Three people have died after a suspected outbreak of hantavirus on a cruise ship in the middle of the Atlantic ocean. At least one other passenger is in intensive care in South Africa.

The World Health Organization announced the deaths in a social media statement on Monday, along with one confirmed case of the rare disease. Authorities are investigating another five suspected cases among passengers travelling on the MV Hondius.

So, what is hantavirus? And why can it be so deadly?

As the investigation unfolds, here’s what we know.

What is hantavirus?

Hantavirus is a rare but severe respiratory illness that can cause severe bleeding, fever and even death.

The virus is spread by rodents, such as mice and rats, mainly through the urine and droppings of infected animals.

Hantavirus does not typically spread from person to person. However, in rare cases it may spread between people.

Globally, there are an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 cases of hantavirus each year.

It is less contagious than airborne viruses such as COVID and influenza, as it typically does not spread from person to person.

---

Read more: What is a virus? How do they spread? How do they make us sick?

---

What makes it so deadly?

There are two main types of hantavirus, each with different symptoms.

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which affects the lungs, is mainly found in the United States. If a person becomes infected with this type of hantavirus, within days they will likely experience coughing and shortness of breath.

As the illness progresses, they can develop symptoms such as fatigue, fever and muscle aches. They may also get headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. This is the most deadly kind of hantavirus. Tragically, about 38% of people who develop these symptoms die from the disease.

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome is mainly found in Europe and Asia, but the strain known as the Seoul virus has spread around the world. This form of hantavirus mainly affects the kidneys.

---

Read more: 5 virus families that could cause the next pandemic, according to the experts

---

People usually develop symptoms within two weeks of being exposed to this virus. Early symptoms include severe headaches, abdominal pain, nausea and blurred vision. More advanced symptoms include low blood pressure, internal bleeding and even acute kidney failure. This disease can be caused by different viruses and some are more deadly than others, meaning between 1% and 15% of cases can be fatal.

Unfortunately, there is no specific treatment or cure for either type of hantavirus. However, early medical treatment may increase a person’s chance of survival. This can include using respirators, oxygen therapy and dialysis.

Authorities are still investigating which type of hantavirus the passengers were exposed to.

How did it get on a cruise ship?

In a closed environment such as a cruise ship, there are two possible ways passengers could have contracted hantavirus.

One is being exposed to the virus while on a shore excursion.

The other possibility is that rodents may have entered the ship on cargo, and then spread the disease to passengers through their infected urine or droppings. Other factors such as hygiene standards and food storage practices may have caused the infection to spread more quickly.

---

Read more: How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are ‘spillovers’ becoming more common?

---

To contain this suspected outbreak, authorities must first ensure any rodents are safely contained and removed from the ship. They should then monitor all passengers for hantavirus symptoms. The virus is diagnosed with a PCR test, similar to those used to diagnose viruses such as COVID.

Given there is no specific treatment for the disease, authorities must help any infected passengers manage their symptoms. This involves checking that they are breathing normally and their kidneys are functioning properly.

So, how worried should we be?

Although alarming, cases of hantavirus remain are extremely rare. But it can look similar to other respiratory illness, so you should always get symptoms checked. If you’ve been in regions where the virus is found and experience shortness of breath, fever or any other flu-like symptoms, see your GP.

Thomas Jeffries does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The Venice Biennale is the most prestigious recurring event in contemporary art, often described as the Olympics of the art world.

The most prestigious prize of the sprawling international exhibition is the Golden Lion for best national participation. The Golden and Silver Lions are awarded by the biennale jury, a rotating panel of international curators and critics.

On April 22, the jury announced Russia and Israel would not be considered for awards. They collectively resigned eight days later – nine days before the opening of this year’s biennale.

This moment marks the unravelling of a long-standing fiction: that art institutions can remain separate from politics.

The jury’s refusal to award prizes

No official explanation was given for the jury’s resignation, but their resignation statement said it was “in acknowledgment” of their intention statement that “this jury will refrain from considering those countries whose leaders are currently charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court”.

In practice, this would have affected Russia and Israel.

This exclusion exposes a fundamental inconsistency: if nations can take part, on what basis are they denied prizes?

The bienniale is structured around national representation. Participation confers recognition of a country’s standing within the international art world. Allowing countries to exhibit but excluding them from awards is inconsistent.

For critics of the presence of Israel and Russia, inclusion constitutes complicity. For defenders of artistic autonomy, withholding awards on geopolitical grounds undermines the claim of institutional neutrality.

The jury’s resignation suggested no coherent position was possible.

