the Iranian nuclear program issue, including through the export of enriched uranium, as it had successfully done before. Putin noted that this earlier effort played a positive role in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the now-defunct 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.

According to the president, the United States, Iran, and Israel initially agreed to the idea. However, both Washington and Tehran later hardened their positions: the US demanded that the uranium be sent only to its territory, while Iran proposed creating a joint Russian-Iranian enterprise on its own soil to dilute the uranium. As a result, the situation has reached a complete deadlock.

Moscow will prevail in the Ukraine conflict, which is a Western proxy war, RIAC’s chief Dmitri Trenin has told Going Underground host Afshin Rattansi

Europe has become Russia’s “principal adversary” for the first time since the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, the president of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Dmitri Trenin, has told Going Underground host Afshin Rattansi.

In the latest episode of Going Underground, the renowned international affairs expert said that “today, Russia is at war again, and this is not simply a war between Russia and Ukraine” but rather a proxy war against Moscow that is being waged by the West.

According to Trenin, while the US under President Donald Trump has increasingly distanced itself from the Ukraine conflict, European involvement has become progressively more prominent of late. He told Rattansi that elites in European capitals are using a perceived Russian threat in an apparent effort to consolidate the “crumbling” European Union and to “relaunch their economies through militarization.”

“They’re trying, above all, to keep themselves in power” by pushing alarmist narratives regarding Russia, he added.

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Trenin went on to describe Ukrainians as a “part of the bigger Russian nation” that is being “misguided” and “used by the West in [its]… very long war against Russia,” which dates as far back as the 16th century.

The international affairs expert expressed confidence that Russia would eventually accomplish its goals in the conflict, though it would take a long time. He defined Russia’s vision of victory as the vanquishing of neo-Nazi elements within Ukraine, as well as “those forces in Europe, primarily among the elites, that have built Russia into a bogeyman again.”

Commenting on Trump’s attempts at mediation, Trenin claimed that the US president is “essentially powerless to insist on something that is of central importance to ending this conflict,” and so his role is rather limited in defining its course. According to the RIAC president, Trump has apparently been unable to get EU warmongers and the Ukrainian leadership to act on the understanding reached by him and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, last August.

Robert Fico’s country turns fractures in Europe’s order into leverage, using ‘glitch art’ diplomacy in weaving its way between Brussels and Moscow

At 6:00 PM on May 8, 2026, the plane carrying Robert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister and leader of the Direction – Social Democracy party (SMER-SD), landed in Moscow. This fact was covered in great detail by both Russian and European media, and for good reason.

A week earlier, Lithuania and Poland had officially stated that they would not allow Fico’s plane to pass through their airspace on its way to the Russian capital. In order to avoid taking a long detour, Slovakia’s air route was reluctantly provided by Germany, Sweden, and Finland.

For Robert Fico, who has served as Slovakia’s prime minister since 2023 (and previously in 2006-2010 and 2012-2018), this was his third trip to the Russian capital for Victory Day celebrations. The first was back in 2015, when Fico marked the 70th anniversary of victory alongside then-Czech Prime Minister Miloš Zeman. The context of that parade was dramatic: despite the milestone anniversary, the 2015 parade cemented a shift in the list of high-ranking guests, in which Western leaders came to make up the smallest possible share.

At that time, a new participation format was introduced: leaders did not attend the stands on Red Square to watch the parade of Russian elite troops and equipment, but instead appeared only for the laying of flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin walls. Thus, during the 2015 parade itself, Fico and Zeman held a working meeting and joined later for the Minute of Remembrance.

Fico’s second visit, on May 9, 2025, cost him dearly in terms of electoral support. The 80th anniversary of victory, along with the relatively strong personal ratings of Fico and his party, encouraged the prime minister to attend the parade. The consequences were swift: SMER-SD’s rating fell from 24% to 18%, its lowest level in the preceding three years of Fico’s time in office. Protests took place in Bratislava, and were attended by up to 60,000 people. It would seem that a tough lesson should have been learned – and yet the charismatic Fico is in Moscow once again.

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Motives and context

To understand the Slovak leader’s motives, one has to look closely at Slovakia’s domestic political landscape and the foreign policy meetings Fico has held in recent months. At the beginning of February, the country declared a state of emergency in the oil sector in connection with the cutoff of Russian oil transit through Ukraine.

Officially, the issue was said to be pipeline damage in Ukraine. However, the leaders of Slovakia and Hungary (which also was not receiving Russian oil) stated that the problem was rooted in Kiev’s political decisions. Interruptions in energy supplies for Slovakia threaten disruptions to key industrial sectors concentrated in automobile manufacturing, which accounts for about 13% of the country’s GDP and nearly half of the republic’s total exports.

These include plants such as Jaguar Land Rover in Nitra and KIA in Žilina. Because of their production needs, they are critically dependent on deliveries of industrial diesel products and plastics (petrochemical products) from Slovakia’s only oil refinery, Slovnaft. In terms of direct employment, about 9,000 families work at the plants in Nitra and Žilina. Further along the chain, one job on the assembly line creates up to four jobs among suppliers (logistics, seating, plastics, catering). Thus, the real dependency rises to 35,000-40,000 people. Beyond them, other key players in the market – Volkswagen Bratislava, Volvo in Košice, and others – would also begin to stall because of energy shortages. Altogether, another 230,000 or so people are employed in this broader sector.

