The headlines are filled with reports of growing discord inside NATO. Donald Trump openly questions the value of allies who, in his view, fail to carry their share of the burden. Western Europe complains about the unreliability of its American patron while simultaneously pledging loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. Beneath the daily noise, however, something far more significant is taking place: the gradual transformation of Europe’s political and military order.

For decades, the United States guaranteed Western Europe’s security while those Europeans concentrated on prosperity and welfare. That arrangement now appears increasingly unstable. Washington’s strategic priorities have shifted toward Asia and the confrontation with China. Europe remains important as a logistical and political platform for American power, but it is no longer the unquestioned center of US grand strategy.

Trump didn’t create this process, though he has accelerated it dramatically. His irritation with NATO is not simply personal caprice. It reflects a deeper American conclusion that the era of underwriting Western European security indefinitely has become too expensive and strategically distracting.

The alliance itself was built for another age and another purpose.

NATO was designed to contain the Soviet Union and anchor American influence in Europe. It was never intended to become a global instrument for confronting China. Yet this is precisely the direction in which many in Washington would like to push it.

These Europeans, however, do not share America’s sense of urgency regarding Beijing. For most of them, China is an economic competitor, not an existential threat. Russia, by contrast, remains the central security obsession of much of the bloc, especially in Northern and Eastern members. 

This divergence is beginning to reshape NATO from within.

France has emerged as the loudest advocate of greater Western European strategic independence. Paris retains a long tradition of military autonomy and still possesses something few other European powers can claim: a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent. France cannot realistically replace the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, but it increasingly seeks to position itself as the ideological leader of a more self-reliant bloc.

Britain, meanwhile, continues its traditional balancing act between the EU and the United States. London insists on its independence from Brussels while simultaneously searching for external support from Washington. Northern and Eastern states remain intensely hawkish and committed to confrontation with Russia, regardless of whether the Americans remain fully engaged. Southern Europe appears far less enthusiastic, distracted instead by migration, economic stagnation and domestic instability.

As so often in European history, however, the decisive factor will likely be Germany.

Much of post-war Europe was built around one central idea: Germany must never again become an independent geopolitical force. After 1945 the country was divided, militarily constrained and tightly integrated into Western structures under American supervision.

Even German reunification in 1990 was accepted partly because Germany remained embedded inside NATO. At the time, many believed that anchoring a unified Germany within the Atlantic alliance was the safest possible arrangement for Europe.

Ironically, that very decision became one of the starting points of today’s geopolitical crisis. NATO expansion eastward created a security architecture that Moscow increasingly viewed as hostile and destabilizing.

Now, three and a half decades later, Europe may again face the prospect of a Germany becoming strategically autonomous, though this time under entirely different circumstances.

Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “new era” in 2022 following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. For some time the slogan appeared largely symbolic. Under Germany’s current leadership, however, concrete changes are beginning to emerge.

Berlin is discussing accelerated rearmament, expanded military infrastructure and legislative changes aimed at increasing recruitment for the Bundeswehr. The debate over compulsory military service, once politically unthinkable, has returned to the mainstream.

Recent comments by Franz-Josef Overbeck, the Catholic military bishop of the Bundeswehr, are revealing. Overbeck openly called for Germany to send forces to the Strait of Hormuz and argued that compulsory military service should be restored not only for men but also for women.

His reasoning was blunt. Germany, he argued, can no longer remain on the sidelines in an increasingly dangerous world.

Many within Germany’s political establishment likely agree with him privately. Politicians, however, remain cautious because German society is still deeply uncomfortable with militarism and foreign deployments. Decades of post-war political culture have created a pacifist instinct that remains powerful among voters.

The bishop, unlike elected officials, can speak more freely.

At the same time, Germany faces mounting economic difficulties. This is not merely a temporary downturn. The old German economic model rested heavily on cheap Russian energy and export-driven industrial growth, not to mention stable globalization. Much of that foundation has eroded.

As a result, discussions that would once have been politically toxic are now occurring openly. Militarization is increasingly presented not simply as a security necessity, but also as a potential engine of economic renewal.

Only a few years ago such arguments would have sounded extraordinary in Germany. Today they are becoming part of mainstream debate.

This is where the historical dimension becomes impossible to ignore.

German political culture has long been characterized by discipline and a tendency to follow strategic paths with remarkable determination once a consensus forms. In calmer periods this can be an enormous strength. In moments of geopolitical confrontation, however, it can become dangerous.

The path on which Russia once again serves as Germany’s principal antagonist is deeply familiar from European history.

For decades after the Second World War, many believed that lesson had finally been learned. Economic interdependence between Russia and Germany was supposed to make large-scale confrontation irrational. The collapse of that assumption has shocked much of Europe.

Trump’s pressure on NATO is therefore acting as a catalyst for changes that were already underway. Western Europe is being pushed, reluctantly and unevenly, toward greater military independence. Whether this ultimately strengthens NATO or gradually hollows it out remains unclear.

The alliance is unlikely to collapse outright. Institutions of this scale rarely disappear suddenly. More likely is a gradual transformation into something narrower and more fragmented.

A core bloc focused primarily on containing Russia may emerge within NATO, while the United States shifts more of its attention toward Asia.

Whether such a bloc becomes effective will depend above all on Germany. If Berlin fully embraces rearmament and strategic emancipation from American oversight, Europe’s political landscape could change profoundly and by the end of Trump’s presidency, this process may already be far advanced.

Thus, once again, Europe may discover that history is not something safely confined to textbooks. The old rivalries and anxieties that shaped the continent for centuries have an unsettling habit of returning precisely when people convince themselves they are gone forever.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

In 2025, Russia became India’s top supplier of crude oil, accounting for about 32.3 percent of imports, with the bilateral trade reaching $68.7 billion (~₽ 74.45), following a sharp rise over the recent years. These figures reflect not a temporary spike, but a structural shift. The supplies of energy, fertilizers, and industrial goods are increasing. Yet the negotiation and execution of transactions are far from easy-going. Contracts sometimes take too long to conclude; payments are overdue because of excessive scrutiny, and shipments are delayed for reasons that are rarely disclosed in official reports. Today the need for aligning the countries’ legal systems has become urgent than never.

Several issues require a thorough consideration and prompt solution.

Firstly, the lack of a centralized legal coordination interface continues to hinder contract formation and enforcement. The negotiating parties often have different expectations of each other’s core legal concepts. In addition, since 2022 contract performance has been seriously challenged by sanctions. In Russian legal practice, sanctions are often treated as a valid force majeure reason for transactions’ disruption. Meanwhile, the Doctrine of Frustration, enshrined under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act,1872, specifies whether disruption of contract performance has become objectively impossible rather than commercially difficult. Thus, a supplier may consider itself excused for disruption, while the buyer sees it as a breach. This difference affects risk-based pricing, definition of contract obligations, and resolution of disputes.

Without a shared interpretation baseline, every contract involves a negotiation not only of terms, but of the legal meaning. A standing bilateral interface, even with non-binding guidance, would help reduce this uncertainty if it clarifies sanctions-related force majeure and aligns the relevant governing law and enforcement practices.

Secondly, the absence of sector-specific mutual recognition frameworks continues to influence costs. A pharmaceutical product approved in India still undergoes additional conformity checks in Russia, including registration and quality evaluation under Russian State Pharmacopoeia requirements. Engineering equipment certified under Russian standards often requires additional testing in India through the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for compliance with Indian Standards (IS) specifications. Each repetition extends timelines and raises costs. Pharmaceuticals, energy equipment, agricultural products, and heavy engineering products form a large share of bilateral trade. Targeted recognition in these sectors would not require full harmonization, but should involve identifying areas where standards already align and formalizing that recognition. Even limited agreements could significantly reduce duplication.

Thirdly, in customs and trade documentation, even small differences can create major disruptions. Disparities in rules of origin, inconsistencies in Harmonized System classification, and differing documentation formats lead to repeated queries at ports. Traders handling processed goods or mixed consignments are especially affected. The lost time translates directly into costs through demurrage, storage, or missed deadlines. Both countries have invested in digital customs systems. India’s GST and and Russia’s EDO systems already operate at scale domestically, but interoperability gaps remain. Digital invoices and electronic bills of lading are not always recognized by the systems and force manual checks, despite efforts to enforce interoperability of the national payment systems. Mutual recognition of digital formats and alignment of documentation standards would remove much of this disfunction.

Fourthly, the sanctions restrictions have caused legal ambiguity that affects decisions at every level. Companies must decide on contract structure, payment routing, shipment insurance, and risk allocation. However, legal boundaries often allow differing interpretations, which causes a cautious response. Even legally permissible transactions face delays because the cost of error is high. This cautious overcompliance may not appear in trade data, but it continues to influence commercial activity.

A coordinated, sanctions-aware framework would not remove risks, but would define them more clearly. Standard clauses, model structures, and clearer allocation of responsibilities would allow businesses to proceed with greater confidence.

Fifthly, an equally important challenge is banking and transactional legal interoperability. Russian banks, such as Sberbank and VTB, now operate actively in India, while Indian banks have enabled trade through special vostro accounts approved by the Reserve Bank of India for rupee-based settlements. These mechanisms have kept transactions moving. Yet uncertainty persists around non-SWIFT systems, particularly concerning the legal moment of settlement and applicable compliance requirements. In practice, Indian public sector banks have increasingly assumed a quasi-regulatory role, sometimes imposing excessive requirements, including confirmation of non-SDN status from Russian parties that are often not in a legal position to provide such assurances. This creates operational deadlocks; a delayed or disputed payment can disrupt entire supply chains.

Russia is tightening oversight of the financial flows, including stricter regulation of cryptocurrency-related activity. A bilateral protocol clarifying settlement finality, recognition of alternative messaging systems, and compliance norms would make existing channels more reliable. Another practical step could involve joint working groups between the Russian and Indian Ministries of Finance tasked with issuing operational clarifications for categories of market participants and commodity classes.

Sixthly, investment and corporate law complexity continues to limit deeper engagement. While Russia-India trade has grown, long-term investments remain modest. Companies are cautious as they face layered regulation, ownership restrictions in some sectors, taxation ambiguity, and repatriation and exit uncertainty. The India–Russia Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, in force since 1998, already provides a framework to avoid double taxation through tax credits and rules on permanent establishment. However, parts of it remain under-used. More consistent application of permanent establishment thresholds and faster use of mutual agreement procedures could reduce disputes, improve tax certainty, and support investment. The issue is less about formal openness and more about clarity in application.

Finally, the burden of legal complexity falls most heavily on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Larger firms can manage regulatory differences through dedicated teams. SMEs often cannot. Many depend on intermediaries, raising costs and reducing control. The absence of standardized contracts, limited familiarity with international commercial terms, and complex customs procedures create barriers. Practical steps can help. Bilingual contract templates for common transactions would provide a clear starting point. Clear guidance on Incoterms and simplified customs procedures for smaller consignments would lower entry barriers. Faster, lower-cost dispute resolution would ensure that smaller firms are not excluded due to legal costs.

In all these areas, the core issue is effective coordination.

Russia and India have established national legal systems of their own strength. The challenge arises when these systems interact without a shared framework. Businesses do not need identical laws; they need predictability. They need to know how a clause will be interpreted, how a shipment will be processed, and how a payment will be settled.

Russia-India economic engagement has moved from exploratory trade into a sustained cooperation at scale. Legal alignment will determine whether this cooperation continues smoothly or face limits. The task is to reduce uncertainty where it matters most. When contracts are clearer, certifications are recognized, documents move smoothly, payments settle with confidence, and smaller firms can participate without excessive burden, the relationship becomes easier to sustain.

The opportunity is already vivid in the performance figures. The next step is to ensure that the legal framework supports this progress. Without institutional and regulatory coordination, the difficulties will persist. One practical starting point could be a bilateral model contract approved by both countries’ ministries of justice, which would cover sanctions-related force majeure, governing law, and streamlined arbitration, while leaving technical implementation issues to working groups rather than political summits.

There will be much talk this May about the so-called “strategic triangle” of Russia, China and the United States. US President Donald Trump is expected in Beijing first, followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Whenever the leaders of the three most influential powers meet, speculation inevitably follows. What if they strike some grand bargain? What if the world suddenly becomes more orderly?

Such expectations are misplaced. The restructuring of the global system is already under way, and it isn’t a process that can be halted or reversed by summit diplomacy. Even so, turning points in history can unfold in different ways; carefully managed, or recklessly accelerated. That’s what makes the coming meetings significant.

Both Russia and the United States are now deeply involved in large-scale military confrontations. The importance of these conflicts lies not only in their scope, but in their broader consequences for the international system. China, by contrast, has historically kept its distance from such entanglements. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear in Beijing that it can’t remain insulated from their effects. Discussions at the recent Valdai Club conference in Shanghai suggested that China is reassessing its position.

At the center of this reassessment is a simple question: what, if anything, is still possible in relations with Washington?

For decades, China’s rise was closely tied to its economic relationship with the United States. The arrangement sometimes described as “Chimerica,” American capital and technology combined with Chinese labor and manufacturing, formed the backbone of globalization.

