Hostage-taking by nation-states is emerging as an overlooked consequence of the more unstable and dangerous world that’s been created by the fracturing rules-based order.

In an increasingly might-is-right system of international relations, malign actors have become even more emboldened to take the citizens of Western democracies hostage.

Once primarily the domain of non-state actors, including terror groups, drug cartels and armed gangs, hostage-taking has become a lucrative bargaining chip in the hands of countries like Iran, Russia, China, North Korea and Venezuela. (I was imprisoned by Iran for more than two years on false charges of espionage.)

It has become an unorthodox yet highly effective means of forcing concessions, including prisoner swaps, financial payments and the removal of sanctions.

The unfortunate truth is that hostage diplomacy works, and there is usually a lot to gain and not much to lose for the countries that practice it.

However, very little scholarly research has examined the phenomenon. The data we do have on cases is patchy. This is in part because the governments whose citizens have been taken hostage usually prefer to negotiate in the shadows. We only tend to hear about select cases that attract media coverage.

Part of the challenge in proposing ways to tackle an amorphous problem like state hostage-taking is that, while out-of-the-box thinking is required, some approaches may not be feasible or may not work at all. We shouldn’t shy away from this.

Treating state hostage-taking as a consular issue to be solved via traditional diplomacy hasn’t worked. Bad actors haven’t been deterred; rather the opposite. An innovative new approach is long overdue.

What we’ve found

A new, special edition of the the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (which I guest edited) highlights some possible policy solutions.

Grappling with this issue requires us to ask: what kinds of dynamics are motivating states to take hostages in the first place? And how can governments take better care of former hostages and their families?

The special issue is a collaborative effort between practitioners and scholars, featuring contributors from a variety of backgrounds. These include human rights lawyers who have represented victims, the current UN special rapporteur on torture, activists, specialists in trauma recovery, and even former hostages themselves.

Some of the ideas put forward in our research include:

1) Expanded international legal approaches

This includes reframing state hostage-taking as a form of torture and, under certain conditions, even a war crime or crime against humanity.

UN torture rapporteur Alice Edwards argues this would help open avenues for victims seeking justice. Many have been frustrated by impediments to restitution when a nation-state is responsible for hostage-taking, not an individual.

Legal academic Carla Ferstman suggests governments should look to existing models in the US and Canada and consider passing legislation to allow victims of state-sponsored terrorism to sue hostage-taking states in their domestic courts.

2) Stronger government-led responses to hostage-taking

Many countries don’t have a designated office or role within government to coordinate domestic and multilateral responses to hostage-taking.

These positions exist now in the US and Canada. This step was also proposed in a 2024 Australian Senate inquiry into the wrongful detention of Australian citizens overseas. The government has yet to respond to the inquiry.

3) Innovative models for multilateral rapid responses to hostage crises

Several contributors to the journal have proposed new ideas for how states can do this, including former Canadian Justice Minister and Attorney General Irwin Cotler (with international human rights lawyer Brandon Silver) and former hostage Michael Kovrig (with international security and diplomacy expert Vina Nadjibulla).

Their recommendations include:

• developing rapid-response mechanisms to hostage-taking in pre-existing multilateral groupings, such as the G7 or NATO

• strengthening the Declaration on Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations (launched by Canada and now supported by more than 80 nations)

• imposing multilateral sanctions and other tools of economic leverage against states that engage in hostage-taking.

4) Greater investment in post-detention recovery care for both victims and families

Proposals for taking better care of former detainees came from the NGO Hostage International, human rights lawyer Sarah Teich and an Israeli team involved in designing reintegration programs for Gaza hostages.

These proposals include:

• passing legislation to mandate a “duty of care” by governments to former hostages

• developing new strategies for helping former hostages overcome their psychological challenges, based on emerging research in the field.

Learning from specific cases

It’s also important we learn from the recent incidents of hostage-taking around the world. These need to be viewed as a global problem, not a series of separate incidents to be managed in isolation by governments.

For instance, in an innovative study on Israeli public opinion in the wake of the mass hostage-taking by Hamas and other armed groups on October 7, 2023, our contributors found that feelings of connectedness to hostage families had an impact on how the public perceived hostage deal-making. This emphasises the importance of family advocacy in cases like these.

Other research shows Russia escalated its strategy of taking US citizens hostage as the relationship between the two countries deteriorated, particularly following the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

Russia’s approach differs from that of other hostage-taking states as it appears to be primarily used to target Americans. As such, it should be viewed as a feature of the bilateral relationship.

A way forward

If the world wants to do something about hostage diplomacy, we need to brainstorm, exchange ideas and test solutions, no matter how radical.

What has emerged from our research is that hostage diplomacy is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to identify and even harder to deter and prevent.