At the same time, for Fico, who has crossed the midpoint of his current term as prime minister, it is extremely important to prepare for the next electoral campaign, which will culminate in September 2027 – both to avoid alienating the party’s core voter base and to expand its support beyond it. That can be achieved only by preventing serious political and economic crises like the oil sector emergency that occurred in February of this year.

A second important factor is Fico’s recent foreign-policy meetings. Among the most resonant was the European Political Community summit in Yerevan on May 4, 2026. During the event, the attention of the Russian audience was focused on the Slovak leader’s closed-door meeting with Zelensky, where support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU was discussed. After the meeting, Fico said he would convey Ukrainian proposals to the Russian leader during talks following the Victory Day celebrations on May 9. We can assume that a “package of proposals,” or ultimatum, on transit issues will be transmitted via the Slovak leader. Yet precisely such an approach legitimizes Fico’s trip to Russia for the Victory Day celebrations, with Brussels’ silent consent.

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Glitch-art diplomacy and Europe’s binary code

It is customary to think that the relatively good relations which exist between Slovakia and Russia are grounded in pragmatism and cheap energy prices. But today’s reality is deeper. Slovaks are warmer and more rational than their neighbors in the Visegrád region. Having always played second fiddle in the history of great empires and middle states – Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia – they learned clearly that ideology is expensive, while survival requires intelligence and flexibility. This understanding enables Slovakia to find ways to make lemonade out of lemons. It should be noted that this brings results: a country which, because of its geographic position, historical circumstances, and energy problems, could be considered an outsider in European politics, is becoming its cyberpunk.

In cyberpunk, life unfolds simultaneously in two incompatible realities according to the principle of “Low Life, High Tech,” using system errors that ultimately form of glitch art – the art of digital interference. Its expressive means are bugs, noise, and wave distortions of the image. Thus, glitch-art diplomacy can be described as the foreign policy of a state that is consciously or forcibly built on protocol violations, unpredictability, and the use of systemic errors. In other words, if classical diplomacy is the polished skill of negotiations and playing by the rules, then “glitch diplomacy” is the aesthetics of apparent chaos, behind which stands a thoughtful, if simple, system.

It is precisely in this way that the foreign policy of modern Slovakia should be viewed. In the eyes of the nation, Robert Fico is a hero who breaks the binary European logic of ‘friend/enemy’ by building a bridge between West and East. In Russian discourse, it is emphasized that most European countries have ‘lost their agency’ by adhering to the shared algorithms of Brussels and Washington. Slovakia, by contrast, is capable of acting outside these algorithms, which is regarded as constructive pragmatism.

In the EU’s binary coordinate system, Slovakia is viewed more as its own systemic error. Since it is one of ‘theirs’, it can be corrected and managed. This is precisely the message Fico will voice in Moscow – and no matter how ultimatum-like or harsh it may be – this makes the Slovak leader’s policy acceptable to Brussels. In this way, Slovakia remains a small but critically important node through which East and West continue to exchange signals.

Wartime legacy underpins a strategic partnership rooted in civilizational respect, not just realpolitik

As Russia marks the 81st anniversary of its victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, the ensuing global conflicts are a grim reminder of the lessons learned (or lost) over the last century. While the Indian Republic joins its strategic partner in celebrating the defeat of fascism, it is worth retracing the common thread of civilizational history that the two giants share.

During the World War II, both Soviet and Indian troops (under British command) contributed decisively towards the defeat of the Axis forces. During the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, Indian and Soviet divisions coordinated their operations to secure the Persian corridor linking the Allies to the USSR. Elsewhere, while the Soviet forces fought the bulk of the German armies in the Eastern European theater, Indian contingents fought the Axis in the South-East Asian, North African, West Asian theaters, as well as playing a critical, often under-recognized role in the Allied invasion of Italy.

Simultaneously, Indian leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose sought to secure external support in their fight for independence. In his efforts to secure cooperation, his first port of call in 1941 was to the Soviet Union. Being unsuccessful he made his appeal to the Germans and the Japanese. Nevertheless, he was appalled at the German invasion of the USSR and in June 1941, declared that Indians had come to regard the ‘Third Reich’ as an aggressor. He believed that the USSR would ultimately become Britain’s adversary in the future and died in 1945 in pursuit of greater collaboration with Moscow.

Subhas Chandra Bose was not the only leader aspiring to closer ties with the USSR. Russia had long been part of a utopian hope, and when Indians thought about progress and development, they looked to Russia for inspiration.

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Jawaharlal Nehru had first visited Moscow in 1927, and the poet-polymath Rabindranath Tagore had also been an admirer. The gigantic achievements undertaken by a semi-industrialized, agrarian state into a transformed great power with improved living conditions captured Indian imaginations.

During that period myriad factors contributed to the Indian and Soviet lack of understanding of each other’s positions. Post-October Revolution, the British Raj took comprehensive measures to prevent the entry of Soviet personnel and citizens into British India. After the Revolution, the Bolsheviks abandoned the extensive Tsarist intelligence networks deployed within the sub-continent and relied on information communicated by the Communist Party of India (CPI) who themselves were at odds with the dominant Indian National Congress (INC).

After attaining independence, these relations transformed into a peculiar multi-bilateral process where the Soviet government engaged with both the newly independent Indian government and the CPI. During the formative years the preference was given to the latter with support being provided in collaboration with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the CPI to undertake an armed proletarian struggle in 1948. However, Indian refusal to acquiesce to all Western positions in the international arena and its efforts in securing a settlement towards the Korean conflict led to changes in perceptions within the Soviet leadership. Stalin in conversation with Indian Ambassador to the USSR K. P. S. Menon expressed his view of a world divided into black and white with a lonely grey India occupying the middle ground. 