It wasn’t an equal partnership, but it was mutually beneficial. For a long time, it seemed that basic economic self-interest would prevent either side from undermining it.

That assumption has now collapsed.

By the late 2000s, dissatisfaction in Washington was already evident. The United States increasingly viewed the arrangement not as a source of shared gains, but as a structural imbalance. Over time, the accumulation of tensions, economic and strategic, reached a point where incremental adjustments were no longer sufficient. What followed was a qualitative shift in the system itself.

For several decades, the global order operated largely in the interests of the United States as the leader of the Western bloc. Its gradual erosion now threatens those advantages. Washington’s response has been to use the current period of transition to secure as much of a head start as possible for the future.

Donald Trump has become the most visible embodiment of this approach. His rhetoric, openly transactional and even boastful, may appear unconventional, but the underlying logic predates him. The objective is clear: maximize immediate gains and build up national capacity as quickly as possible. Then use that accumulated strength to dominate the next phase of global competition.

This represents a sharp departure from the earlier American strategy, which prioritized long-term investments in the international system. Those investments didn’t always produce immediate returns, but they reinforced a framework that ultimately benefited the United States more than anyone else. Today, the emphasis has shifted toward short-term advantage, even at the risk of longer-term instability.

Whether this strategy will succeed remains uncertain. The initial phase has already produced setbacks. But the broader direction is unlikely to change. Future administrations may adopt a different tone, but they will operate within the same constraints. The liberal international order won’t return, not because of Trump’s personality, but because the conditions that sustained it no longer exist.

For other major powers, including China, this has profound implications. The idea of a comprehensive “big deal” with the United States, one that stabilizes the global system for years to come, has effectively become unrealistic.

Trump’s frequent use of the word “deal” is revealing. In his vocabulary, it’s more than a mere strategic concept but a commercial one. A deal is “big” not because it is durable or all-encompassing, but because of the scale of immediate gain it delivers. And like any commercial transaction, it can be abandoned if a more desirable opportunity presents itself.

Under such conditions, long-term agreements on the structure of world order are impossible. Washington is unlikely to commit to any arrangement that limits its flexibility before it has secured what it considers a sufficient advantage.

This is not necessarily a product of malice or arrogance. It is, in its own way, a rational response to a period of extreme uncertainty. The United States is seeking to preserve the foundations of its future dominance by acting decisively in the present.

But rationality on one side forces adaptation on the other.

If key players conclude that stable agreements with Washington are unattainable, their behavior changes. Military capability becomes more important as a safeguard against pressure. At the same time, interest grows in alternative forms of cooperation. That is, frameworks that operate independently of the United States and are insulated from its influence.

This logic isn’t new, but it’s gaining urgency. Russia has been advocating for such arrangements for several years. China, by contrast, has approached the idea with caution, hoping instead to preserve some form of mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. That hope now appears to be fading.

The upcoming visits to Beijing will provide a useful indication of how far this shift has progressed.

The meeting between Trump and Xi will likely define the limits of a temporary accommodation between two powers that remain economically intertwined, yet increasingly distrustful of one another. The question is no longer whether a comprehensive agreement is possible, but what narrow, short-term arrangements can be reached, and how long they will last.

Putin’s subsequent talks with Xi will address a different issue: the extent to which Russia and China are prepared to develop mechanisms of cooperation that bypass the United States altogether. Moscow has been moving in this direction for some time. Beijing now appears to be considering whether it must follow.

May will not produce a grand bargain. But it may show, more clearly than before, how the world is adjusting to the absence of one.

This article was first published by the magazine Profile, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

Is it possible to create a new reserve currency as an alternative to the U.S. dollar? The topic is controversial. Some believe that it is not, others think that it is even undesirable. I am one of the few who believe that it is not only desirable and possible, but perhaps indispensable.

I first wrote about the need for a new reserve currency in August 2023[1], and since then has elaborated the idea in detail[2]. In this article, I will outline some of its main points. As an innovative alternative, it certainly needs improvement and is open to criticism.

In modern history, the role of international currencies has usually been played by national currencies, and only few were specially designed to serve this function (issued and managed by a national central bank, or by a regional bank, like the euro). Since the issuing country’s objectives do not usually coincide with others’, the international currency can rarely serve the interests of other nations.

Today, we need to create a new international currency that would not perform national functions. Before discussing its characteristics, let me show why there are no efficient ready-made alternatives.

Discarding Options

The options now available are either inconvenient or unlikely.

One would be to continue living in a world dominated globally by the U.S. dollar (and, regionally, by the euro). However, the U.S. dollar system is inefficient, unreliable, and even dangerous. It has become an instrument of blackmail and sanctions. The precariousness of the monetary, fiscal, and financial foundations of the U.S. economy is becoming increasingly clear. This does not suit the emerging economies of the Global South.

Can the U.S. dollar be replaced, at least partly, by some other national or regional currency of the Global North? This scenario is not feasible on a large scale. The euro, compromised as an instrument of sanctions, suffers from the same problems as the U.S. dollar. Europe’s economic situation is even more problematic than that of the U.S.

The Japanese yen has similar problems: the Japanese economy is not doing well and does not inspire confidence. Besides, the yen has never played a major international role. Other national currencies of the Global North are either too small (e.g., the Swiss franc, the Canadian or Australian dollar) or suffer from the country’s economic weakness (the British pound sterling).

As for gold, it can replace the U.S. dollar only partially, as a reserve asset for central banks and other economic agents. However, its high price volatility, caused by the widespread nervousness about the U.S. dollar, makes this option unreliable.

There are two preconditions for the renminbi’s internationalization: free convertibility and China’s willingness to allow a large exchange rate appreciation. The Chinese government is hesitant on both—and rightly so. In the Chinese case, free convertibility would essentially mean removing capital controls—a central element of China’s economic policy in recent decades that has greatly contributed to its stability. The renminbi’s external appreciation would threaten the competitiveness of exports, one of the main factors of the Chinese economy’s dynamism. Moreover, in recent years China has seen deflation in wholesale prices and close-to-zero inflation in consumer prices, so a sharp rise of the renminbi may put the economy in a deflationary trap and at associated risk of recession.

There also remains the question of whether other countries of the Global South would want the renminbi, just another national currency, to replace the U.S. dollar and the People’s Bank of China, another national central bank, to replace the U.S. Federal Reserve. With China issuing an international reserve asset on a large scale, the rest of the world would continue to experience, albeit perhaps in a milder way, the same problems it now has with the U.S. dollar.

In any case (and there are more possible options), creation of a new reserve currency faces challenges—geopolitical (fundamentally, the U.S.’s resistance) and technical (building a trustworthy monetary institutional and operational structure is no easy task). But we need to address this task, not least because we cannot rule out a major financial crisis of the Western capital markets in the coming years, e.g., associated with artificial intelligence and technology companies. If this happens, the decline of the U.S. economy and dollar, will accelerate. Everyone will be scrambling for a solution. So, we’d better look for it today.

A Possible Path

Theoretically, one way would be to back the new currency with gold, as suggested by Russian economists. However, they have so far not solved the main problem this alternative entails: how to ensure a new currency’s stability while supporting it with an eminently unstable asset. If there is a solution, it is beyond my knowledge.

It seems more appropriate to back the new currency in the way I briefly discuss below.

The first question to address is who would create the new currency. In the current international circumstances, there seems to be only one possibility—a group of 15 to 20 Global South countries, including BRICS members and other middle-income countries. Yet none of them can accomplish this mission reliably by delegating the issuance of a new reserve currency to an existing financial institution.

Thus, a new international financial institution—an issuing bank—must be established with the sole and exclusive function of issuing the new currency and putting it in circulation. This bank would not replace national central banks, and its currency would circulate in parallel with the national currencies of the sponsoring countries and other national and regional currencies. Its operations would include international transactions only, excluding domestic ones. Contrary to what is often suggested, it cannot be a euro-type currency, i.e., a single currency issued by a single central bank which replaced national currencies (Deutsche Mark, French franc, Italian lira, etc.).

There are other questions, too. How can we ensure the success of a new international currency? What would make it widely used? The essential thing is to ensure confidence, and this depends on how the new monetary arrangement will be constructed institutionally.

The way that seems most viable to me should be based, among other things, on five legal guarantees: 1) the currency’s stability in terms of value; 2) its non-use as an instrument of sanctions or pressure; 3) operational autonomy of the issuing bank; 4) maximum limit for its issuance; and 5) backing by a basket of the sponsoring countries’ government bonds.

Let me briefly describe these five points.

First, the currency should be based on a weighted basket of the participating countries’ currencies, with its fluctuations following the changes in these currencies. Since all currencies in the basket would be floating or flexible, the new currency would also be a floating currency. The weights in the basket would be determined by the share of each country’s PPP GDP in the total GDP of the sponsor group.

The new reserve currency’s exchange rate is expected to be relatively stable since China accounts for at least 40-45% of the total (depending on the exact composition of the group). The renminbi’s relative weight in the basket would provide certain stability, given the stability of the Chinese currency. Another endogenous factor of its stability is that the basket would be formed by currencies of both exporters and importers of commodities, i.e., countries standing at the opposite sides of the commodity price cycle. These factors could be further reinforced by establishing a weighted, geometrically and symmetrically trimmed, average. Currencies with large fluctuations, beyond pre-established limits, would be temporarily excluded from the basket.

Second, the participating countries would make an explicit commitment to non-use of sanctions. This would contrast with the insecurity caused the abusive use of the U.S. dollar and the euro for punishment and blackmail. This legal guarantee would be reinforced by the issuing bank’s operational autonomy.

Third, to ensure the bank’s operational autonomy and avoid political interference and diplomatic maneuvering by its founders, its president and vice-presidents should be granted long terms (e.g., five years). This kind of guaranteed autonomy, typical of international financial organizations, does not fully protect the bank from interference, but it has its advantages.

The institution’s management could be overseen by and accountable to the Board of Governors and on the Board of Directors designated by the sponsoring countries. The oversight and accountability should be implemented through normal institutional channels, not through the president and vice presidents’ individual pressure.

Fourth, a limit should be set to the amount of the new currency circulated by the bank as a safeguard against excessive issuance. The new international currency would thus have a constraint that the U.S. dollar does not have. Yet this ceiling is secondary to the most important instrument—back-up of the new currency.

Fifth, therefore, is the importance of defining a proper procedure for creating a basket of national bonds of the founding countries and those that will join later. The issuing bank would issue the new reserve currency (NRC) and new reserve bonds (NRB), whose interest rates would be attractive as they would reflect the interest rates on the bonds of the participating nations, all of which are higher than the rates on the bonds in the U.S. dollars and euros. The NRC would be fully convertible into NRBs. The high weight of the Chinese currency, issued by a country with a solid economy, would raise confidence in the NRC’s backing and help stabilize the new currency’s average exchange rate.

The West’s Reaction

The proposal has its vulnerabilities, discussed in detail in [2]. Here let me just note the most significant one: the initiative may provoke negative reactions from the West, which can resort to threats and sanctions. This risk is real: today the declining West is more violent than ever before.

Yet we must decide now whether we are going to live indefinitely with the Western increasingly dysfunctional monetary system used as a geopolitical tool, or we will gather economic, political, and intellectual efforts to get out of this trap.

The next few years will tell whether Global South countries are up to this challenge.

The defeat of Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party in Hungary’s parliamentary election shouldn’t be seen as a shock. Opinion polls had long pointed in this direction. Nor should the outcome be divorced from a simple political reality: sixteen consecutive years in power, twenty in total, is an exceptionally long tenure by the standards of Central and Eastern Europe. Fatigue with familiar faces is inevitable, and psychologically understandable.

Yet the result contains a paradox. Orban’s defeat appears, in some ways, to confirm the very trend he has come to embody: the primacy of the national agenda, “my country first.” In recent years, particularly since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, Hungary’s sovereignist approach has become deeply entangled with external issues. Opposition to the European Commission’s line on Ukraine, justified in Budapest as a defense of Hungarian interests, led to sustained confrontation with both Brussels and Kiev. What began as a domestic political stance increasingly played out on the international stage.

This dynamic shaped the election campaign. Orban’s camp leaned heavily on external themes, portraying Ukraine and its leadership, especially Vladimir Zelensky, as central antagonists. His opponents took the opposite approach. They focused on domestic concerns: living standards, and the promise of restoring smoother relations with the EU as a pathway to improving everyday life. Whether that promise proves justified is another matter, but it resonated with voters. The message was entirely consistent with the logic of sovereignty, only turned inward rather than outward.

It’s also notable what didn’t matter. The visit to Budapest by US Vice President J.D. Vance, along with repeated expressions of support from Donald Trump and his circle, appears to have had no measurable impact. This, too, fits the pattern: overt external endorsement rarely helps in national elections.

Indeed, Trump’s team has so far failed to influence outcomes in any European country where it has attempted to intervene, including Romania and Germany. External pressure, regardless of its source, cannot substitute for domestic political conditions.

That said, external actors were not absent. The Western European mainstream, as usual, worked against Orban where possible. But such involvement has long been a structural feature of European politics. Without underlying domestic factors, it’s rarely decisive.