The biennale has always been political

Founded in 1895, the Venice Biennale began as a civic initiative to promote Italian art and attract tourism.

From 1907, with the introduction of national pavilions, it became an international exhibition functioning as cultural diplomacy.

Of the 100 countries that participate, 30 have a permanent exhibition space. This has included Russia since 1914 and Israel since 1952. Other countries exhibit in various venues across Venice.

Each country’s participation is represented through curated artistic production. Flags, borders and diplomatic recognition are built into the exhibition’s logic.

Such a setup produces a fundamental contradiction. The bienniale claims to operate apart from geopolitics – but it is an institution structured through state representation.

In periods of relative global stability, this contradiction could be contained. Disputes arose – over inclusion, representation or censorship – but rarely threatened the institution’s stability.

Today, that balance can no longer hold.

The war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East and increasing geopolitical polarisation have made neutrality itself appear as a political position.

A loss of authority?

The involvement of the Italian government and the European Union further complicates matters.

While formally acknowledging the biennale’s autonomy, Italian officials have opposed Russia’s participation and signalled pressure through administrative scrutiny.

The European Union withdrew a €2 million grant in response to Russia’s inclusion.

These actions from the EU and from Italy make clear the Venice Biennale’s independence is limited. Reliance on external funding lets political actors exert influence by threatening to withdraw support or increasing scrutiny.

The bienniale’s jurors decide on prizes. When the basis for those decisions becomes entangled in a wider political dispute, they are placed in a difficult position. Withdrawal becomes a way of refusing to confer legitimacy through awards.

This year, the biennale will replace the jury-awarded Golden and Silver Lions with “Visitors’ Lions”, to be voted on by attendees and presented in November.

Italian cabinet minister Matteo Salvini described the change as “democratic”. He frames the shift as one that transfers authority from a select jury to visitors. This treats wider participation as a more legitimate basis for judgement.

Although such a move appears philosophical, it was the only viable option. It allows the exhibition to continue without resolving the underlying conflict. The awards will be transformed into collective choices, rather than critical judgements.

The biennale’s authority rests on its historical role as a site of judgement, where expert evaluation through juries and awards shapes contemporary art discourse.

This year, that function will be suspended, and the awards will be grounded in preference rather than critique. Does this mean the exhibition will become more open, or simply less authoritative?

The difficulty of ‘neutrality’

The jury’s resignation is not simply a breakdown of decision-making. It also exposes the flawed belief that culture can stand apart from politics, and institutions can operate independently of state influence.

This breakdown is not unique to the cultural institutions. It reflects a broader shift affecting also institutions that produce knowledge and interpretation. We have seen this story repeated at universities, research bodies and cultural organisations.

Under conditions of political conflict, these institutions are increasingly subject to pressures that make claims to neutrality more difficult to sustain.

Patrizia Biondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Over the last two months, refineries and fuel storage facilities around the world have caught fire due to war (Russia) or accident (Australia, the United States, India and Mexico), adding more pressure to stressed oil and gas supply chains.

Global production of refined oil is normally around 100 million barrels a day. But this is under real strain. When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in February, it prevented 25% of global seaborne oil exports leaving the region. Iran also responded to strikes by the United States and Israel by launching attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in neighbouring states.

Ukraine’s recent attacks on Russian oil refineries have driven Russian output 12% lower than last year’s figures.

But while the spate of accidental refinery fires around the world only affect a small percentage of global output, they amplify the impact of the bigger supply shocks flowing from the Iran war.

This year’s unprecedented energy crunch has exposed deep structural weaknesses in how the global oil system operates – and how easily it can be disrupted. Refineries have become targets in war, while poor maintenance or accidents point to systemic stresses.

How refineries became a target

This year, oil refineries have become targets in two wars. Refineries and energy infrastructure have been targeted in previous conflicts. But advances in drone technology and intelligence have made attacks cheaper and more effective. It’s now possible to hit specific distillation columns or fuel storage tanks within a refinery.

The Russia-Ukraine war is now well into its fourth year. Ukraine has relied heavily on drones for defence and, increasingly, attack. Successive drone strikes on Russia’s Black Sea Tuapse refinery have done significant damage. Earlier strikes hit refineries in Perm and Orsk.

One of Iran’s main targets has been the oil and gas infrastructure of neighbouring Gulf States. Missiles, shrapnel and drones have hit refineries, fuel storage facilities and oil tankers. Fuel exports from the world’s biggest oil and gas region have slowed to a trickle.