A decisive change in relations ushered in with the ascendancy of Nikita Khrushchev and the subsequent process of destalinization. Simultaneously, two trends came into being: firstly, the acceleration of the rivalry between the US and the USSR and subsequently the systems of capitalism and communism, and secondly, the trend of decolonization. Indian foreign policy under the leadership of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, gravitated towards the concepts of non-alignment and ‘Panchsheel’ (or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence).

The USSR itself shifted from a policy of ‘those who are not with us, are against us’ to ‘those who are not with the West, are possibly with us’. Under this new policy, encapsulated within the concept of Peaceful Coexistence propounded at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Moscow essentially saw the non-aligned movement with its anti-colonial stance as an ally.

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Nehru’s visit to the USSR in 1955 and the subsequent visit by Khrushchev and Bulganin to India in the same year, the combined Indo-Soviet opposition to Anglo-French aggression during the 1956 Suez Crisis and India’s refusal to diplomatically condemn the USSR during the 1956 Hungarian Crisis deepened Indo-Soviet relations. Matters came to a head in 1962 with the simultaneous eruption of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict. The USSR was stuck between a “brother” and a “friend” while simultaneously facing the possibility of a global conflagration against the capitalist West.

Until the 1960s, the Indian armed forces had been largely equipped with British-origin weaponry. Post-1962, India embarked on a military modernization spree aided by the Soviets. The primary driver was the deterioration of both Indian and Soviet relations with China. Soviet economic aid to India was forthcoming, establishing steel plants such as the Bhilai Steel Plant, which to date remains a flagship unit of the country. The ushering in of détente brought American embargoes on weapons supplies to both Pakistan and India during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Taking an alternative approach, the Soviets sought reconciliation and succeeded with the 1966 Tashkent Agreement.

The integrity test of the Indian-Soviet relations occurred during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. Having achieved rapprochement towards China with Islamabad’s assistance, the US did not want to constrain continued Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan. New Delhi and Moscow finalized the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, thus setting the stage against a Pakistan-US-China grouping.

The Indian economy took a distinctly socialist turn during Indira Gandhi’s tenure, noticeably due to internal crisis of leadership rather than external factors. However, the slowdown in Western economies, the 1973 US-USSR Grain Deal, and the combined Oil Shocks due to the Arab-Israel war and the Iranian Revolution gravely affected Indian economic indices. The Soviet Union, itself facing a stagnating economy, wasn’t able to extend economic aid. New Delhi had to instead rely on US supplies while resisting American attempts to arm-twist changes to the Indian domestic economy. However, in terms of arms supplies, the USSR remained the dominant partner for India for the entirety of the Cold War.

READ MORE: China’s forgotten World War: The West has much to learn

The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 sent Indian foreign policy into a tailspin. At that point, with the End of History argument reaching its zenith, many foresaw the death knell of Indian-Russian relations. As the Soviet Union vanished from the imaginations of the people – being instead relegated to bittersweet reminisces of nostalgia – academic engagements with Russia and Indian-Russian relations practically disappeared.

During the Unipolar Moment, India sought to turn around its relationship with the US, the sole hegemon. With the ascendancy of Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000, relations with India were upgraded to a Strategic Partnership the same year. India was at that time under sanctions from the US for its 1998 nuclear tests, and the relationship would not be reset until the 2006 Indo-US Nuclear Agreement. Two trends dominated during this time period: firstly the September 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terror, and secondly the normative principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) arising out of the 1993 Rwandan Genocide. Moscow’s disillusionment with Western promises to accommodate Russian interests – epitomized in the 2007 Munich Speech – coincided with New Delhi’s rapprochement with the US.

However, Moscow and New Delhi soon found themselves advocating similar positions when the R2P reached its crescendo during the 2011 Libyan intervention. India, Russia, and China abstained and later opposed the increasingly blurred distinction between protecting civilians and regime change operations. The RIC grouping evolved into BRICS as a major non-Western institution with the joining of South Africa in 2010. At the same time, Indian-Russian relations were further upgraded to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.

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As opposition to a selectively imposed Western-dominated liberal international order increased along with calls to reform the anachronistic United Nations to better represent the non-Western states and the Global South, concepts such as polycentricity and multipolarity gained ground. Rather than being a smooth transition, the world has lurched violently towards multipolar disorder.

The issue of a common European security architecture has disintegrated into a proxy conflict involving Ukraine, and the Israeli-US assault on Iran has effectively ended the liberal-international order. In these times, Indian-Russian relations have shown adaptability and resilience by concluding the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS). The agreement allows the stationing of foreign troops on Indian soil (a first in the state’s history), which the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed with the US does not cover. While debates for and against it are far from being settled, it allows a near permanent Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean (where the US operates the Diego Garcia base) and conversely Indian presence in the Arctic and the Pacific. In effect, the RELOS exemplifies deeper military integration between the two states than the 1971 Treaty ever envisioned.

Ultimately, for most of their existing histories, the trajectories of the two civilizational giants have been in harmony. Similar to the World War II, the RELOS signals commitment from both states’ leadership to proactively respond to international challenges by building on each other’s strengths.

In times beleaguered by strife and paralysis of institutional organs of intervention, bilateralism is rarely a better response to a polycentric disordered world. But when on rare occasions it does show adaptability and strength – as in Indian-Russian relations – it has the capacity to propel both states to unimaginable heights.