There were, however, surprises in the details. Fidesz had anticipated potential losses in the proportional vote but expected to retain strength in single-member districts. The opposite occurred. The party’s relative resilience in the lists contrasted with a collapse at the constituency level. This suggests that, at a local level, voters viewed opposition candidates as more attuned to their immediate concerns, and less associated with a government perceived as preoccupied with broader geopolitical battles.

In Brussels and other Western European capitals, the mood is celebratory. Orban had become a persistent irritant, an obstacle to consensus and, at times, to policy itself. His departure will be framed symbolically as a triumph of liberal integration over a disruptive and illiberal figure, often portrayed as aligned with Moscow and Washington’s more nationalist wing.

The incoming government will be expected to demonstrate its credentials quickly. Chief among these expectations is the unblocking of the €90 billion package for Ukraine, something that will likely happen without delay.

From Moscow’s perspective, this isn’t welcome news. Yet it would be naïve to assume that the European Commission would have been unable to advance its agenda had Orban remained. Mechanisms to bypass obstruction were already under discussion.

Beyond these immediate questions, however, the direction of Hungary’s new government remains unclear. Peter Magyar’s campaign bore many of the hallmarks of a personal project. The composition of his cabinet, the balance of power within it, and its concrete priorities are still unknown.

More importantly, the structural realities facing Hungary haven’t changed. Geography and the broader geopolitical environment impose constraints that cannot be wished away. Magyar has already acknowledged the need for dialogue with Russia, a recognition that reflects practical necessity rather than ideological alignment. Whether this pragmatism can coexist with expectations from Brussels and Kiev remains to be seen.

Orban’s defeat is therefore symbolically significant, but its practical implications are far less certain. Hungary’s new leadership will have to navigate the same complex and often unfavorable conditions as its predecessor. The difference may lie less in the direction of policy than in the manner in which it’s presented.

In that sense, the election may mark not a fundamental shift, but a recalibration. The slogan may change. The constraints will not.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team. 

Donald Trump has declared the start of a new “golden age” in the Middle East after announcing a ceasefire with Iran. The war, at least for now, has been paused. And while predictions are always risky with this White House, there is at least a chance that the fighting will not immediately resume.

That alone matters. A prolonged war would raise risks for everyone, but above all for Washington. For all the bombast coming from the US administration, America has always been deeply uncomfortable with prolonged uncertainty and strategic risk. It is one thing to threaten. It is another to endure the consequences when threats fail.

The precise terms of the ceasefire remain unclear and may not yet be fully agreed. But the central political fact is already visible: Faced with determined resistance, the US stepped back.

None of the sweeping demands set out at the start of the operation were met. Trump’s all-caps demand for Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” now looks more like political theater than strategic doctrine. Yet behind the social media drama, something more rational prevailed in Washington: When pressure fails, it is better to retreat than to escalate into a situation you may no longer control.

The feverish rhetoric before the truce served a purpose. It allowed Washington to claim that Tehran had blinked, while creating such a sense of looming catastrophe that any pause in fighting could be sold as relief. The White House will now try to present restraint as victory.

This conflict is undoubtedly a milestone in the wider transformation of the international system. But it is not the end of that process. Nor is it the final chapter in the struggle for the Middle East. Iran, above all, has demonstrated resilience. It has completely undermined the core assumption behind the US-Israeli campaign, namely that a sufficiently powerful blow would be enough to bring down the Islamic Republic or force it into submission.

Tehran’s response was not spectacular in the conventional military sense, but it was effective. Iran widened the theater of tension and signaled that the costs of escalation would not be confined to military targets. It forced its opponents to reckon not only with Iranian retaliation, but with the fragility of the wider regional system.

This matters because the endurance of the US and its regional partners is limited. Iran’s, by contrast, has historically been much greater.

The so-called Axis of Resistance also proved more durable than many had assumed. Despite the serious damage inflicted by Israel over the past two years, pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq remain a strategic factor. Even where they did not intervene directly, they raised the temperature and forced the attackers to remain on edge.

The broader effort to neutralize Iranian influence has therefore backfired. Iran has emerged bloodied but still standing. Even if Tehran’s claims that any settlement must happen on its terms are partly negotiating tactics, one thing is already clear: Iran’s regional weight has not diminished in the way Washington and West Jerusalem intended.

Negotiations with Tehran are now unavoidable. The real question is what Iran itself wants.

Its previous strategy of regional expansion contributed to many of the crises now engulfing the Middle East. There is also the unresolved issue of its nuclear program. What exactly is Iran seeking, and what price is it prepared to pay? Iran appears to have entered a new internal phase as well, with power shifting further toward security institutions. That leadership will now have to weigh ambition against reality.

For the wider region, the implications are profound.

The Gulf monarchies have had a sobering experience. There will be no return to the comfortable old formula in which security could simply be outsourced to Washington in exchange for money and loyalty. That arrangement, which underpinned the region since the Cold War, has been badly shaken.

Publicly, the Gulf states are unlikely to make dramatic gestures. But privately, their search for new hedges and new partners will intensify. China, South Asia, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe will all become more important in their calculations.

That doesn’t mean the Gulf will accept Iranian dominance. The monarchies will not tolerate Tehran having unchecked influence over the Persian Gulf or the ability to dictate terms in the Strait of Hormuz. Their policy is likely to become more complex: containing Iran where possible while engaging with it where necessary.

Israel, meanwhile, has not achieved its stated aims either. However loudly victory is proclaimed, the basic strategic reality has not changed. The Iranian factor remains. It has not been eliminated, nor weakened enough for Israel to feel genuinely secure.

The domestic consequences for the US are harder to judge. Trump’s self-congratulation already rings hollow, but much will depend on economics. If oil markets stabilize, the White House will try to move on quickly and insist disaster was averted thanks to Trump’s leadership. Whether that helps Republicans in the November midterms is unclear.

Still, Trump has always had one instinct his critics often underestimate: He knows how to survive setbacks and reframe them.

The larger conclusion, however, goes beyond Trump. The US remains immensely powerful. Its military reach, financial leverage and ability to shape events are still formidable. But they are not limitless. America can still influence outcomes but can no longer simply impose its will at any cost.

That lesson has now been absorbed far beyond Tehran. Allies and adversaries alike will draw their own conclusions. Iran may be a special case, but a precedent has been set.

This is another step toward a different world, one in which coercion is less decisive and the old assumptions about American omnipotence increasingly obsolete. Trump may wish to replace a liberal American-led order with an illiberal one under US dominance. But the events of recent weeks suggest something else: a world moving beyond any order Washington can fully control.

This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and was translated and edited by the RT team.

When President Trump made the fateful decision at the end of February to go into Iran with full force and decapitate its leadership, there were a number of likely consequences to that decision that the President, apparently, did not fully take into consideration. Foremost among these was Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, putting a stranglehold on a critical route of international trade and hence the global economy – an outcome which had been widely discussed and expected beforehand but which, as Trump himself has stated, took him by surprise. It soon became clear that the President had expected a quick and decisive victory in Iran and didn’t fully consider the potential fallout of failing to achieve that. 

But it’s not only the consequences of failure that the President and his advisors seem not to have fully considered. It’s also certain consequences of the operation’s success, or even of its having been undertaken at all – especially the success of its decapitation strike, during negotiations, on Iran’s top leaders at the outset. One such consequence is the chilling effect that this move was likely to have on one of the top declared priorities of Trump’s presidency: improved relations with Russia and a negotiated peace in Ukraine. It’s not clear whether he is personally aware – as many of his advisors must be – of certain foreboding undercurrents in Russian political sentiment that have been developing and gaining ground over the past two or three years, and which his invasion of Iran has almost certainly exacerbated.  

Being vaguely aware of these currents among Russia’s military and political elite, and wanting to learn more about what impact the US attack on Iran has had on the political mood within Russia, Jonathan McCormick (Marker) spoke with Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the influential foreign affairs journal Russia in Global Affairs. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): There’s been a lot of discussion about the impact of the war with Iran on the economies and strategic objectives of various countries. And in all these discussions, Russia seems always to come out on top. From your perspective, how has the Iran crisis actually impacted Russia, and the political mood within the country? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Of course this is closely watched in Russia. And I would say the impact is ambivalent. I know that in the West, many commentators assume that what is going on with Iran is favourable for Russia. And it’s true that economically, of course, we see oil prices going up – which is pretty important for the Russian budget at this point, because we have economic problems. And additionally, there’s a further sense that the whole attention of the United States and the Europeans will be diverted from Ukraine, and that the capacity to deliver arms to Ukraine might be limited. Both points are fair. But I don’t believe many people in Russia think that these are significant factors in the long term, or even the medium term. Because what the Americans and Israelis have done has caused a major disruption, obviously. And Trump miscalculated heavily, expecting an easy and quick defeat of the Iranian regime, which of course didn’t happen. And now no one knows how to get out of this.

It looks like Trump cannot simply declare victory and go home, because Iran has demonstrated the efficiency and the capacity to block the most important strategic sea route in the world. And if Trump allows Iran to get away with this, it would mean a significant blow, a huge blow to the prestige of the United States.

So now the Americans have to do something to unblock it, and to guarantee for the future that something like this will not happen again. And that’s a very risky operation. I can imagine the Americans will simply have to do it, but it’s very risky. But anyway, this is the short term outlook. In Russia, many people are looking at it through a more long term lens. And from this perspective, the whole thing could be pretty devastating for international relations at large. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Well, on that point, the US has actually made a series of aggressive moves recently: first Venezuela, then Cuba – which is ongoing, the Americans may well invade – and now Iran. And in the case of Iran, the US attacked and killed their leaders while actually in negotiations with them. And of course, Russia is also in negotiations with the US. How does this sort of thing affect diplomatic relations, especially with countries like Russia that have an adversarial relationship with the United States? Are people in Russia looking closely at this? Are they worried about it? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, absolutely. People both at the top, and in the more rank and file public, have come to a couple of conclusions based on what happened this year, starting with Venezuela and then all the other moves. First of all, as you said, diplomacy has been discredited – heavily, massively. Because what the Americans and Israelis have demonstrated – with the Americans in the lead – is that negotiations do not mean anything. It can happen that those with whom they’re negotiating will be killed immediately, even during the negotiations. This was already demonstrated to a lesser extent last year when the Israelis attacked Iran, and even more so when they tried to kill the Hamas negotiating team in Doha, in an attack on Qatar. Which was absolutely outrageous, of course. And as you said, these same people, the same US negotiators, are conducting negotiations with Russia. Of course, Russia and Iran are different, it’s not exactly the same. But the aftertaste of that is strong. So it will be pretty difficult for Mr Kushner and Mr Witkoff to fully regain trust. Secondly – and from my point of view, this is more important and more dangerous for the international situation – the very fact of the possibility of a decapitation strike, which at once eliminates everybody, the whole political leadership – this is being very seriously considered here. First of all, because it is seen as proof that the Americans are actually capable of doing anything. It’s a kind of lawlessness. Whatever they imagine is to their benefit, they will do. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): In terms of assassinations and decapitation strikes, that sort of thing? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, assassinations of leaders – which until recently was not very common. Maybe historically, but not in the 20th century for example. But in Russia, this is having an additional impact. Beginning in 2022, and especially since 2023, we’ve been having an interesting, and somewhat terrifying, debate here in Russia, about the nuclear factor. Some have been arguing that in the case of real trouble, Russia should be ready to use nuclear weapons, even without any nuclear provocation from the other side. The debate was launched by certain commentators and scholars – in particular by Professor Karaganov, a senior colleague of mine. Of course, the idea is not to persuade the whole leadership to use nuclear weapons. Rather it’s the opposite – to avoid this scenario, by lowering the threshold for usage, as a credible deterrent. And to some extent the debate has had an impact, because Russia did correct the concept of its nuclear policy – not in support of immediate usage, but as suggested, the threshold was lowered. Of course, it’s a big debate. I would not say that the people arguing for that view are in the majority here, not at all. But after what happened in Iran, I think the national leadership has moved, at least psychologically, closer to the position of people like Professor Karaganov. Because they see that nuclear arms – the red button, the final red button – might be the only guarantee, the only means against such an aggressive policy. You remember from Cold War times, the whole system of the “dead hand” that could still launch a nuclear attack even after its own country had been annihilated – there’s that famous movie by Stanley Kubrick, Dr. Strangelove. I don’t insist, of course, that we are moving towards that. But again, with the psychological impact of such behaviour on international politics, in particular within Russia, we’re looking at very disturbing scenarios now which we couldn’t imagine a couple of years ago. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Some months ago there was an incident where it looked like Putin’s residence in Valdai was targeted by a drone strike. And I remember there was a general feeling coming out of Russia that the Americans were likely involved – which of course led people to doubt the sincerity of American negotiations. From your perspective, did this incident have a serious impact on how Russians view the Americans? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: You know, it’s difficult to judge, because this episode was put on a very high level initially. And we remember some moves – including when Russia’s chief of military intelligence personally visited the US Embassy in Moscow to deliver some documents proving that it was an attack. But the Americans disregarded that. They said they didn’t receive sufficient evidence that this was the case. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I believe he gave them some actual electronics containing targeting data, didn’t they? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, some sort of chip. But paradoxically, the issue then disappeared. We heard no more about it – either in the Russian political position, or in their negotiations, or continued statements. So, I don’t know what that was.