Ukraine and Iran’s attacks on oil infrastructure show oil assets are no longer just civilian infrastructure. They can be instruments of economic warfare. Attacks are designed not just to cause local damage, but to create wider market disruptions and trigger sustained economic pressure. For Ukraine, the goal is to weaken Russia, economically and strategically. For Iran, the goal is to exert influence over the region and drive up oil prices to pressure the US to negotiate.

Australia’s refinery fire points to fragility

Fire is a key vulnerability for refineries and fuel storage facilities.

In mid-April, a fire broke out at one of Australia’s two remaining refineries. The fire forced petrol production at Viva’s Geelong refinery to be cut to 60% of normal production and diesel and jet fuel production to be cut to 80% until repairs are complete.

The cut to domestic refining capacity was “a setback”, according to federal Energy Minister Chris Bowen. Australia faces a real challenge on fuel, given limited local capacity and a heavy reliance on imported liquid fuels from overseas refineries in Asia. Unfortunately, the fire in Geelong added to the strain on fuel due to already reduced supply.

Refineries under strain globally

Over the last two months, fires have damaged a number of oil refineries.

India: A fire broke out at India’s large new Pachpadra refinery a day before it was to open. Initial reports suggest a leaking valve was to blame.

Mexico: Two fires have broken out at the troubled Dos Bocas refinery in Tabasco in recent weeks. The flagship state-owned refinery was meant to help Mexico cut dependence on fuel imports and boost energy sovereignty, but production targets have not been hit. The fires have worsened the situation.

United States: In March, a large explosion damaged the Valero Port Arthur Refinery in Texas, spreading toxic smoke throughout nearby communities.

Risk multipliers

This year’s spate of oil refinery fires have taken place as the world grapples with the much larger disruption caused by the US-Iran conflict.

These smaller incidents act as risk multipliers, amplifying the impact of the Iran war. The global energy system is already under pressure from geopolitical fragmentation, strained supply chains and contested shipping routes.

What they show is how vulnerable our energy systems are to disruption – even outside a war zone.

Aging infrastructure, reduced maintenance and increasingly complex systems mean even small fires or unit failures can escalate into significant supply disruptions.

During the first big oil shocks of the 1970s, the oil market was much less interconnected. Today’s oil system now has fewer backups and higher complexity, leaving it even more exposed to disruption, whether by accident or on purpose. Localised shocks can ripple further.

The 2026 energy crisis isn’t only a story about conflict in the Middle East. It’s also about a global energy system running on fumes. We should see news of a refinery fire not as an isolated industrial event – but as a sign of system under strain.

Meredith Primrose Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

During the summer of 2019–2020, half of Australia’s third largest island was on fire. Kangaroo Island, also known as Karta Pintingga or Karti in local mainland Aboriginal languages, was one of the worst-hit places during the Black Summer fires. Two people lost their lives and almost all the remnant vegetation on the island burned.

In the wake of the fires, fears grew for unique species that live on the island, such as the green carpenter bee, a critically endangered dunnart, and the Kangaroo Island micro-trapdoor spider.

Increasingly unstable climate conditions are exacerbating fire risk across the globe. Since the Black Summer fires six years ago, we’ve seen many more megafires as far north as the Canadian Arctic. Every fire season in Australia brings more devastation as well.

In the months following the 2020 fires, we headed to Lashmars Lagoon on the Dudley Peninsula, eastern Kangaroo Island. Here, trapped within the mud, are thousands upon thousands of charcoal fragments built up over time from ancient fires. By analysing them we could reconstruct valuable long-term context for what’s happening today.

Our findings, now published in Global and Planetary Change, tell a complex 7,000-year-long story of how fire was shaped by the climate, vegetation and people.

A rare case study

To understand environmental change and how ecosystems cope with extreme events, we need perspectives longer than written observational records.

Studies of long-term fire histories from mainland Australia propose that Indigenous management reduced fuel loads, thereby reducing the occurrence and risk of bushfires.

After European colonisation, much of the Indigenous land management stopped. Since then, plant life in many parts of Australia has changed, exacerbating the risk and impact of wildfires.

But these changes also coincided with long-term fire suppression by the colonisers, landscape degradation and anthropogenic climate change. This makes it hard to untangle the exact effect of any one of these changes on fire regimes.

Kangaroo Island provides a rare chance to study the long-term fire history of an Australian environment that wasn’t managed by First Nations people in recent times. Early European colonisers in the 1800s noted Kangaroo Island’s thick scrub and lack of campfire and cultural burning smoke as evidence for lack of human habitation.

Indigenous oral histories also describe the departure of people from the island following isolation from the mainland. Archaeological work further supports the idea that the island was uninhabited for thousands of years.