RT spoke with the author of the documentary ‘Victory Day in the Baltics: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow’, about the ban on Victory Day commemorations in the region, historical revisionism, and growing tensions

Andrei Starikov, director of the documentary film ‘Victory Day in the Baltics: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow’, spoke with RT about how Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are shaping the historical memory politics of the Western world. He also discussed how it has been turned into a political instrument by the supporters of Hitler and their descendants, who returned to the Baltic nations after the Cold War, and why the Baltic region could become a serious flashpoint. 

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A region caught between East and West

RT: Andrei, your film addresses the revision of the outcomes of the Second World War, a topic that the Western audience knows little about. Do you think this is a coincidence or the result of a deliberate information strategy?

Andrei Starikov: I wouldn’t exaggerate and say that it’s some kind of centralized effort to suppress information. It’s not a conspiracy or a particular strategy. We are, rather, talking about a certain perception: every country or society has its own pain points that it focuses on. 

However, it’s crucial to understand that even if a topic seems to be of regional importance, its implications can be global. History provides examples of this; the First World War was sparked by a local event – the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. At first glance, it seemed like a minor incident, but it triggered a massive conflict.

The situation in the Baltic states follows a similar logic. This is a small region but it lies at the intersection of major powers’ interests.

Looking at the bigger picture, we observe a broader geopolitical landscape composed of the United States, China, and Russia. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia ceased to be the superpower it once was, and a ‘belt’ of new states (the former Soviet republics) formed around it.

The Baltic countries – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – are part of this belt. These countries are Russia’s neighbors but they are also part of Western structures like the EU and NATO. And today, they find themselves in a challenging position. 

RT: Why is it challenging? 

Andrei Starikov: Primarily because of their historical and demographic structure. After 1991, a Russian-speaking population remained in these countries. In Latvia, nearly half of the population is Russian-speaking; in Estonia, it’s about 35-40%; Lithuania has a lower percentage of Russian speakers, but still a considerable number. 

It’s important to note that Russians didn’t appear there by chance. And it didn’t occur instantly. Some residents are descendants of migrants from the days of the Russian Empire – as far back as the 18th and 19th centuries. There were also religious migrations, such as Old Believers who fled church reforms.

In the 20th century, more migrants came during the Soviet era. When these territories joined the USSR, specialists such as engineers, workers, and builders migrated there actively. They established enterprises, infrastructure, and cultural institutions in the new republics.

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This was internal migration. People didn’t move to ‘another country’ but relocated to another region within their own country to build, develop, and modernize it.

During Soviet times, the Baltic nations found themselves in a unique position. These republics were sort of the ‘showcase of the USSR’ – a region that demonstrated the level of development, quality of life, and efficiency of the system. Thus, the Russian-speaking population appeared in the Baltics as a result of a lengthy historical process. 

From ‘bridge’ to frontline

RT: Today, the Baltic states refer to the Soviet era as “occupation” and Russians are seen not as settlers but as “occupiers.”

Andrei Starikov: When speaking of this, we must consider the historical context of the early 20th century. During that time, both Western and Eastern Europe demonstrated a strong interest in leftist ideas. Communist parties enjoyed significant support due to widespread disillusionment with capitalism, dire social conditions, and a lack of basic rights for workers.

The Soviet Union was viewed as a project that offered an alternative: social guarantees, education, healthcare, and labor rights protection.

Thus, the incorporation of the Baltics into the USSR in 1940 was part of a broader historical process supported by a segment of society. It wasn’t forced; it didn’t stem from Moscow’s ultimatum. It was a natural process that many welcomed.

Later, during the Soviet period, active modernization began in the region, involving the construction of industries, infrastructure, and cultural institutions. This further integrated the Russian-speaking population that had moved to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

RT: Why did the authorities’ stance change drastically after the collapse of the USSR?

Andrei Starikov: A new identity was formed at that time. When countries emerge from a large political entity, they need to redefine who they are. This is often done through a rejection of their past.

For the Baltics, distancing themselves from the Soviet legacy symbolized a break from Russia. Geopolitics plays a role here: when you push away from one center of power, you inevitably gravitate toward another.

Small nations caught between major powers can rarely maintain neutrality. It’s like in physics – larger bodies attract smaller ones. The Baltic nations faced a choice: to serve as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West or to become a dividing line. Unfortunately, political elites chose the latter path, and this led to heightened tensions both externally and internally. 

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Within these countries, there are different visions regarding the future. Some groups advocate for dialogue and economic cooperation, aspiring to be that sort of ‘bridge’. However, those in power today are focused on confrontation and establishing a hardline anti-Russia stance. They instill fear of war with Russia, and condition their populations for war.  

The people resist, many pack their bags and leave. When society operates under a constant state of opposition, people seek more stable conditions – they emigrate, postpone starting families, and birth rates decline.

All the challenges that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are currently facing stem from their leaders’ decision to play an active role in the confrontation between Russia and the West.  

This is an awful course that affects both those who identify themselves as ethnic Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians, and the remaining Russian population.

Naturally, this creates tension within these countries and outlines a potential civil conflict. I repeat: there are those who lean towards Russia and wish to facilitate dialogue, and then there are those who desire war. The latter include nationalists whose stance has been shaped by those who fought alongside Nazi Germany and those who fled to Latin America and other countries after the war.

Victory Day and the battle over historical memory

RT: What role does Victory Day play in this conflict?