But, of course, as we already discussed, what happened in Iran has demonstrated to many Russians that there are absolutely no limits to what the Americans might be willing to do. They’ll do whatever they think is good for themselves, and that’s it. And this is being projected onto everything else – including Ukraine, of course.

And the Maduro case – that was something else again. To some extent, it was more shocking – because we had already seen the killing of leaders. We saw it done by the Israelis in Lebanon and in Iran. But just to abduct a functioning head of state – that’s quite new. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Russia has been supporting Iran throughout this conflict – at least, it seems, in terms of providing critical intelligence. And as the situation has escalated – and in response to certain extreme threats made by Trump toward Iran – Russia has at least once issued a strong statement warning the US against a certain course of action. Do you or others in Russia perceive any risk that this situation could lead to a direct confrontation with the US?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Not really. It’s not necessarily the case that we would get into a direct confrontation with the US over this particular issue. It’s true that early last year, a couple of months before the 12-day war, Russia signed a treaty – a strategic partnership – with Iran. This treaty is pretty cautiously formulated, and it’s not binding, I would say. And to be accurate about the Russian position, Russia is in a pretty delicate situation here. Because the Russian leadership actually has a rather tense relationship with Iran – and at the same time basically a good working relationship, and a very extensive one, with the Gulf monarchies. Russia has a lot of converging and diverging interests with Turkey.

Russia has a not very good relationship, but an extensive one, with Israel. And in the case of Putin and Netanyahu – I don’t know whether they like or dislike each other, but they normally understand each other very well, because both are pretty straight-to-the-point kind of guys.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): And how would you characterize Russia’s current relationship with the Americans? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: With Trump, despite all the nuances we discussed earlier, Russia – and Putin in particular – doesn’t want to break with Trump, because at the end of the day there is still the expectation, the hope, that some kind of settlement can be negotiated between Russia and the US on Ukraine. I wouldn’t say it’s a very big chance, or a very high expectation, at this point. But still, it’s something. And Putin doesn’t want completely to disrupt his relationship with Trump. So within this complicated equilibrium of relations, it’s not so easy to know how to navigate in a proper manner. And I think that’s why Putin has been pretty silent. He hasn’t made any statements since the war against Iran began. He’s had a lot of phone calls, and phone diplomacy, and probably discussed certain things with all involved, but never public statements. It’s quite remarkable, really. So again, coming back to your question – at the end of the day, I don’t think Iran’s situation will create a casus belli for Russia to involve itself in a direct conflict with the United States. But the atmosphere is very, very complicated, and there’s a question as to how Russia will be able to manoeuvre through it.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): In terms of the global impacts of the war with Iran – apart from energy, a lot of people are also worried about the possibility of a widespread threat to food security. And in the case of the Gulf States, even water security – if the desalination plants are destroyed. And all of this, of course, could lead to more wars. How are these issues being looked at inside Russia? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: In terms of Russia itself this is not a big problem, because Russia is self-sufficient when it comes to food security. We do have certain shortages and certain deficits – like for example, in the process of enhancing and improving the whole food industry. Many of those things that are needed have been imported from other countries, from Europe in particular. But in general, Russia can survive very easily in terms of food, even if isolated. But when it comes to the global situation – yes, this is serious indeed. The Ukrainian crisis, when it started, created problems – but they were more or less resolved. Partly by force – to be frank, Russia failed to isolate Ukraine from the world market. But also diplomatically – as despite all the hostility, Russia was not absolutely committed to this. So at the end of the day, it worked. This time it is worse, because we see a blockade of the world’s most important channel through which fertilizers come, and elements to produce fertilizers. And just now, at this time of year, when countries have to prepare for agricultural work – this is really bad. Especially for Asia – in countries like India, Bangladesh and others, this could be really disastrous if it continues. So Russia, of course, is ready to extend support to so-called “friendly countries”, those who did not introduce sanctions against Russia. But the problem is still pretty severe – because even if those countries quickly reorient their relationships toward other partners, like Russia, this cannot be accomplished easily or in a few days. It will take months to rearrange the whole system, and then it will be too late. So I think this is a real possibility, and one of the serious dangers we face. That’s why Trump is so nervous about this, and wants to stop it. But of course, in this situation, the blockade of Hormuz is the only means Iran can employ against the Americans. And of course, they will use it. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Let’s talk a bit about Europe. Obviously Europe has been trying since 2022 to rid itself of all energy imports from Russia, and to a large extent has done so. But now, with the war in Iran and the closure of Hormuz, it seems Europe will be facing a critical energy situation. Is there any sense within Russia that Europe might come and ask to have its energy imports resumed? And what do you think Russia’s response would be if that happened?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Well, I think it’s pretty ambivalent on Russia’s side. On the one hand, to be frank, of course Russia would be very much interested in resuming exports to Europe, because those contracts and relations cannot be replaced. Not with Asia, not with anybody else. Asia might partially compensate for the loss of Europe, but not entirely. But at the same time, the European Union has proved itself to be an absolutely unreliable partner – a 200% unreliable partner. So unreliable, in fact, that it is ready to act against its own interests, even to its own harm – to damage itself, in order to punish Russia. And of course, this makes things very difficult.

Even if, theoretically, we assume that the Europeans now decide to come to Russia, it will be very difficult to restore trust, to restore confidence. Frankly, I don’t see it happening. And I cannot imagine how it could, because that would mean basically the elimination, the cancellation of the whole policy conducted by the European Union for more than four years now.

And this is not just a policy of confrontation with Russia, or simply the replacement of Russian energy. This is very much a principled position – even proclaimed early on as a holy war, a holy war between good and evil. And nothing has changed since then. Okay, they don’t say it as frequently as they used to do, but it’s still there. The Americans may be more flexible, insisting as they do that they want to negotiate a deal for both sides – that they are not on either side, and so on. Which may be hypocritical, but still, it shows some flexibility. But with Europe, it’s different. Europe is still committed to its initial position: Russia must not gain anything at all from this war – Russia has no right to gain anything. And the war should continue as long as it takes for Ukraine to win. This will be difficult, of course, in the context of a severe energy crisis, but I don’t see how they can change it. Maybe I’m underestimating the flexibility of some European politicians. But so far, they’ve never demonstrated this skill vis-à-vis Russia.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I believe the Belgian prime minister, Bart De Wever, has recently moved a bit in that direction. 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes – but I think, at the end of the day, it depends on one particular country. It depends on Germany. Because Germany was the biggest consumer. Germany had the most extended relationship with Russia, the biggest economic relationship, biggest energy relationship. And Germany was the key element of this new policy of cutting off Russia: We’ve cut it off completely, we can never restore it, we will never go back, and so on. And historically we know that in many respects, what happens in Germany defines the whole European political environment. So we will see. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): I want to ask about the ongoing dispute between Zelensky and Orban. It seems Ukraine is blocking Russian oil going to Hungary, Orban responded by vetoing the EU’s 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine, and Zelensky responded with a thinly veiled threat to kill Orban, or his family. And with Orban up for election this month – an election he could conceivably lose – the EU is trying very hard to use the opportunity to get rid of him. And so it looks like the whole future of the war in Ukraine could be hanging on the results of this one election. How are people in Russia looking at this situation? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Well, this is, of course, a moment of glory for Hungary. Who could imagine that this local election, pretty small on the global scale, would make such a big noise? On the Ukrainian side, Zelensky believes that he can afford to do anything towards anybody because he is in the right – he is fighting against Russia, and so on. As for the election, I would neither underestimate nor overestimate its significance, or the significance of Orban’s position. I suppose that if he wins and remains in power, the European Union will do everything it can to find some way around him – although this will be not easy, because it will undermine many aspects of the European Union.

In Russia, I think this situation is seen as a symptom, as one more sign of how severe the gap is between all of us, and of how nervousness creates aggressiveness – from Ukraine towards Hungary, and from Europe towards Hungary and towards anyone they believe is pro-Russian. Although neither Orban nor Fico, for that matter, is really pro-Russian – they are simply trying to keep some kind of balance for their economies.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): There are people who believe that all of this tension, all this splintering within the EU, is only going to get worse. How are people in Russia evaluating the future of the EU?

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Of course, many people here discuss and speculate about the future of the European Union. And it seems clear that Orban per se, or Hungary per se, cannot undermine the European Union significantly. But we’re hearing more and more dissenting voices, for example from the Belgian prime minister, as you mentioned, or the Italian prime minister, Meloni, who is not in favour of what Trump is doing in Iran, for example. I think the European Union is in confusion – in a confused situation. To some extent this is bad for Russia, because a confused European Union – which is feeling serious problems regarding its own integration – needs the Russian menace, and needs Ukraine as a herald of the free world, in order to keep itself going and to deal with internal problems. It needs to divert public opinion away from its multiple internal troubles, and towards this issue of an imagined external threat. As we discussed earlier, some people – especially in the West – believe the Russians are very happy to see what is happening in the European Union. Okay, there might be some Schadenfreude, but on the whole Russians understand that an uncertain, nervous and confused European Union might become even less able to make rational decisions vis-à-vis Russia. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Coming back to Ukraine – how do you see the future of that conflict, and its possible resolution? What do you think Ukraine will look like, and Russia-Ukraine relations, after this war is finished? It seems obvious there are nationalists in Ukraine that won’t accept any kind of settlement, and presumably they will still have weapons. How does this future look from your perspective? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: It’s a question which I can hardly answer, because the outcome of this war – the endgame – is still not clear. In spite of the fact that Russia generally prevails on the battlefield, this advantage has not been enough to achieve a breakthrough. It’s not easy for us to admit, but the Ukrainians are resisting pretty bravely. Nobody can be sure that it will end anytime soon – for example with the collapse of Ukrainian defences or the Ukrainian state. This could happen, because the severity of internal problems within Ukraine is huge. It’s really enormous, and it’s growing – in terms of demography, in terms of everything. But no one knows when. And to be honest, Russia is suffering some problems as well. The whole situation has turned into a full-scale attrition war, and there’s no telling how long it will continue. I think we are approaching a point where the situation will be clarified, either diplomatically or militarily – but again, I don’t dare to guess.

What is clear, however, about any post-war Ukraine-Russia situation, is that any Ukraine that will still be in place after the war – reduced, exhausted, destroyed, whatever – any remaining Ukraine will be an arch-enemy of Russia. And it will be something worse than the India-Pakistan situation.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Worse than India-Pakistan? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, worse. It will be similar, but much worse, because of the closeness of the two countries – because of many things. And I think many people here understand that if Ukraine remains in place – however this war ends – Ukraine will pose a very long-term problem and threat to Russia. And there’s no reason to believe that Ukraine will disappear or be totally destroyed. And that’s why some people here argue that we shouldn’t stop – even if it’s difficult, even if it’s costly, we should continue. Because otherwise, we will create a huge precondition for another war to happen pretty soon. And that war might be much worse than this one, because then it will be a war between Russia and NATO, not between Russia and Ukraine. And so that’s part of the current debate. I wouldn’t say it’s the only view, but that’s what you can hear in Moscow and in many other places.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Is there still actually a worry that Ukraine could end up joining NATO? Because it seems to me that a lot of people on the European side have pretty much given up on that. 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: No, not necessarily joining NATO. Because NATO has no appetite for it, because Ukraine has finally realized it’s a bad idea, because the Americans are absolutely not in favour of it, and so on. But the question of formal NATO integration is just a symbol – it’s not something that actually matters. The scale to which Ukraine is already part of the Western military and political machine is enough. You don’t need to be formally integrated into NATO. What’s probably more important for the Ukrainians is the European Union. Because if they were to join, that would create new opportunities. But frankly, I simply cannot imagine that the European Union would accept such a Ukraine. That would ruin the European Union completely, both economically and politically. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): So when you say Russia is worried they could be at war with NATO next time, you’re not talking about Ukrainian membership – you mean a direct war with NATO? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, I mean a war with NATO. Because the European part of NATO will never, in a sense, surrender – they will never accept the fact that this war brought about this result. And in the event that a new war does erupt after some time, I’m afraid that this new war will be much harder. There will be much more mutual hatred, even compared to what we have today. A postponed hatred is sometimes worse than the present one. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): You mentioned earlier that Orban and Fico are kind of exceptional in that they’re not really pro-Russian, but are pragmatic and looking after their own economies, which involves having decent relations with Russia. Does Russia see Hungary and Slovakia today as somehow different from the rest of Europe? And what do you think Russia’s attitude will be towards these countries in the context of future situations or confrontations? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, indeed, Russia sees Hungary and Slovakia as countries with a different position. And despite the fact that both countries are very small, they’ve demonstrated a very firm position, both of them. Which is, of course, appreciated in Russia very, very much. But having said that, realistically speaking, of course neither Hungary nor Slovakia, nor even a larger bunch of central European countries – which might include Czech Republic under Babiš, or I don’t know, maybe Bulgaria – would be enough to make an important, decisive influence on European policy. And to imagine a separate relationship between Russia and individual countries inside the European Union, countries that have different positions, that’s very difficult. Because how to go about this? These countries are so fully integrated into the European system that they are basically limited in their sovereign decision-making. Which was the whole idea, after all, of integration. Of course, in the middle-term perspective, I can guess – and many Russian experts expect – that the European Union will change as well. Because European integration, as it was designed in the 20th century and then developed in the 21st century, cannot survive. It will change.