This is where scholars and practitioners can play an important role. They are the ones who can gather data, identify trends and focus the attention of policymakers trying to tackle this growing international issue.

Kylie Moore-Gilbert does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Two months into the Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz is still mostly shut. Vessel traffic is running at a fraction of pre-war levels, with the patchwork of ceasefires, blockades and re-closures since February 28 not restoring confidence on the bridge of any tanker.

Hormuz has long been understood as one of the world’s central trade chokepoints. It normally carries around 20 million barrels of crude and oil products each day, as well as roughly a fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. A third of the world’s helium and a similar amount of the urea that ends up as fertiliser also pass through the strait.

Plans and projects to diversify away from Hormuz have been on drawing boards for decades, and those workarounds are now being stress-tested as never before. The bypass infrastructure is doing roughly what architects had hoped, providing around 3.5 million barrels to 5.5 million barrels a day of crude capacity.

But this is still nowhere near enough.

Hormuz workarounds

The most important pipeline on the planet right now runs across Saudi Arabia. The East-West Pipeline – also known as Petroline – was built in the 1980s during the original Tanker war, when Iran and Iraq attacked merchant vessels in the Gulf as part of their wider conflict.

The pipeline’s capacity was expanded to a 7 million barrel emergency ceiling in 2019. However, the loading terminals in the city of Yanbu on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast were never designed to carry this much oil this fast, and analysts tracking tanker traffic estimate that less oil is currently flowing through the pipeline than its theoretical ceiling.

From Yanbu, oil bound for Europe still has to cross Egypt via the Sumed pipeline, which has a capacity of just 2.5 million barrels per day. Although oil flows through this pipeline have surged by 150% since the start of the war, its comparatively small capacity remains a binding constraint on European supply.

Iran noticed the geoeconomic importance of Petroline and has targeted it accordingly. An Iranian drone strike on a pumping station in April knocked 700,000 barrels a day offline. Saudi Aramco, the operator, had the line back at full capacity within three days. While the repair time is reassuring, the fact of the strike is not.

The other half of the Gulf bypass story runs through the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (Adcop) goes from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman side of the country. With a capacity of just under 2 million barrels per day, Adcop is the only major bypass that exits the Gulf directly into the Indian Ocean.

But as with Petroline, it has been targeted during the war. Iranian drone strikes on Fujairah on March 3, 14 and 16 set storage tanks on fire and suspended loadings. While Adcop offers some diversification for the UAE, it does not solve the targeting problem.

The situation is worse for the Gulf region’s other big oil producers. Iraq’s 3.4 million barrels per day of pre-war crude exports went almost entirely through the southern port city of Basra and the Strait of Hormuz.

There is one northern pipeline, connecting oil fields in Kirkuk to Ceyhan in Turkey. This pipeline was reopened in September 2025 after a two-and-a-half-year halt, with flows ramped up to 250,000 barrels a day in March. But this volume pales in comparison to what Iraq has lost.

Kuwait has it worse still. Pre-war crude exports ran at around 2 million barrels per day, with every barrel exiting through Hormuz. Kuwait has no pipeline alternative. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation declared force majeure in March, temporarily allowing it to suspend its obligations to meet delivery contracts.

This was extended on April 20, with the oil company saying it could not meet contractual obligations even if Hormuz reopened. Overcoming the damage that has been inflicted on Kuwait’s production base – and then ramping up production – will take months.

Qatar’s vulnerability is a different shape. Its pre-war crude exports were smaller than its Gulf neigbours, at around 0.6 million barrels per day. These exports all left Qatar via the strait. For Qatar, the story is gas. Its 77 million tonne LNG capacity at Ras Laffan is the largest in the world, supplying about 19% of global LNG trade. There is no alternative to shipping this gas through Hormuz.

Iran itself has built a Hormuz bypass: a 1,000-kilometre pipeline from Goreh at the head of the Gulf to a terminal at Jask on the Gulf of Oman. It is designed for 1 million barrels per day. But in practice, sanctions and unfinished terminal infrastructure have kept actual throughput at a fraction of design.

The US Energy Information Administration estimated that, in summer 2024, under 70,000 barrels per day were flowing through the pipeline. Loadings stopped altogether that September. According to Kpler, which provides real-time data on global shipping movements, only a single tanker – around two million barrels – has loaded at Jask in the war so far.

A call for more pipes in the Gulf, as there have been since the war began, is understandable. But it is no answer. Replicating Hormuz in pipelines would cost hundreds of billions of US dollars and a decade of construction. And at the end of it, new pipelines and terminals at Yanbu, Fujairah and wherever else would be no harder to reach with a drone than the old ones.

David B Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.