Why North Korean labour is returning to Russian industry

Videos are circulating online showing North Korean workers arriving in Russia to work on construction sites. The reaction, in some quarters, has been surprisingly positive. People remark on their discipline, their physical fitness, even the way they move in formation. It has prompted a broader question: should Russia actively invite more workers from the DPRK?

In truth, North Koreans have been part of Russia’s labor landscape for decades. I remember seeing them as far back as the late 1990s in Tyumen. In the 2000s, they were a common sight in industrial zones, moving in groups, often under supervision, quiet and self-contained. For reasons I never fully understood, they collected empty Coca-Cola and Fanta cans. You could spot them instantly.

Later, in St. Petersburg, I noticed groups of North Korean women working near a sewing workshop. They too, travelled together, and they stood out, strikingly thin and reserved. At the time, I even called the workshop, concerned about their conditions. It seemed harsh, perhaps even exploitative. But they continued to come and go freely. Whatever the system, it was structured, not chaotic.

So this is not a new phenomenon. What has changed is the rationale. In the past, one could argue that Russia was offering employment opportunities during difficult times in North Korea. Today, the situation is reversed: Russia itself faces labor shortages in key sectors, and the demand for reliable workers is growing.

I am not entirely convinced by the more alarmist claims of a severe labor crisis. Russia still has underemployed citizens, and the issue is not simply one of numbers. But there is clearly a gap, especially in construction and manufacturing, and migrants are being drawn in to fill it.

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The question then, is not whether migrant labor is needed, but what kind.

This is where North Korean workers stand apart. Above all, they’re disciplined. They come through organized, state-managed channels, with a clear purpose: to work and to represent their country. For them, a trip abroad goes beyond mere employment; it’s seen as a responsibility. They arrive with a sense of duty, to their state and their own reputation.

That mindset matters because it contrasts with the more fragmented, individualized migration flows we often see elsewhere. North Korean workers are doing more than drifting in search of opportunity; they’re deployed, in a sense, as part of a broader national strategy. They’re expected to perform, and they do.

Another factor is social structure. These workers tend to be older, often already married, having completed military service. They’re not aimless young men arriving in a foreign country with no ties or responsibilities. They’re there to work, and they know it.

This doesn’t mean life in North Korea is easy, far from it. The system that produces such discipline is strict, even harsh. But from the perspective of a host country, there’s a certain predictability in dealing with workers who operate within clear boundaries. Their behavior is monitored and their objectives defined. 

There’s also cultural factors. North Koreans are universally literate and generally secular. They’re also accustomed to structured environments and they adapt to industrial work with relative ease. In many cases, they arrive with relevant training or education, particularly in construction and engineering fields. Employers consistently note their diligence and curiosity.

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A new wave of North Korean workers began arriving around 2025, and early feedback has been positive. They’re described as hard-working and capable of learning quickly. In sectors where reliability is crucial, this is no small advantage.

Of course, any discussion of migrant labor raises broader questions and social cohesion and long-term demographic effects can’t be ignored. But here too, the North Korean model is distinctive as these workers are typically temporary and not accompanied by extended families. Their presence is functional rather than transformative.

There’s is also a historical familiarity because Koreans have lived and worked in Russia for generations, particularly since Soviet times. There’s a degree of cultural understanding, a shared memory of order and collective structures. This makes interaction smoother than with groups that arrive from entirely different social contexts.

For North Korea, the arrangement is equally logical. The country has a population of around 26 million, concentrated in a relatively small territory. Urbanization is increasing and automation is advancing. Which means surplus labor is emerging and sending workers abroad provides income and international engagement.

For Russia, the benefits are clear: a steady supply of disciplined, skilled workers who can fill gaps in the labor market without the unpredictability that sometimes accompanies other migration flows.

None of this suggests a simple or universal solution. Migration policy is always complex, and no single model fits every situation. But as Russia looks for ways to sustain its economy and maintain stability in key sectors, the North Korean option deserves serious consideration.

If we need migrant labor, and in some sectors we clearly do, then it makes sense to prioritize systems that deliver reliability and mutual benefit.

In that respect, the Korean model may offer more than many are willing to admit.

This article was first published by the online newspaper Gazeta.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team