I don’t mean the collapse of the European Union – I mean that the model of integration will need to change in order to correspond to what is now a completely different international environment.

And then we will see. But so far as I understand, there is absolutely no clear idea within Europe itself as to how to change it – neither among the establishment, nor among those so-called populist parties. Because the original model seemed to be forever – but now it is not.

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Do you mean because of international pressures – the various wars, Ukraine and Iran, and now energy issues? The pressure on Europe because of all these things coming together? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, indeed, all these things are coming together. But I think the more important factor is that the whole idea of this European integration was designed for a peaceful world. Even during the Cold War – because the Cold War in Western Europe was actually pretty peaceful. There were a lot of fears, but it was a very stable, peaceful situation. And of course, after the Cold War, people believed that all the big threats were now gone. So this model was not designed for a wartime situation. And the world today is moving towards a situation of war in general – not just Iran, not just Ukraine, but in general. There is a very, very high level of hostilities, and at all levels. So Europe will have to change. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): You personally have been targeted by Europe and added to the EU’s sanctions list in December, along with a number of others. Did this surprise you? What do you think is behind it? And to what extent has it impacted your life? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: I did expect it, actually, because I’m a public person. I’m very much on the stage and the screen, and I appear once a year with the President of the Russian Federation. So the whole world sees me. And actually, if you read the explanation for the sanctions as written in the official document, I felt very much pleased. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Pleased? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Because it seems my role was highly appreciated – my role as a person who shapes Russian debate, who shapes Russian public opinion. I never believed I was that important. So I would like to thank the external service of the European Union for pointing this out. As to whether it’s had an impact on my life – to some extent, yes. Because I cannot travel to the European Union anymore. I haven’t done so anyway for quite some time, and I didn’t have any plans to do so, but still – before this, there was at least the possibility, and now that’s been ruled out. My only real disappointment is that my favourite city in the world, which I love passionately, is Rome. I think it’s absolutely the best city in the world, and unfortunately I can no longer visit it. As for practical life – yes, the sanctions of the European Union do have a certain impact on my capacity to make financial transactions – even with countries which are not part of the European Union. The influence of the Western world, both America and Europe, is quite big actually, even on places that are outside it. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): How do you perceive this step taken by the European Union, in terms of its actual effectiveness in bringing about some sort of result? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: I think it’s a stupid move. Because, if we assume that sanctions are designed to have an influence on policy, this will not change anything. First of all, because I’m simply not someone who can shape policy. And secondly, even if I could, I don’t believe that under pressure I would. And there’s another aspect to this.

The ability to communicate with our counterparts in the West – to interact, to discuss important issues – is now absolutely minimized, limited to almost zero.

Because people like me, and my colleagues in the Valdai Club and other organizations affected by these sanctions – yes, we are on the side of the Russian Federation, but we are always trying to find ways to build up or maintain relationships, in particular with people in the European Union. And in fact, within the Russian context we are actually quite liberal. If the European Union rejects us, then I’m afraid Europeans will not have any vis-à-vis in Russia for a very long time. Okay, that’s the choice they make. We can live without it. But it’s strange. And frankly, I could not imagine something like this happening five years ago. 

Jonathan McCormick (Marker): Do you have any sense of whether these sanctions will outlast the war – whether you’ll still be sanctioned even after open hostilities cease and there is some sort of dialogue, some normalisation? 

Fyodor A. Lukyanov: Yes, I think it will outlast the war. And I’m afraid that even after the war – even in the beginning stages of normalisation – there will be a very long process of bargaining. Both Europeans and Russians – because we introduced many sanctions as well – will attempt to sell them back at the highest possible price. So frankly, I don’t expect the sanctions to be lifted during my lifetime. I’m not so old, but not so young either.

Marker

For citation, please use:
Sviridov, V.Yu., 2026. Russia in Africa: From Minority to Majority. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(2), pp. 142–153. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-2-142-153

This year will see the third Russia-Africa Summit. This platform, which brings together Russia, 54 African countries, the African Union, and regional integration associations, has been recognized as successful: efforts have been taken to maintain regularity and ensure continuous communication between the events. Since the first October 2019 Summit, Russia-Africa dialogue has been expanded with additional mechanisms: preparations are underway for a second Russia-Africa Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and sectoral tracks on digitalization, food sovereignty, energy, and medicine are being devised or running. But the platform’s role has changed, from promoting bilateral relations and explaining Africa’s importance to Russia in 2019 and 2023 to reporting on progress and discussing risks in 2026.

Russia’s objectives and strategy in Africa were widely discussed by experts and scholars in 2018-2021, but mainly with a focus on the extent to which Africa is important for Russia’s foreign policy. Several dedicated reports (Maslov et al., 2021) and publications facilitated the adoption, at the 2023 Summit, of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan, as a roadmap for cooperation in 2023-2026. These discussions were also summarized in a fundamental article by Alexei Drobinin (2025), Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Foreign Policy Planning Department, which underscored Russia’s interest in “African civilization’s internal consolidation and prosperous sovereignty-based development.”

The changes in Russia’s external environment since 2022 have dispelled any doubts about Africa’s relevance for Russia. The continent offers the Russian government new foreign partners and opportunities, and offers business new markets and partners, investment opportunities. Russia is strengthening engagement by setting up embassies, specialized financial mechanisms, expert councils, and civic and research organizations (Maslov and Sviridov, 2023). Trade volume grew from $18 billion in 2021 to $28 billion in 2024.

Yet Russia’s key achievement in recent years has been most African countries’ friendly neutrality regarding the Ukraine crisis, as displayed in UNGA voting and top-level communication. Russia’s Africa policy has several official vectors, including opposition to neo-colonialism and support for African countries’ sovereignty. This approach is particularly seen in Russia’s growing military-political influence in the Sahel region (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso), where it has partially filled the vacuum that emerged after France, other EU countries, and the U.S. reduced their presence, partly due to events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific.

This might seem to suggest that discussions about Russia’s Africa policy are no longer necessary. Despite Russia’s habit of “avoiding clear goal-setting when the future is uncertain” (Bordachev, 2024, p. 7) and shortage of resources, Moscow has established itself as an influential actor in Africa, alongside the U.S., the former colonial powers, Türkiye, the UAE, India, China, South Korea, and Japan.

Russia’s practical approach—centered on expanding trade and enhancing its position in areas where opportunities emerge—has yielded tangible results.

However, several questions remain. How can mutual political understanding be translated into practical cooperation, and how should the Russian government and businesses support it? What are Russia’s objectives in expanding engagement in regions such as the Sahel? To what extent do Russian and African approaches to ‘sovereignty” and ‘multipolarity’ correlate? Although Russia has made notable success in Africa, further work is needed to develop the conditions and mechanisms to achieve sustainable progress.

Between Old and New

The success of Russia’s return to Africa, in the late 2010s, cannot be detached from the broader global context.

Firstly, Russia re-entered Africa belatedly, after China (early 2000s) and India (late 2000s to early 2010s), when enthusiasm around the continent had already begun to wane. By this time, the commodities crash had triggered a recession in most leading regional economies, and many Africans saw risks in growing debts to China.

Secondly, Africa’s consumption, international role, and decision-making independence were growing, and African countries were seeking new partners.

Thirdly, Western countries had downscaled their involvement in Africa for various reasons. Cooperation with Russia was seen as an alternative.

Moscow trumpeted its return and achieved some success, as mentioned above. But African countries’ interest should not be overstated. While the 2019 Summit was better-attended (with more than 40 heads of state), similar to the forums hosted by China and the U.S., the 2023 Summit and 2024 Ministerial Conference were much less authoritative: 20 heads of state and 36 foreign ministers, respectively.

Closer examination reveals that many of Russia’s achievements were due less to systemic efforts than to favorable circumstances and emerging opportunities. For example, growth in trade in food, fertilizers, fuel, and arms  was a result not only of Russian investments in supply chains and personnel training, but also of price fluctuations, Russia’s forced reorientation towards new markets, and short-term procurement initiatives by individual countries. These ties may remain sensitive to changes in the economic and political environment and, in some areas, to the lack of a solid institutional foundation.

African states’ voting in the UN General Assembly is commonly cited in support of claims about Russia’s success in Africa. However, in general, UNGA voting is becoming an increasingly limited indicator of states’ political orientation, as states often separate their declarative positions in multilateral forums from their practical foreign, economic, and security policies. Moreover, many African countries tend to abstain on issues that they do not see as directly affecting their core interests, while Russia interprets such abstentions as politically significant (Panin, 2023). The states that consistently actually align with Moscow at the UNGA tend to have limited economic resources and greater dependence on external assistance. By contrast, some less economically vulnerable states that have declared strategic partnerships with Russia, such as Egypt (a BRICS member) and Nigeria (a BRICS partner country), have not always supported Russia on key resolutions (Safranchuk et al., 2023).

There remains a gap between demonstrative activity (forums, visits, and public statements) and the implementation of concrete projects. Investment agreements announced at summits, intergovernmental commissions, and bilateral meetings have not progressed beyond declarations. Since 2019, few major new investment projects have taken shape. This reflects, above all, the constraints facing private Russian businesses (which often operate autonomously from the state in the absence of institutional support) that lack local knowledge and experience in African markets. Private businesses struggle to secure financing, including from Russian, partner-countries’, and African banks. Lack of significant progress is less due to external political factors and more due to weaknesses in projects’ planning and commercial feasibility. This explains why losses are mainly borne not by state-owned companies but by private firms such as RUSAL, Norilsk Nickel, and Lukoil.

Between Minority and Majority

For all the claims of a unified communication space, pan-African institutions, shared historical experience, and civilizational closeness (Maslov, 2023), Africa is a heterogeneous region with 54 countries, and prioritization is necessary. Russia would not develop relations with Asia, the Persian Gulf, or the Caucasus as a whole, except perhaps in certain supplemental areas, such as the humanitarian or educational spheres. Russia’s growing involvement in Africa necessitates taking positions on crises where friendly countries clash: for instance, Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the DRC and Rwanda in the Lake Kivu region, and Algeria and Mali over the Tuareg issue. Russia’s generally constructive relations with different parties to regional conflicts can provide a basis for a more effective mediating role. However, to translate this potential into a solid political resource, it is important to clearly define key partner states that could lend greater coherence and systemic character to Russia’s network of partnerships in Africa.

Prioritizing one region over another (e.g., East Africa over the Sahel, or vice versa) is inappropriate. Regions, like the entire African continent, are not coherent. The prioritization of regions by certain countries (East Africa by China, India, and Japan; North Africa by the EU and Türkiye) is driven by those countries’ geographic locations. Russia’s approach should be functional, rather than territorial, as it seeks the same things—logistics, payment infrastructure, trading partners—everywhere.

Priorities should be dictated by the degree to which countries offer opportunities that align with Russia’s economic-development objectives.

While emphasizing support from the World Majority, Russia’s policy in Africa has at times focused disproportionately on actors with limited political weight and economic potential. This may reduce the overall effectiveness of engagement, especially where resources and institutional attention could instead be directed towards relationships capable of generating broader and more sustainable returns. In this sense, political sympathy is less important than strategic selectivity and clearly-defined priorities.

Russia’s Africa policy includes a search for partners receptive to cooperation, hence its engagement with non-systemic political actors, public commentators, and civic organizations. While this approach finds an eager response from Africans seeking electoral and military-political support, its long-term benefits appear bleak. These actors can offer short-term political openness but not a durable, stable partnership. In contrast, many ruling parties and well-established state institutions across Africa have no explicitly anti-Russian positions, suggesting that closer engagement with systemic actors may offer more practical and sustainable ties.

Systemic parties—such as Chama cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania, the African National Congress in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe—owe their longevity precisely to balanced ‘network-centric’ (Maslov, 2023) communications, including with Moscow. Even pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian forces balance their rhetoric and remain open to dialogue, prioritizing public opinion and economic benefit. This is illustrated by the dynamic growth of trade with Morocco (now around $2 billion annually), Kenya (around $500 million), and others. Trade with the CAR, meanwhile, amounts to about $5 million.

Thus far, Russia has acted as if trying to mimic the USSR’s role in Africa as an ally of impoverished, civil-war-ridden states, to whom it provided nonrepayable grants for building socialism. But such a perception is actually a myth; the USSR cooperated with socialist-oriented countries (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) and capitalist states (Nigeria, Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire). Soviet financial aid, compared to Western aid, was limited and came with stricter conditions. In the 1980s, COMECON provided only about 3% of global aid to Africa (compared to 23% from the U.S. and 10% from West Germany), and Soviet loans mainly financed the purchase of Soviet equipment and construction of industrial facilities by Soviet organizations, its output then served as payment-in-kind for the African states’ resources. This fit into the Socialist Bloc’s broader system of economic cooperation: the USSR strengthened the African countries’ industrial potential, securing necessary resources for itself (Sviridov, 2025).