Kangaroo Island is famed for its high biodiversity and unique ecosystems. There are 45 species of plants not found anywhere else. Have widespread wildfire events in the past contributed to this high biodiversity? Or are increasingly frequent fires threatening these remnant ecosystems?

This is where we come back to a seven-metre-long sediment core (a cylindrical sample) we collected after the fires in 2020.

Painting a detailed picture

We were not the first scientists to examine the mud from this site. Fifty years ago, Australian biologist Robin L. Clark established methods central to research in this field. She used fragments of charcoal and pollen grains found in the sediment of Lashmars Lagoon to paint a picture of past fire and vegetation.

We also used these techniques, combined with scientific advances in sediment dating, analysis and interpretation, to re-evaluate Clark’s hypothesis that fires became bigger after the departure of people from Kangaroo Island.

After a rigorous screening of archaeological data, we found the last reliable evidence for people living on the island was between about five and six thousand years ago. After people left, a more shrubby, denser vegetation established on the island.

Despite this, fire remained relatively rare and subdued in the landscape for a further 3,000 years under relatively wet climates. Then, fires increased over the last 2,000 years, culminating in prominent fire activity between 700 and 900 years ago.

This increase in fire activity coincided with a trend towards the climate becoming dryer, possibly due to changes in the southern westerly winds.

Crucially, this increase in fire activity is at odds with evidence from mainland Australia. Over the same 2,000-year period, fire activity in southeastern Australia was actually lower. This suggests the importance of Indigenous stewardship in suppressing bushfires, even when contending with the impacts of a drying climate overall.

Ultimately, our study has a message of optimism. Biodiversity on Kangaroo Island appears to have weathered major changes in climate and fire regimes in the past. However, questions still remain as to whether this unique environment can continue to withstand decreasing water resources and more frequent intense fires.

One thing is certain. With a rapidly changing climate, there is an urgent need to combine Indigenous wisdom, community engagement and western scientific evidence to conserve these unique ecosystems for future generations.

Haidee Cadd receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Jonathan Tyler receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO).

Lucinda Duxbury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

The ABC has revealed a major cybersecurity flaw in Bluetooth-enabled police tasers and body-worn cameras that means officers can be tracked.

The exposé shows how anyone can use simple software tools to detect the presence of a police officer carrying one of these pieces of equipment. Not only can you detect their presence, but it is possible to track their location over time – representing a potential threat, especially to those operating covertly.

But if police equipment can be tracked via Bluetooth, what about your phone, watch and headphones which use the same technology? Can they also be used to track you using simple software tools?

The short answer is yes. The long answer is a bit more complicated.

How does Bluetooth work?

Bluetooth is a short-range wireless communication technology that enables devices such as phones and speakers to connect with each other.

To effectively communicate, Bluetooth devices have a unique address – a bit like a phone number. These addresses are represented as 0s and 1s in their digital form. But they are typically viewed in hexadecimal, using the digits 0–9 and letters A–F (for example “00:25:DF:68:5D:1F”).

Each device has a distinct address. But these addresses are distributed to manufacturers in blocks, in a similar way that our phone numbers are grouped by geography.

As such, it’s possible to identify a Bluetooth device’s manufacturer by monitoring and detecting the signals being broadcast (sometimes called sniffing). This sniffing is usually over a short distance, but can be undertaken over longer distances with the right equipment.

A Bluetooth device address typically includes two parts: the manufacturer’s code and a unique device code. Once you know the manufacturer’s code you can easily identify devices they make by simply listening for their Bluetooth traffic.

How are police being tracked?

Police officers across Australia are issued with tasers and body-worn cameras manufactured by Axon, a US-based weapons and technology company.

These devices use Bluetooth as part of their operation. But a flaw allows anyone within a few hundred metres to be able to detect the presence of Axon technology. By listening to Bluetooth communications and filtering for the known manufacturer’s code, anyone can “detect” an officer carrying the Axon products. With enough monitoring stations, you can track officers across a geographical area.

---

Read more: Remember, Apple AirTags and ‘Find My’ app only work because of a vast, largely covert tracking network

---

At first glance it may seem odd that Bluetooth should feature on a taser. But there is a genuine benefit.

According to Axon, sensors integrated in the Axon product range can generate alerts over Bluetooth. For example, removing a gun from a holster or enabling a taser can alert nearby body-worn cameras to start recording.

While the general public has only just learned of the vulnerabilities in Axon’s equipment, police and some in academic and tech circles have known about them for longer. The ABC reports, for example, that Victoria Police were notified in 2024.

A Facebook page and a couple of GitHub repositories where code and files are stored and publicly available (for example PoliceDetector and JudCrandall) have been active for some time, with computer code available since September 2023.