Andrei Starikov: Victory Day is the cornerstone of historical memory. The anti-Hitler coalition emerged victorious in WWII, and the Soviet Union was  part of it. The USSR suffered the heaviest losses, as most battles occurred on its soil. Moreover, the Nazi occupation was exceptionally brutal and terror-driven in Soviet territories. It was true genocide.

For Russia and many post-Soviet countries, victory over Nazism is more than just a date; it’s woven into their identity and collective memory – a vital element that resonates powerfully even with today’s generations, the descendants of the victors. For the people of Russia and neighboring countries, Victory Day remains a deeply significant, emotional, and truly national holiday.

Any attempts to challenge or reinterpret this holiday cause deep pain. The memory of WWII victory in Russia is codified not only socially but also legally – it’s enshrined in the constitution. Yet, it transcends mere legal norms; it forms an organic foundation upon which modern Russian identity and foreign policy thinking largely rest.

Any actions taken against the symbols of this holiday – especially in the post-Soviet space – are perceived in Russia as personal affronts and insults. Naturally, such steps provoke strong reactions, both socially and politically.

In some ways, this can be likened to how the legacy of the Civil War continues to shape the national consciousness in the United States. Much time has passed, yet the topic remains part of the national consciousness and evokes strong responses.

Today, in the Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – public celebrations of Victory Day are prohibited.

Related events, concerts, fireworks, and WWII victory symbols are banned. Those who attempt to publicly commemorate the day face administrative and sometimes criminal charges. People may be fined, persecuted, sometimes even stripped of their status or deported.

Russia perceives any actions regarding May 9th acutely – especially when they are prohibitive or demonstrative in nature. For Russia, this is a day of remembrance and at the same time a celebration of victory, and such [prohibitive] measures are seen as an assault on [historical] memory. 

This is particularly painful for those for whom this day holds personal significance – the descendants of the veterans and their families, for whom the memory of the war is alive. When people are forbidden from honoring that memory and denied the opportunity to pay their respects, it generates a lot of tension.

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This creates additional strain and raises the risk of a broader conflict, as for Russia, this issue extends beyond politics and encompasses values, historical memory, and cultural identity.

RT: Can we say that the leadership of the Baltic states, which has banned Victory Day, aims to provoke Russia?

Andrei Starikov: Their actions are mostly symbolic but [for Russia, it’s a] deeply sensitive matter. Such actions are perceived as attempts to offend, provoke, and humiliate. 

This is particularly hard for the older generation living in the Baltic states, including those who experienced the war or grew up in its aftermath. For these individuals, Victory Day isn’t just a date on the calendar – it’s part of their life. 

When these people are denied the chance to commemorate Victory Day, when their rights are restricted, their access to healthcare or social services is limited, and when they are pushed out of public life, it feels like an assault on the very memory of Victory. 

Today, one of the main threats is that in the political elites of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, there are strong forces that advocate for revanchism and seek to reinterpret the outcomes of WWII. They prioritize rigid ideological positions over pragmatism, economic development, or constructive dialogue.

Such an approach creates points of tension that could escalate into larger conflicts. History shows that major wars often stem from local crises. Today, the Baltic Sea region – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – has become one of those sensitive flashpoints.

The tail wagging the dog

RT: How significantly do perspectives on WWII differ in Eastern and Western Europe? Can we say that the Baltic states influence how the wider Western world interprets history?

Andrei Starikov: Since joining the European Union and NATO, the Baltic countries have positioned themselves as sort of ‘experts on Russia.’ They say, ‘We know Russia better than anyone else; our historical experience and Russian language skills give us unique insights because we lived in the Soviet Union.’ 

Despite their small size – these nations collectively have only a few million inhabitants – they have actively engaged in shaping EU policy in Eastern Europe. Through participation in EU institutions, through resolutions, memoranda, and committee work, they have managed to set a tougher and more confrontational tone towards Russia.

Additionally, there’s the factor of emigration. After WWII, people from these countries emigrated to the West – particularly to the US, Latin America, and Australia. Over time, they integrated into political and social structures there, forming lobbying networks. Today, these connections continue to function, amplifying their agenda.

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As a result, despite their relatively small size, the Baltic countries exert a noticeable influence on the broader course of the West. This situation is often described as ‘the tail wagging the dog.’

RT: Did the Baltic states’ accession to the EU mark a turning point after which Russia and the West began to view 20th-century historical events differently?

Andrei Starikov:  It was a significant milestone, but not the starting point. Small states positioned between major power centers can’t exist in a vacuum or remain entirely neutral.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic nations chose to distance themselves from their Soviet past – and consequently, from Russia. In doing so, they inevitably began to construct their identities in opposition to Russia.

This process began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Joining the EU and NATO solidified this choice and gave them added confidence, partly due to the NATO ‘security umbrella’. 

From that point on, they were able to adopt a firmer stance, often disregarding Russia’s position.

Can the truth about WWII still be defended?

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RT: Your film addresses not only the past but also the future. How do you assess our capabilities: can we defend the truth about WWII? 

Andrei Starikov: I believe we can. Some aspects are open to interpretation, but there are also fundamental truths. WWII victory is one of these truths. It’s not merely a historical fact; it serves as a critical reference point.

No matter how hard people try to reinterpret, distort, or rewrite it, this victory remains relevant. It represents a triumph over an ideology that denied the value of human life.

For Europe and the West, this moment is just as significant as the Civil War is for the US. It was a dialogue about values, albeit in a deeply tragic context. The victory in WWII set a trajectory toward progress, human rights, and equal opportunities. For Russia, it’s even more pivotal. It’s not just a part of history – it’s foundational to its identity.