Until recently, Russia often engaged with politically and economically fragile states not out of a clear preference for them, but rather out of reluctance to disengage from any partners interested in cooperation. In 2024–2025, however, there were signs of reorientation towards more stable and institutionally significant partners, such as Tanzania and Ethiopia, and a more balanced approach to regional conflicts, such as that between Algeria and Mali. Yet some partners, whose practical political and economic potential remains limited, are still ascribed a political weight disproportionate to their strategic importance.

This logic is understandable: politically fragile states can at times offer external partners quicker access, greater diplomatic visibility, and opportunities to establish a presence where the competitive environment is less consolidated. Yet these advantages are often accompanied by heightened risks. Cooperation in such settings tends to unfold under conditions of continuing political uncertainty, limited institutional capacity, and a high degree of personalization of power. As a result, agreements may depend heavily on particular leadership configurations. In such circumstances, external support can strengthen the position of incumbent actors, but shifts in authority—whether through political realignment, internal fragmentation, or abrupt transfers of power—may significantly reduce the durability of earlier understandings.

More broadly, excessive focus on a narrow group of politically fragile partners may sit uneasily with the broader logic of multipolarity that Russia itself emphasizes in its foreign policy discourse. If multipolarity is understood as the strengthening of non-Western centers of influence, then particular importance belongs to regionally-significant African actors—such as Abuja, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Dakar, Dodoma, Cairo, Kigali, Kinshasa, and Pretoria—above all within their regions. African states may welcome the reduced dominance of older external powers (France, the UK, the U.S.), while remaining cautious about simply replacing one outside influence with another. A more sustainable strategy would not substitute for regional actors but rather build partnerships with them in ways that reinforce their own agency and regional roles.

Decades of Russia-Africa engagement suggest that periods of intensified political contacts and ambitious joint initiatives—sometimes associated with large-scale projects such as a Russian military facility or a nuclear power plant—are often followed by periods of slower implementation and reduced momentum. Greater systematization of cooperation and a stronger role of the state may help mitigate this pattern, but alone they are unlikely to eliminate its structural causes. Over the longer term, more sustainable results are likely to come from deeper relations with politically and economically more stable regional heavyweights—such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania, and South Africa—which maintain ties with multiple centers of power and pursue their own strategic agendas.

This, in turn, points to the importance of aligning Russian engagement with those parts of the continent where demand for external partnership and the capacity to absorb large-scale projects are greatest. States with stronger infrastructure, more diversified economies, and greater purchasing power are often the most competitive. Yet this should not be seen as an obstacle: in such environments, long-term projects have the best chance of gaining scale and durability. This suggests the need for a more selective distribution of resources and attention to areas where cooperation can generate broader and more sustainable returns.

However, commercial profitability alone cannot determine priorities. Historically, Russia’s engagement in Africa has largely been shaped by the state, while private businesses—including some of the most commercially successful actors—have not always been willing or able to associate themselves too closely with Russia’s broader foreign policy objectives. Therefore, priority areas of cooperation may require more targeted official instruments, including preferential financing of exports and investment projects, insurance mechanisms, offset arrangements, and long-term contracts in strategically important sectors.

Smaller states, for their part, should not be excluded from this framework. They may remain important partners where they are directly relevant to Russia’s development interests or where investment costs and risks can be shared with third parties. In such cases, engagement can be both practical and politically meaningful, provided it is embedded in a broader and more differentiated partnership strategy.

Within this broader framework, the pan-African track should retain its importance as a platform for humanitarian, educational, and cultural cooperation. These dimensions are essential for shaping a positive image of Russia and sustaining its long-term ties across the continent. But they are unlikely to substitute for clearer prioritization of states and sub-regions. In practical terms, a more focused strategy would place greater emphasis on sub-regional frameworks and on cooperation with a limited number of ‘anchor’ partners capable of giving broader coherence and continuity to Russia’s presence in Africa.

What Can Russian Strategy Be Built On?

Strategy—objectives, available resources, and how to use them—should determine a country’s priorities.

Across various administrations over a quarter-century, the U.S. maintained continuity in Africa in key areas: healthcare (PEPFAR), trade preferences (AGOA), security (consolidated since 2008 under AFRICOM), humanitarian aid, and energy since 2013 (Power Africa). Different administrations assigned these things varying significance, but the overall logic remained unchanged: developing the American economy and ensuring security. After Donald Trump came to power, approaches have been reconsidered, but formats are more likely to be adjusted—e.g., with greater support for U.S. exports and greater emphasis on access to critical minerals—rather than be cast aside. There has already been a shift in aid delivery towards bilateral compacts built around co-financing, measurable benchmarks, stricter timelines, and recipient-side commitments to assume a larger share of costs over time. The reformulation of health cooperation with Kenya illustrates this logic well. In late 2025, Washington did not end aid, but replaced older forms of it with a five-year framework under which the U.S. committed over $1.6 billion, Kenya pledged roughly $850 million of additional domestic spending, and funding was redirected away from NGOs towards the Kenyan state, which is to become more self-reliant. This is not so much a rejection of humanitarian assistance per se but more an effort to make such assistance more conditional, performance-based, and closely-aligned with broader U.S. strategic and economic interests.

Russia’s instruments are not so institutionalized, although the groundwork is now being laid. Russia awards 5,000 scholarships annually to African students (thereby preserving educational and human ties); it exports critical commodities like grain, fertilizers, and petroleum products (so-called ‘humanitarian exports’); and it has established an E-Governance Knowledge Sharing Program aimed at exchanging Russian and African experience of developing and implementing e-governance. But all this requires further development and optimization.

Having tools at hand facilitates targeted goal-setting and helps avoid empty slogans and wishful thinking. Promising areas of cooperation include the agricultural sector (seeds, fertilizers, machinery, storage); energy (small hydropower plants, pipeline construction); digitalization and information security; education and workforce training. For each sector, a set of tools should be created, including preferential (not only financial) support, project expertise, and training.

Russia also has a special offering for export to Africa: ‘sovereignty tools.’ These are specific measures that an African country can take to strengthen its negotiating position with Western or Eastern countries. In food security: food storage systems, digital prediction of extreme climate events, GIS, etc. In mineral extraction: regulatory and other measures that promote the development of domestic markets, rather than exports to the Asia-Pacific or Europe. In digitalization: requirements for data localization, development of fiber-optic networks, and satellite communications.

Sovereignty tools become an extension of sectoral priorities and help create a favorable environment for Russian investors and exporters.

However different their political priorities and development levels may be, African states’ key task is attracting investment. Russia, while declaring its willingness to support African countries’ sovereignty and expand mutual trade, currently does not match its competitors in ability to invest in the continent.

However, these limitations may not be permanent. The size of Russia’s frozen assets in the EU (about $300 billion), its significant military expenditures, and its continued export surplus suggest that it does—or at least will—have access to resources that could support external economic development and, with proper planning, generate income.

* * *

Like a great river, Africa’s development will proceed independently of external intervention. The influence of individual players, including Russia, is often overstated: African countries move along their own economic, political, and social trajectories, determined more by internal factors and regional dynamics. Africa will maintain friendly relations with Russia if Moscow avoids serious mistakes that could disappoint its partners and the new generation of African leaders—mistakes that are more likely if excessive foreign policy ambitions ignore economic and political realities.

Russia’s role should be more supportive than directive. Without imposing its development models, Russia should act as a stabilizer—like a plaster cast—helping Africa properly heal the wounds of historical shocks and maintain the resilience of its institutions. Such a position would allow for genuine, long-term assistance, fostering trust and respect for Russian presence. As a result, by the mid-21st century, Africans will perceive Russia as a partner that contributed to their development and independence—as they still remember the USSR.

For citation, please use:
Lukyanov, F.A., 2026. Force and Its Limits (If Any). Russia in Global Affairs, 24(2), pp. 5–8. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-2-5-8

The war that erupted in West Asia, on the last day of winter, has immediately spread beyond the region. The U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran is a watershed in world politics, even amid the expanding stormy conflicts of the 21st century. The last remaining norms—and even formal rituals, like inventing a pretext to attack—have been demonstratively cast aside. The world has entered a truly predatory era, in which ambitions are restrained only by the limits of one’s strength. Attributing this historical shift to certain leaders’ characteristics would mean underestimating it. Individuals do not determine the zeitgeist; an epoch brings certain personalities to the fore.

The Iran war is also important in that it may show the limits of military force. Iran is the U.S.’s greatest and most serious military opponent since the Korean War. Beyond the military balance, in the context of a deeply interconnected global economy, Iran’s strength lies not in its ability to defeat the U.S. and Israel militarily, but in its ability to disrupt global energy markets by blocking a critical artery. And even Iran’s powerful adversaries lack the resources needed to render it utterly toothless.

If an unambiguous victory is impossible, can there be a negotiated settlement, or deterrence based on a certain balance and understanding of the limits of one’s own capabilities? The military imbalance, which existed from the start, will constantly push the stronger side to seek complete victory—if not last June, then now; if not now, then next time. 

But can something like the last century’s Cold War—an intense confrontation that does not descend into mass bloodshed—be repeated in the current unusual international circumstances?

The turn of winter to spring this year was marked by two 80-year anniversaries: George Kennan’s Long Telegram on 22 February, and Winston Churchill’s Fulton Speech on 5 March. Kennan’s communique is considered the conceptual basis for containing the USSR. And Churchill’s speech, about an Iron Curtain being lowered across Europe, was a declaration of the Cold War.

Both have been much discussed in Russia, whose fierce rivalry with the West has now resumed after a reprieve from the late 1980s to the early 2020s. By inertia, this struggle is called a new incarnation of the Cold War. But is it?

It was George Orwell who termed the new phase of world politics a ‘cold war.’ In a short essay published in 1945, he wrote that the invention of something as destructive as the atomic bomb could replace large-scale wars with “a peace that is no peace.” He was right. Weapons of mass destruction have helped avoid a clash between major powers by making confrontation chronic and indirect. Both Kennan and Churchill spoke of prolonged struggle, a cold war of attrition. They believed that the West had every reason to count on winning. It would be a long and hard endeavor, but it would eventually bear fruit.

The first Cold War is sometimes remembered with nostalgia: supposedly, things were rough and sometimes dangerous, but at least clear and orderly. In truth, none of it should be idealized; contemporary documents and articles are enough to disabuse one of any romantic tint. But there is one thing that distinguishes the current situation from its predecessor: the ‘free world’ now has the experience of winning the first marathon of survival.

The USSR’s self-dissolution surprised its opponents and convinced them of the validity of the prescriptions offered by Kennan, Churchill, and other ideologists at the confrontation’s outset. It infused them with confidence in their own ideological and moral rectitude, as they had won a dangerous conflict without using military force. It was the cleanest of victories, in a way: the opponent simply gave up, recognized his inferiority, and walked out of the ring.

Why this happened is a separate matter. But the West cannot forget the experience. Firstly, the victory seemed so fateful that its revision still seems unthinkable. Secondly, and more importantly: if you succeed once, you will expect to do so again. And since Russia is not the Soviet Union in resources or influence—and the West, on the contrary, has maximally expanded its position over the past thirty years—success is expected much faster this time. After all, the previous round already revealed who is historically right.

Hence the opinion that agreement with Russia is possible only on condition of its new (and this time not even veiled) capitulation. This approach remains unaltered in Europe. But the U.S. has adjusted its approach, in accord with the new administration’s pragmatic desire to end the conflict in Ukraine, which is distracting it from more important issues. Yet the Americans also still believe that Russia should know its place—or rather, understand America’s incomparably more important and well-deserved place.

Russia, of course, intends to prove otherwise.

It is indeed not the USSR, and thus demands recognition of its right to define its own security, but now without attempts to export its worldview or development model. Yet the West perceives Russia precisely as a weakened version of the former superpower, which must be put in its place. Without recognizing any rights, which were recognized then only because the USSR’s power and influence could not be ignored. Russia’s nuclear capabilities are taken into account only in that they continue to ensure the Orwellian “peace that is no peace,” i.e., the absence of direct war.

The risk of mutually assured destruction remains. But the West’s victory in the Cold War led it to believe that total victory is possible through measures that simply bypass nuclear weapons. Such confidence is dangerous, as lessons from the previous confrontation are drawn not only by the winners, but also by the losers. And the latter now recognize that circumvention of the nuclear factor must be made impossible. Things like “decapitation strikes”—the assassination of Iranian leaders with whom supposedly serious negotiations were just being held—make the U.S.’s other opponents even more fatalistically resolved, in the spirit of legends about the “Dead Hand.”

George Kennan lived to the age of 101 to see the aftermath of the Iraq War. He sharply criticized the American geopolitical euphoria after 1991, i.e., after his concept had proven a success. And he specifically recalled the part of his Long Telegram that called for soberly assessing the opponent’s motives and considering the opponent’s concerns (rather than dismissing them and potentially provoking a disproportionate response). The patriarch’s opinion has not been heeded.

No matter how the Iran conflict ends, its outcome will have far-reaching consequences. Is force almighty? How far is it ready to go to prove that it is almighty? And what will be left after that?

For citation, please use:
Trenin, D.V. and Rusakovich, A.V., 2026. The Nuclear Component of the Union State. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(2), pp. 128–140. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-2-128-140

Military alliances of the 21st century differ significantly from those of the 20th. Today, only NATO remains as a hegemon-led bloc. But it is going through a partial decoupling, caused less by a European quest for greater independence and more by a major shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities. As the European Economic Community, the EU economically underpinned the Atlantic bloc. But after the Cold War, it failed to become an independent geopolitical player, a ‘United States of Europe.’ Today, it seeks agency on a military-ideological basis, using the image of Russia as an external enemy, but with highly questionable results.

Associations that emerged in the former Soviet space—the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)—are fairly loose (in truth, incohesive) structures. Unlike Western institutions, they lack bloc discipline and a common ideology. Nevertheless, they perform certain useful functions. The CIS is primarily a historical association with a humanitarian profile; the EAEU is an advanced form of customs union; and the CSTO (the only military organization of the three) is a platform for political consultations and security cooperation, but not a traditional military alliance.

The Cold War was largely fought on the periphery of the world system, while its center was dominated by the stasis of iron curtains, frozen fronts, and impregnable walls. But the 21st century, at least since the mid-2010s, has become an era of great-power competition, dynamism, and sharp turnabouts. The Western alliances still exist, but in practice they rely upon small groups of ‘activists’ that are ready and able to participate in military conflicts. And Washington, when seeking states to pit against its adversaries, turns mostly to those with which it is not even in formal bilateral or multilateral alliance: Ukraine (against Russia), Israel (against Iran), Taiwan (against China). A supportive echelon is drawn from selected allies in Europe and Asia: Germany, Japan, Poland, Australia, and others.

Outside the Western world, the largest powers—China, Russia, and India—eschew blocs, preferring more flexible forms of ‘unlimited’ (but also nonbinding) strategic partnership. China, India, and other BRICS and SCO countries are essentially maintaining a benevolent neutrality towards Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine. The CSTO’s members, formally considered allies by Russia, hold a similar position.

Major non-Western states (especially Russia and China) are often suspected by their neighbors—with or without justification—of seeking regional hegemony. These suspicions can prompt the neighbors to turn to more distant powers, especially the U.S., whose provision of ‘global security,’ as an offshore balancer, underpins its hegemony (i.e., ‘global leadership’).

Russia’s security is seriously threatened by Western use of its neighbors to pressure and (in the case of Ukraine) weaken it. This threat has not yet been fully eliminated. Yet Russia also has two neighbors with whom it has formed full-spectrum military alliances that truly strengthen its security: Belarus and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

With the DPRK, Russia has a classic bilateral alliance that envisions military assistance if one of the parties finds itself at war with a third state. Historically, this alliance dates to the Red Army’s liberation of northern Korea at the end of World War II, and to Soviet aid to Pyongyang during the Korean War. From the very beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, Pyongyang supported Moscow, sending troops in 2024-2025 to help repel the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk Oblast. Under 2024’s Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Russia has similar obligations to the DPRK and provides various assistance to it.

The Russian-Belarusian alliance, on the contrary, is something unique: it is realized within the sui generis Union State, and it features a nuclear dimension.

These characteristics warrant special consideration.

The Union State

The Union State, formalized in 1999 by a treaty signed eight years to the day after the Belovezhya Accords, was conceived as a close-knit confederation of Russia and Belarus, and also as a political model and legal framework for reintegrating other former Soviet republics. The agreement provided for a single economic space, a single currency, and a common parliament and cabinet. But this did not happen, and Russian-Belarusian relations developed along interstate lines. That which was meant to be unified instead became common, joint, or coordinated. The Union State never acquired international legal agency, instead becoming a union of states.

It is, nevertheless, an exceptional phenomenon in the post-Soviet space. Belarus quickly (from 1994) managed to reject the ultranationalist path that was chosen by many other republics, the path of building an independent state defined in opposition to Russia. Belarus did not discard the rich historical heritage that it shares with Russia but did establish its own state ideology, as well as a national identity that coexists with—neither opposing nor dissolving into—the Russian one.

Modern Belarusian statehood has developed and crystallized within the framework of friendly and increasingly close relations with Russia. Politically, as Moscow’s closest partner, Minsk is very sensitive regarding its sovereignty. Economically, it benefits enormously from the common market with Russia. Despite the huge differences in size, population, and economic and military capabilities, Belarus and Russia exemplify equal and mutually beneficial relations between neighbors.

Belarus, positioning itself as a European country, strives to maintain contact with the West wherever possible, notwithstanding long-term European and American sanctions. (In 2025, the U.S. lifted sanctions on Belaruskali and Belavia—although the practical effect for Belavia is limited by the continuation of EU sanctions—and the Belarusian government released and deported several groups of people convicted of crimes against the state.) For many years, the Minsk Dialogue facilitated such contacts. After the Maidan in Kiev, the Russian Spring in Crimea, and the start of civil war in the Donbass, Minsk hosted negotiations between the belligerents, leading to the Minsk Accords on a ceasefire and political settlement.

After an attempted Western-backed color revolution in Belarus in 2020, Minsk amended (but did not eliminate) the multi-vector nature of its foreign policy, and now seeks additional partners to the East. Since 2024, Belarus has been a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China is its second most important strategic partner after Russia. Minsk is also developing ties with the Arab monarchies and Iran. Since 2023, Minsk has hosted annual international conferences on Eurasian security. In 2024, the foreign ministers of Russia and Belarus, Sergei Lavrov and Maxim Ryzhenkov, jointly proposed a set of ideas for a Eurasian Security Charter.

Belarus is not directly involved in the SMO, but Russian troops did operate from its territory at the beginning. Minsk does not officially recognize territorial changes in the former Soviet space, be they in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donbass, or Novorossiya. Although, in 2022, Belarus voted against the UNGA resolution condemning the referendums on incorporating the Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson regions into Russia. Belarus performs some intermediary functions via Ukraine’s embassy in Minsk: in 2022, it hosted the first rounds of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. POW exchanges between Russia and Ukraine also take place mainly on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.

NATO’s proxy war against Russia in Ukraine has important implications for Belarus as Russia’s ally.

Poland is rapidly militarizing and it hosts a U.S. brigade; a German Bundeswehr brigade is stationed in neighboring Lithuania; officials and others in NATO countries are making threats against Russia’s Kaliningrad region. All this requires Russia and Belarus to strengthen their military alliance.

More Than a Military Alliance

Belarus lies astride Central-Eastern Europe’s main geostrategic axis between Berlin and Moscow. Numerous Russian-Polish wars, Charles XII’s campaign, Napoleon’s invasion, and both World Wars proved Belarus to be Russia’s most important line of defense.

This is equally true today, as Belarus is bordered by NATO members Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia to the north and west, and by Ukraine to the south. For its part, Russia serves as Belarus’s political and military ally, its most important economic partner, its strategic rear, and the guarantor of its sovereignty and independent development.

Belarus and Russia form a united line of defense. The indivisibility of their common security space means that Russia considers any attack on Belarus to also be an attack on Russia. Indeed, Moscow would be directly threatened by any invasion of Belarus and by any Western political aggression that forces ‘regime change’ upon Belarus. Hence President Putin sent Russian security forces to Belarus’s border during its political crisis in 2020: pro-Western forces’ rise to power in Minsk was absolutely unacceptable for Moscow.

The Belarusian-Russian military alliance has a solid foundation: a shared civilization; linguistic similarity; the ubiquitous use in Belarus of the Russian language (which Belarusians consider their own); similar though not identical cultures and worldviews; common traditions and Orthodox faith for majorities in both countries. For two hundred years (1793-1991), Belarusians and Russians lived in one state. Importantly, Belarus’s western regions, incorporated in 1939, were never a stronghold of nationalism like those of Ukraine are.

Memory of the Great Patriotic War is deeply embedded in the consciousness of both Russians and Belarusians. The Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk and the war memorial in Khatyn tell of Belarus’s enormous loss of life: a third of its population. The Red Army’s liberation of Minsk on 3 July 1944 has been celebrated since 1996 as Independence Day. This distinguishes Belarus from all other former Soviet republics, where the main state holiday celebrates the proclamation of independence (de facto from Russia).

Belarusians value peace above all. But they understand that their sovereignty, independence, and security can only be guaranteed by friendly, allied, and equal relations with Russia.

Anything else would inevitably turn Belarus into a target for Western interference and an arena for the West’s struggle against Russia, as in the clear and tragic cases of Georgia and Ukraine.

The Russian and Belarusian economies are closely interconnected: since Soviet times, Belarus has been the ‘assembly shop’ of the machine-building industry. The Belarusian and Russian military-industrial complexes are well-integrated. For example, the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant supplies Russia with the special chassis for the launchers of its Topol-M and Yars ICBMs, Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, Bastion and Bal coastal missiles, Uragan rockets, S-400 anti-air missiles, etc.

The strategic cultures of Russia and Belarus have common roots. The USSR’s Belarusian Military District, one of the most powerful in the Soviet military, formed the basis of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The defense policy and military thought of Russia and Belarus are based on a similar vision and common principles. The Union State’s first military doctrine was adopted in 2001, and the most recent in 2021.

Communication between Russian and Belarusian leaders is exceptionally frequent and trusting. Top officials of the Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, and security agencies meet regularly. A regional group of forces has been active since the 1990s. The two countries regularly hold joint exercises, of which the largest and best known is Zapad.

The Russian-Belarusian military alliance is entirely defensive in nature. Since independence, Belarus has strictly limited its army’s foreign deployment. Its 1992 military doctrine provided for deployment only within UN peacekeeping operations. When ratifying the CIS Charter in January 1994, Belarus added stipulations that its forces could be deployed to other members’ territory, and other members’ forces deployed to its territory, only with the approval of the Belarusian parliament.

This provision was later reconceptualized. Belarus’s Constitution, after amendment approved by a referendum on 27 February 2022, states that “the Republic of Belarus precludes military aggression from its territory against other states” (Constitution, 2022, Art. 18). Current Belarusian legislation (Law on the Armed Forces) prescribes procedures for the armed forces’ participation in collective security operations and international peacekeeping. In January 2022, a Belarusian military contingent took part in the CSTO’s peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan.

Initially, there were no Russian military bases in independent Belarus. In 1992, the Belarusian Military District, in its entirety, transformed into the Belarusian Armed Forces. Russia retained only strategic nuclear weapons (soon removed from Belarus), the Vileyka naval communications center, and the Volga early warning station in Baranovichi. Russian proposals for an air base in Belarus, made in the later 2010s, were rejected.

But the military-political situation’s sharp deterioration in the early 2020s, due to the Ukraine crisis, prompted Belarus and Russia to strengthen their joint defense, including through its endowment with an expressly nuclear dimension.

The Alliance’s Nuclear Dimension

Belarus is a non-nuclear state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Belarus’s aspirations to become a nuclear-weapons-free zone and a neutral state were formalized constitutionally in August 1991. At the time of the Soviet Union’s breakup, Belarus hosted strategic nuclear forces totaling about 180 formations, units, and institutions with a combined strength of about 40,000 personnel and 1,120 nuclear warheads (Maltsev, 2003, p. 80).

Under the Agreement on Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons, signed on 21 December 1991 in Almaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to join the NPT as non-nuclear states and to transfer Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. In May 1992, Belarus became a party to the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) by signing its ‘Lisbon Protocol.’ Since 1992, Belarus also participated in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In July 1993, Minsk joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state. In November 1996, the last RS-12M Topol ICBM was removed from Belarus to Russia. In the 1990s, Belarus promoted a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe.

The situation changed after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. Back in late 2021, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said he was considering stationing Russian nuclear weapons in the country in response to possible actions by NATO, specifically the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland. He repeated this warning shortly before the start of the SMO. The 27 February 2022 referendum removed the Constitution’s provisions for Belarus’s neutral and nuclear-weapons-free status.

Russia has been prompted to strengthen its nuclear deterrence by the further escalation of the military confrontation in Ukraine, by NATO’s plans to turn Poland into a leading military force, by the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the UK after a 20-year hiatus, by French statements about possibly extending their nuclear umbrella to Poland, and by discussions (including in Germany) of “European nuclear deterrence” based on the French and British arsenals.

As part of this deterrence, Russia deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Belarus, as announced by President Putin in March 2023. According to official data, by the beginning of 2024, two Russian Iskander-M battalions—with a 480 km range, reaching almost all of the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine—had been deployed. Russia also helped convert Belarusian Su-25 aircraft to carry the (nuclear-warhead-capable) Kinzhal hypersonic missiles.

This was Russia’s first foreign deployment of nuclear weapons since the USSR’s collapse. But it differs from Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe and (in 1962) Cuba in that Belarus participates in nuclear planning and has nuclear delivery vehicles (though their use still requires Russian approval). In May 2023, the Russian and Belarusian defense ministers, Sergei Shoigu and Victor Khrenin, signed the documents regulating the deployment.

This situation resembles that of NATO, which presents itself as a nuclear alliance. However, the Union State is much more than a military alliance of individual states.

The security of the Union State as a whole, and of Belarus in particular, is more important to Russia than Atlantic solidarity and distant European states are to the U.S. Russian and Belarusian security is inextricably linked not only by treaties, but physically and organically.