That’s why this memory cannot be erased. It still prevents the world from descending into full-scale conflict. It shows that even in times of intense opposition, dialogue, alliances, and shared victories are possible. In this sense, it serves not only as a remembrance of the past but also as a guide for the future. 

Understanding and remembering history is crucial. It can be complex and contradictory. Yet, the goal of politicians and leaders should be to avoid igniting new conflicts based on old wounds and to create space for coexistence.

Conversely, when tensions arise and forces that are interested in escalating the conflict come to power, this creates global risks. These ‘marginal’ groups seize power, create flashpoints and put all of us at risk of nuclear catastrophe. We must stop them, apply pressure, and unite our efforts to defeat them early on, preventing them from spreading their influence.

The Baltic states and other such regions require special attention, since local crises can lead to much more serious consequences. Without addressing the Baltic issue, it will be challenging to engage in dialogue and develop further. 

Washington has hailed the operation as a major security victory amid its standoff with Iran over a far larger stockpile

The US has triumphantly announced that it has removed highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Venezuela in what the US Department of Energy (DOE) hailed as a victory for America and “the world.”

In a statement on Friday, the DOE said it had completed the “removal of all remaining enriched uranium from a legacy research reactor” in the South American nation and transferred it to the US for processing and reuse. The quantity removed was 13.5 kg (30 pounds).

The move “sends another signal to the world of a restored and renewed Venezuela,” the statement reads. It also hails “[US] President [Donald] Trump’s decisive leadership” on the issue.

Washington rebooted relations with Caracas after US forces abducted and imprisoned Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January over narcoterrorism allegations. The uranium removal was coordinated with the Venezuelan Ministry of Science and Technology, the DOE statement said.

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Despite the dramatic language surrounding the operation, the material had not been publicly linked to any imminent proliferation threat. The uranium originated from a Cold War-era civilian reactor near Caracas established under the “Atoms for Peace” program that ran from the mid-1950s through the 1970s.

US nonproliferation officials argue that any civilian HEU stockpile, regardless of size, presents a long-term threat of theft, diversion, or trafficking and should eventually be removed from circulation. The Venezuela transfer closely resembles dozens of similar HEU-removal operations carried out over the past three decades as part of routine US- and IAEA-backed nonproliferation programs targeting civilian research reactors.

Even at the height of Washington’s hostility toward Maduro, US accusations against Caracas centered on drugs trafficking and corruption, not on any Venezuelan nuclear threat to the American homeland.

The announcement of the removal comes as the US has reached an impasse with Iran over its far larger stockpile of enriched uranium, estimated at roughly 440 kg, which Trump has repeatedly described as a major threat to US security.

READ MORE: When the world’s most powerful country has no war plan

Washington has demanded Iran surrender, export, or dilute its highly enriched uranium stockpile, pushing for a long-term suspension of enrichment along with strict verification measures. Iranian officials have rejected these demands as “maximalist,” insisting enrichment is a sovereign right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Kiev has committed a total of 8,970 violations since midnight Friday, according to the Russian MOD

The Ukrainian military has violated the Victory Day ceasefire on 8,970 occasions since it took effect at midnight on Friday, including drone and artillery strikes, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.

Moscow said on Friday that it had ordered all of its troops along the Ukraine front line to halt combat operations and stay at their positions.

In a statement on Saturday, the Russian Defense Ministry stressed that its forces were continuing to abide by the ceasefire. By contrast, the Ukrainian military had conducted “strikes on our forces’ positions involving unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery,” military officials in Moscow reported. On top of that, a number of Russian regions, including Crimea, Bryansk Region, Belgorod Region, Kursk Region, and Moscow Region, have come under Ukrainian attacks.

According to the ministry, of the 8,970 ceasefire violations on Kiev’s part, 1,173 attacks were conducted by Ukrainian artillery, multiple launch rocket systems, mortars and tanks. The Russian military has additionally recorded a total of 7,151 enemy drone strikes.

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“Ukrainian forces have carried out twelve attacks on Russian positions,” according to the statement.

Russian troops have responded in kind, launching retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian firing positions, command posts, and UAV launch sites, the Defense Ministry stated.

Earlier this week, the MOD announced a unilateral two-day ceasefire on May 8-9 to mark the 81st anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany and the end of World War II in Europe.

On Friday, US President Donald Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform that he had directly asked Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky to cease hostilities for three days, May 9-11, with both agreeing to the proposal. Trump added that Moscow and Kiev would swap 1,000 POWs each during the period.

“Hopefully, it is the beginning of the end of a very long, deadly, and hard fought War,” the US president wrote, expressing hope for a “big extension.”

Putin’s aide Yury Ushakov later confirmed that Moscow agreed to extend the ceasefire it had originally announced for May 8-9 for the period mentioned by Trump, as well as to a major prisoner exchange.

Staff have not observed attacks near the facility amid reported violations of the US-Iran ceasefire, Rosatom CEO Aleksey Likhachev has said

Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant in Bushehr continues to function normally despite reports of renewed US-Iran military exchanges, Aleksey Likhachev, CEO of the Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom, has said.

Russian personnel have not observed any attacks near the plant in recent days, and the situation there remains “generally calm,” Likhachev said in an interview with the Strana Rosatom corporate newspaper published on Friday. Unit 1, currently the plant’s only operational reactor, continues to run at full capacity, he added.