By the middle of 2023, facilities for the maintenance and secure storage of nuclear weapons had been built in Belarus, and the first weapons arrived shortly thereafter. In 2024, the Belarusian military was trained in the use of NSNWs. In 2025, Belarus selected and prepared sites for stationing Russia’s intermediate-range nuclear-warhead-capable Oreshnik missile. Yet Belarusian officials emphasized that these measures were purely defensive (Belta, 2026). Two S-400 battalions were also stationed in Belarus in response to NATO’s actions (RBK, 2023; RIA Novosti, 2023).

In sum, Russia’s deployment of NSNWs in Belarus is one of its most important steps, since the start of the SMO, to reinforce its nuclear deterrence.

In the middle of 2024, the Russian General Staff supervised an exercise involving Iskander missiles and Kinzhal-armed Su-25s to practice the use of NSNWs. The Belarusian military joined in at the second and third stages of the drills to practice joint planning and the coordinated use of nuclear weapons.

Doctrinal Innovations

Shortcomings in Russia’s concept of nuclear deterrence, which became obvious during the conflict in Ukraine, prompted President Putin in November 2024 to amend the nuclear doctrine. In the “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” Moscow for the first time declared its determination to defend Belarus with nuclear weapons if necessary (Fundamentals, 2024, Art. 18). The new doctrine provides for nuclear weapons’ use not only in response to an adversary’s use of nuclear weapons or other WMDs, but also in the event of conventional aggression against the Union State that critically threatens its members.

The indivisibility of Russian and Belarusian security has also been declared in the “Security Concept of the Union State” (December 2024) and the Treaty on Security Guarantees Within the Framework of the Union State (active since March 2025). The latter calls for the parties’ enhanced joint protection of sovereignty, independence, and constitutional order—referencing foreign-backed pro-Western forces’ thwarted color revolution in Belarus in 2020.

Article 6 of the Treaty terms nuclear weapons an important factor in preventing military conflicts, including nuclear ones, “as well as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and forced measure.” The Treaty replicates the Russian nuclear doctrine’s nuclear guarantees to Belarus, thereby creating a legal basis for the deployment of Russian military bases and NSNWs in Belarus. In addition, by stipulating that Russian nuclear weapons deployed to Belarus will be used by agreement between the parties, the Treaty provides for Belarusian participation in Russian nuclear planning and the general implementation of Moscow’s nuclear policy.

Thus, doctrinal amendments and bilateral treaties have legalized the practice (effective since 2023) of deploying Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. Close cooperation with Belarus has, for the first time in the post-Soviet period, extended Russia’s nuclear deterrence to another state—doctrinally, legally, and operationally. This also constitutes a major shift in Russia’s geopolitical and nuclear deterrence.

Any military aggression against Belarus will inevitably lead to Russia’s military response, which under certain conditions may involve nuclear weapons. Belarus can rely on Russian nuclear protection with more confidence than Western allies can count on U.S. nuclear protection, which is not even mentioned in their treaties of alliance.

Nuclear Energy

The Russian-Belarusian alliance’s nuclear dimension also includes cooperation in nuclear power. One of Russia’s largest investment projects in Belarus has been the construction of the “Belarus” nuclear power plant in Ostrovets, Grodno Oblast. Today, nuclear energy supports Belarusian energy security and technological-industrial development. Yet the road to this point was not easy.

From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Soviet government considered various plans for a nuclear power plant in Belarus, but did not implement them for various reasons. The 1986 Chernobyl accident, which did the greatest damage to Belarus’s southern regions, sharply worsened Belarusian attitudes toward nuclear energy, freezing nuclear plant plans for decades.

It was not until the mid-2000s that Minsk, driven by the Belarusian economy’s demand for energy and by the situation on the international energy market, decided to build a nuclear power plant with Russian help. In 2007, President Lukashenko signed a decree greenlighting the project. The relevant intergovernmental agreement was signed in March 2011. Russia provided Belarus with a $10 billion loan to finance the construction.

The nuclear power plant was designed and built by Russia’s Rosatom, which chose a standard Generation III+ reactor for the project. Its two units became commercially operational in mid-2021 and late 2023. With a total capacity of 2,400 megawatts, they can meet about 40% of the country’s electricity needs, making Belarus a world leader in nuclear energy’s share of electricity generation.

The nuclear sector has supported economic growth and technological development. In September 2025, Belarus decided to build a second nuclear power plant with Russia’s support and assistance. Thus, the Union State is strengthening its nuclear dimension, not only militarily but also in terms of civilian energy.

*  *  *

Nuclear cooperation between Russia and Belarus attests to their deepening integration. Russia’s nuclear guarantees reinforce not only the Union State’s military alliance but the Union State itself. The parties’ security becomes truly unified, foreign policy planning and implementation are coordinated, and economic cooperation proceeds within an increasingly unified economic space.

By coalescing, the Union State is becoming more than a union of states. This places higher demands on Russians and Belarusians, requiring deeper mutual understanding, the harmonization of national interests, the development of common positions, and the implementation of agreed plans. For the outside world, this alliance of differently sized neighbors contributes to a new equality-based order, which may be particularly valuable for Eurasia’s security architecture.

The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus is not just a response to the escalating Ukraine crisis. It is the first implementation of Russia’s expanded deterrence, and grants a nuclear dimension to the Union State, increasing the cohesion of its common security space.

Significantly, the Union State’s transformation into a nuclear alliance is a step towards international agency.

Moscow and Minsk need the closer and deeper coordination of foreign and defense policy, given the military and political instability in Western Eurasia, and especially given the Ukraine crisis, which is unlikely to end after an agreement is signed and ceasefire implemented. Ukraine will long trouble Russian and Belarusian security as a source of instability and threats. As previous forms of allied relations become increasingly irrelevant in the new international reality, Belarusian-Russian integration can serve as a unique model of close and flexible interaction that does not compromise sovereignty.

This research was supported by the RF Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Agreement #075-15-2025-680 as of 21 August 2025.

For citation, please use:
Timofeev, I.N., 2026. The Iranian Crisis and Russia: Seven Lessons. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(2), pp. 96–100. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-2-96-100

The massive Israeli and U.S. airstrikes on Iran hardly came as a complete surprise. For several months, the U.S.-Israeli strike force had been concentrating in the Persian Gulf. Tense negotiations between Iran and the United States had stalled and were unlikely to yield progress.

The deaths of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, members of his family, and a number of senior military and political figures have sent shockwaves through the region. Iran has retaliated with missile strikes against Israel and U.S. infrastructure in the area. The military operation has already disrupted maritime oil shipments in the Persian Gulf and the financial and logistical hubs of the UAE and Qatar. Iran stands a good chance of withstanding the assault, as a full-scale ground invasion appears unlikely. However, the strikes will further erode the country’s industrial base, deepen its economic crisis, and impoverish its population. Should Iran manage to endure this round of aggression, it is unlikely to be the last—unless the current attacks prove prohibitively costly for the aggressors.

The situation offers several important lessons for Russia.

Lesson 1: Sanctions are followed by military force

The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran withstood this economic pressure, but the damage has been significant, growing as Washington managed to expand the coalition of sanctioning countries, internationalizing restrictions through the UN Security Council, and persuading third countries to halt purchases of Iranian oil. Moreover, the U.S. and its allies repeatedly supplemented these sanctions with assassinations of nuclear engineers and intelligence officers (e.g., in 1980, 1987, and 2025), with cyberattacks, and with threats of military attack. This pattern has been applied elsewhere: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela.

For now, direct military force against Russia remains unlikely, largely due to fears of nuclear escalation. Nevertheless, force is being applied indirectly through large-scale aid to Ukraine, including for frequent Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. Despite the recent defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, new forays are possible. European NATO members’ ongoing military modernization increases their liability  to use force at points of contact with Russia—particularly in the Baltic region.

The deterrent effect of Russia’s nuclear weapons could be undermined if the West falsely convinces itself that Russia would not risk using them for fear of a nuclear response.

Military crises between Russia and the West, of one kind or another, are a real possibility.

Lesson 2: Western pressure will be long-term

For years, a strategy of gradual attrition has been employed against Iran. While economic pressure through sanctions once dominated, recent months have seen a shift towards military attrition through repeated strikes. These do not involve large-scale ground operations or occupation; instead, they rely on missile and bomb attacks that steadily degrade the target’s military-industrial capacity. With each new round of escalation, Iran’s ability to resist weakens further. For now, Tehran retains the capacity to launch painful retaliatory strikes, but further rounds may exhaust it.

Russia must therefore prepare for the long-term application of sanctions—measured not in years but in decades. Occasional easing of certain restrictions is unlikely to be followed by their full removal, especially not in sensitive areas such as dual-use export controls. A similar logic applies to the military dimension. Any lull in hostilities, in Ukraine or elsewhere, will likely be followed by a new military crisis.

Lesson 3: Concessions do not work

Throughout its lengthy confrontation with the United States, Iran has made multiple concessions. Most prominently in the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. In exchange for sanctions relief, Iran accepted significant limitations on its nuclear program. Yet just three years later, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the deal and imposed new demands. The concessions bought only a brief respite and ultimately failed to alleviate long-term U.S. pressure.

In the current context of negotiations over Ukraine, Russia has shown notable firmness. This may draw criticism from those seeking peace, as each day of continued fighting is measured in lost lives and resources. But this stubbornness is justified, given that compromises merely provoke new demands. Compromise, at least unilateral compromise, is thus impermissible. Especially given that trust between Russia, the U.S., and Ukraine is virtually non-existent. The Iranian experience only reinforces this caution.

Lesson 4: Leaders in the crosshairs

The attack on Iran demonstrates that legitimate leaders and senior officials have become priority targets. The earlier kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signaled this shift. Leaders have been killed in war before—as in the Soviet storming of Amin’s palace in Afghanistan in 1979, or the deaths of Libyan and Iraqi leaders after U.S.-led interventions. However, such deaths were often incidental. In Iran, we witness the deliberate targeting of the Supreme Leader, his family, and numerous officials.

Russia is acutely aware of the threat to its President and high-ranking officials. Already for some time, assassinations on Russian territory have been attempted—and sometimes accomplished—against military officers, officials, journalists, and civic activists. The Iranian case confirms that protecting the national leadership is now the task of not only the intelligence services but also the armed forces. Gaps in counterintelligence, personal security, air defense, and broader military preparedness can leave leaders dangerously exposed.

Lesson 5: Internal unrest invites external intervention

Shortly before the airstrikes, Iran experienced mass protests driven by internal divisions and economic hardship. Clashes between demonstrators and security forces resulted in numerous deaths. These protests were exploited by Iran’s adversaries and likely seen as indicating that an effective strike might topple the weakened political system, as had been the case in Libya and elsewhere.

The collapse of the USSR demonstrates that internal economic decay and societal divisions can lead to disaster even without external intervention. Effective governance, timely reform, and trust between state and society are essential to maintaining stability. Cracks within society or the elite are tantamount to an invitation for increased external pressure.

Lesson 6: ‘Black knights’ are important, but not a panacea

Even under crushing sanctions, Iran managed to maintain trade with various countries—the literature terms such sanctions-busters ‘black knights.’ In the 1980s and 1990s, Iranian oil was sold at a discount to buyers in Western and Southern Europe, Turkiye, Syria, Japan, India, and China. The U.S. invested enormous diplomatic capital to cut off these flows but could only reduce Iran’s revenue, not eliminate it.

Yet the military-political situation was a different matter. Iran was left one-on-one with its adversaries. Third parties do not help those adversaries, but they do not have the desire or ability to oppose their attacks on Iran, either.

‘Black knights’ can mitigate economic pressure, but they are useless in preventing military attacks.

Russia has similarly reoriented its trade under sanctions, with exports to China, India, and other friendly nations growing rapidly. Yet mutual military-political obligations with them remain absent. Russia will have to confront its adversaries alone, with the recent exception of North Korea’s participation in countering Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Oblast. Moreover, Russia itself ensures the security of its CSTO allies, adding to its own burden and responsibility.

Lesson 7: The need for a balance of power

Unlike many previous targets of U.S. military action, Iran is far from defenseless. In 2025, Tehran responded with domestically produced missiles and drones, and it is doing so again today. While it is too early to assess the weapons’ precision and effectiveness, the U.S. and Israel appear to view the damage from Iranian retaliation as acceptable—so far. Yet Iran has also taken steps previously considered extreme, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to navigation. The U.S. Navy may eventually restore safe passage, but doing so will require time and resources, and success is not guaranteed—especially if Iran remains resilient.

Russia possesses far greater capabilities to counter potential strikes on its territory. Nuclear deterrence aside, Moscow has the means to inflict significant damage across multiple domains and directions. Yet an adversary may deem that damage to be painful but acceptable. Even in the nuclear sphere, the pain threshold can shift. As political struggle intensifies, sensitivity to injury falls, something well-demonstrated by the 20th century.

The Iranian situation inspires little optimism. Instead, it is fostering a fatalistic resolve on all sides, which risks becoming the defining spirit of the coming years.

This article is an edited version of the paper written for the Valdai Discussion Club, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/iranian-crisis-and-russia-seven-lessons/