The Russian-built plant, a critical piece of Iran’s energy infrastructure, contains substantial nuclear fuel stockpiles. Likhachev previously warned that any strike on the site could trigger a catastrophe of at least “regional” proportions.

Earlier this week, the US military launched a wave of strikes on Iranian targets near the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran accused Washington of violating a ceasefire agreed last month and retaliated against American warships in the area. The Bushehr plant is located roughly 250 km (155 miles) northwest of the strategic waterway.

Following the start of the US-Israeli attacks on Iran in late February, Rosatom reduced its on-site presence from roughly 700 specialists to just 20 people after strikes and explosions were reported near the plant in March and April. In one incident, a projectile struck near the site’s perimeter, killing a security guard.

The Rosatom chief said the company is prepared to rapidly redeploy its full workforce to Iran once it is convinced there is no renewed risk of military escalation threatening personnel safety.

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Bushehr Unit 1 entered commercial operation in 2013. Units 2 and 3, two additional Russian-designed reactors intended to expand the plant’s electricity-generating capacity, have been under construction since 2016.

Likhachev said work at the site is gradually resuming, with around 2,200 Iranian contractors returning to focus mainly on reinforcement and concrete work at the under-construction Unit 2 reactor.

The Bushehr nuclear power plant produces electricity for Iran’s national power grid. The project was started in the mid-1970s by a West German company but was suspended in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1980, to be revived by Rosatom in the 1990s.

Tehran and Washington continue “sporadic” exchanges of fire as they vie for control of the strategic waterway

The US military has attacked two more Iranian-flagged oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman as Washington presses ahead with its “freedom of navigation” blockade, while Tehran has compared control of the Strait of Hormuz to possessing an “atomic bomb.”

US Central Command said on Friday that American forces had struck two “unladen” Iranian tankers, the M/T Sea Star III and the M/T Sevda, which it claimed were attempting to “violate” the US blockade by entering an Iranian port.

Iranian armed forces allegedly responded to “the violation of the ceasefire and to American terrorism with strikes,” a military official told local media, but the US military did not report any damage.

The Strait of Hormuz has become one of Tehran’s main bargaining chips, after Iran shut the waterway early in the war, stranding hundreds of vessels and roiling energy markets.

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“The Strait of Hormuz is a capability equivalent to an atomic bomb,” Mohammad Mokhber, a top adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, said on Friday, as cited by Press TV.

He vowed that Iran would not “forfeit the gains of this war” and said Tehran would seek to change the legal regime of the strait, through international law if possible and unilaterally if necessary.

The US has rejected Iranian ambitions as “unacceptable,” with Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying on Friday that Washington will never allow Tehran to “normalize” its grip on Hormuz.

The US insists that its own naval blockade is intended to restore freedom of navigation and pressure Tehran into a deal, while Iran has accused Washington of violating the April ceasefire by targeting commercial shipping.

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The latest incident in the narrow maritime chokepoint, through which a large share of the world’s oil and gas shipments passes, came a day after US and Iranian forces exchanged fire. The US Department of War claimed three American guided-missile destroyers had encountered “unprovoked” missile, drone, and small-boat attacks, and that US forces retaliated against Iranian launch sites, command-and-control locations, and surveillance nodes.

Tehran, however, accused Washington of attacking first, claiming US forces had targeted an Iranian oil tanker in its territorial waters and struck civilian areas along Iran’s southern coast.

READ MORE: Washington ignored intel warnings on Iran – Trump’s ex-counterterror chief

Trump downplayed the exchange as a “love tap” after Tehran “trifled” with the US, but warned that if the truce really collapsed, “you’re just going to have to look at one big glow coming out of Iran,” urging Tehran to sign an agreement “fast.”

Russia’s cultural comeback in Western Europe is underway

The West’s Overton window on Russia is slowly beginning to reopen. A revealing example emerged this week in Italy. At the Venice Art Biennale, organizers decided to reopen the Russian pavilion for the first time in four years. More importantly, it wasn’t handed over to representatives of the émigré opposition or anti-Kremlin proxies, but to actual Russian delegates who travelled from Moscow.

Predictably, the decision provoked outrage. The European Commission reportedly sent angry letters to the Biennale organisers and the Italian government. Ukraine imposed sanctions on those involved in running the pavilion. Activists quickly descended on Venice, including members of Pussy Riot, the punk group banned in Russia as extremist, who staged demonstrations against the event.

What’s striking is that, despite the pressure, the Italians refused to back down. Biennale president Pietrangelo Buttafuoco openly accused critics of censorship and narcissism. The Russian pavilion remained open.

Only a year or two ago, such a scenario would have seemed impossible. During the height of the Ukraine conflict, even the slightest positive gesture towards Russia in the West was treated as morally unacceptable, as evidence of “sympathy for the aggressor.” Any deviation from the approved line had to be condemned immediately, and those responsible risked public ostracism.

Now the atmosphere is gradually changing. Russia is cautiously being allowed back into international cultural and sporting life. The Venice Biennale is only the latest example.

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Earlier this year, Russian athletes at the Paralympics in Milan were once again allowed to compete under national symbols. The pattern was similar as Ukraine protested loudly and Western activists demanded restrictions. Yet the International Paralympic Committee ultimately sanctioned Ukraine’s most disruptive athletes rather than reversing the decision. Russia’s return proved highly successful: six athletes won 12 medals, and the team finished third overall.

Taken together, these episodes suggest that attitudes towards Russia inside the EU are beginning, however slowly and reluctantly, to soften.

It is hardly surprising that Italy is at the forefront of this shift. From the beginning of the conflict, Rome adopted a distinctive position. Officially, Italy supported collective Western European initiatives. In practice, however, it maintained a noticeably more restrained attitude towards Moscow than many of its allies. Earlier this year, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was among the first major EU leaders to openly raise the question of restoring official contacts with the Kremlin.

Italian society reacted calmly. That is no accident. For decades, Italy has maintained close cultural and economic ties with Russia, and ordinary Italians have generally viewed Russians favourably.

A similar dynamic can increasingly be seen elsewhere in Europe, although in many countries it is still drowned out by the aggressive rhetoric of political elites. France offers a good example. While Emmanuel Macron continues discussing the “containment” of Russia at European summits, French audiences have enthusiastically embraced a new production of Tchaikovsky’s Eugene Onegin performed in Russian.

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More broadly, Western Europeans increasingly recognize an uncomfortable reality: Russian culture cannot simply be erased. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Tchaikovsky and Chekhov are not merely “Russian” figures in a narrow national sense. They are part of world civilization. Attempts to cancel them always looked intellectually shallow and culturally self-destructive.

And this is precisely where the growing demand for normalization comes from. Once people accept that Russian literature, music, and art remain legitimate parts of European cultural life, it becomes harder to argue that everything contemporary Russia produces must remain permanently quarantined as well. One thing inevitably leads to another.

Another important shift is also visible. The West no longer treats Ukraine’s position as morally unquestionable in the way it once did. There was a period when every statement from Kiev was amplified as if it carried unique ethical authority. Zelensky and his officials were treated less as political actors than as moral arbiters, but that mood has faded.

Even if the EU’s illusions about Ukraine have not disappeared entirely, expectations have become more grounded in reality. Western Europeans increasingly understand that Kiev’s total rejection of everything Russian is not simply a cultural preference but a wartime political necessity for the Ukrainian leadership. It’s part of the ideological framework through which Zelensky maintains internal unity during a prolonged conflict.

The EU’s interests are ultimately different. However hostile rhetoric towards Moscow may sound today, many in Europe understand at a deeper level that Russia is not going anywhere. Geography alone dictates that some form of coexistence will eventually have to be rebuilt.

And if Western Europe and Russia will ultimately need to find a path back to peaceful coexistence anyway, then perhaps the small steps now being taken are not merely symbolic gestures, but the beginning of something larger.

This article was first published by the online newspaper Gazeta.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team

Exiled embezzlement suspect Timur Mindich was reportedly tipped off that agents had been despatched to arrest him

Vladimir Zelensky's Kiev bag man who ran a series of corruption schemes which stole hundreds of millions of dollars from Ukraine's energy sector was alerted by a mole inside an anti-corruption agency that he was about to be arrested, minutes before the bust was due to take place, local media has reported.

Timur Mindich and his right-hand man Aleksandr Zukermanjsut fled to Israel before Western-backed anti-corruption agents raided his home. Ukrainakaya Pravda (UP) is among several outlets that have been publishing purported transcripts of surveillance records gathered during the 2025 investigation that triggered Mindich's decision to flee.

The alleged mole

Friday’s transcript release centers on Andrey Sinyuk, the former deputy head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), who resigned after formal charges were filed against Mindich and his associates. He is suspected of warning Mindich about the raid.

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In a conversation reportedly recorded on October 14, 2025, former advisor to the Minister of Energy Igor Myronyuk and Executive Director for Physical Protection and Security of Energoatom Dmitry Basov, both suspects in the alleged Mindich-run $100 million scheme at state atomic energy firm Energoatom discuss a SAPO deputy head identified as Andrey.

Andrey is described as an old friend of a man named Oleg – whom UP believes to be either deputy head of Zelensky’s administration Oleg Tatarov or one of his aides – and as a “good contact that is worth keeping.”

No honor among thieves

“Oleg is among those who played with him,” Basov said, according to the transcript. “Everyone worked with him, dined and wined and split money. It’s clear what the relationship format there is normal… manly.” However, he added that he feared “this pederasty among those people may backfire,” and that Andrey could “play a double game” by keeping records of the “wages” – regular bribes – he allegedly received.

It is unclear whether the references to homosexuality were meant literally or used as insults aimed at Ukrainian government figures whom Mindich’s associates viewed as untrustworthy.

Suspected tip-off network

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Mironyuk and Basov agreed that Andrey could be useful, but said he should be used sparingly and only after a test operation involving a service that could not be traced back to them.

UP claims that on October 26, Sinyuk searched classified criminal databases for the names of Energoatom suspects, including Mironyuk and Basov, as well as figures linked to Mindich, such as former energy ministers German Galushchenko and Svetlana Grinchuk. According to the outlet, the searches were logged in the system and later uncovered during an internal investigation.

Escape plan emerges

The outlet also cited conversations allegedly involving Mindich’s personal driver shortly before charges were filed against the businessman, which appeared to point to preparations for an emergency escape from Ukraine.

The so-called ‘Mindich tapes’ have confirmed long-held suspicions in Ukraine of extreme corruption in the upper echelons of Vladimir Zelensky's government and shattered the Western illusion of transparency and accountability for the hundreds of billions in 'aid' sent to Kiev.

The impact is widening since original charges were levelled last year over corruption at Energoatom and have now included Fire Point, a former movie casting and location agency linked to Zelensky's friends that has transformed into a billion-dollar drone and missile company now at the centre of allegations based on content from the Mindich tapes.