While Axon indicates that devices can have firmware upgrades, it’s not clear if this extends to Bluetooth functionality. As a highly integrated device, the Bluetooth functionality may be hard-coded into the technology and may not be upgradeable.

So it’s possible the only solution would be to replace the devices or find some mechanism to disable the Bluetooth functionality – something that may reduce safety and accountability.

So, can any Bluetooth device be tracked?

In principle, yes.

Any device that emits a radio-frequency signal (such as WiFi, Bluetooth or 5G) can be detected with appropriate hardware. Unique identifiers are used for many kinds of wireless communication.

If you build up a list of these identifiers, you have the ability to track devices. And if you can link devices to people, you can track people.

If you are using wireless communications you can certainly be detected. But most modern devices such as iPhones have privacy modes that create random addresses. This ensures that most devices aren’t trackable in the same way the Axon devices are.

It is, however, possible that less sophisticated devices (such as the cheap earbuds you bought online) will not support random addressing.

While this means they are likely trackable, walking around with a mobile phone continuously transmitting and receiving is already ensuring you are very visible.

Unless you go completely offline, you can’t completely eliminate the risk of being tracked. If you are worried about being tracked, one step you can take is turning off WiFi and Bluetooth when not in use.

But remember there are many other ways we can be surveilled in our modern lives.

Paul Haskell-Dowland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

In his first term, Anthony Albanese was highly reluctant to break promises. He resisted for a long time recalibrating the Coalition’s tax cuts, because he had undertaken to deliver them intact.

This term, it seems to be a different story. In last year’s election campaign, Albanese promised there would be no change to negative gearing. Asked in one of the debates to confirm that “negative gearing is off the table”, the prime minister was unequivocal, “Yeah, it’s off the table […] the key is supply, and that measure will not boost supply”.

Nor did Albanese indicate he would reform the capital gains tax.

Now, next week’s budget is expected to see changes to both.

On Monday, Treasurer Jim Chalmers was asked about the government likely breaking promises (one directly, the other more contestable), in the name of intergenerational equity (an issue, it was pointed out to him, that was obvious before the election).

Chalmers was asked: “Is it your thought that if something’s popular […] you don’t have to promise it before an election, that that outweighs going to an election saying what you are and what you’re not going to do?”

In his defence, Chalmers turned the notion of “trust” on its head. “The best way to build trust is to make the right decisions for the right reasons,” he said.

“There are genuine intergenerational concerns and pressures in our budget, in our tax system, in our housing market and in our economy more broadly.

"I thought the prime minister put this well in some of those interviews that we saw over the weekend. A government like ours, a responsible government, cannot ignore the very real pressures and concerns that people have in our communities.

"As these pressures have been building, obviously we calibrate our budgets to the conditions that we confront.

"I think the intergenerational pressures are really serious.”

Pressed further on breaking promises, Chalmers said: “You build trust by taking the right decisions for the right reasons and explaining, if you’ve come to a different view over time, being upfront and explaining why that has been the case.

"I refer you, for example, to the necessary and I think warranted steps that we took when it came to the stage three tax cuts. When we came to a different view, we explained why, and we made the right decision for the right reason. We explained why that was necessary. I think that’s how you build trust.”

Chalmers is putting a particular slant on what happened with the tax cuts. Before the 2022 elections Labor agreed to deliver them to make itself a small target. Quite soon after the election, Chalmers tried to get Albanese to go back on that decision. Albanese held out because he worried about the consequences of breaking trust.

On these various issues, it is not so much a question of the government coming to a different view on the matters – it’s more that the political circumstances have made it possible and advantageous for it to implement its original views.

The changes the government does make to property taxes in next week’s budget may well be desirable.

The point is not to criticise whatever those changes turn out to be. The point is that we will have learned again not to take too much notice of what politicians say before elections. Once Albanese was persuaded to break his promise on the tax cuts – however justified that decision might have been – he gave notice that he’d probably be willing to break his word again.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Health Minister Mark Butler has said the government is considering capping specialists’ fees to reduce the gap between what Medicare covers and what specialists charge patients.

The Australian Medical Association strongly opposes the idea and is threatening legal action. Butler says the government is willing to “test the boundaries” of constitutional limits.

So what’s going on here? What does the Constitution have to do with doctors’ fees?

Doctors’ groups oppose ‘socialised’ medicine

The current fuss forms part of a long history of doctors’ lobby groups opposing key elements of Australia’s system of universal health care.

Doctors’ lobby groups have opposed:

• introducing the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) in the 1940s
• introducing Medibank (the first version of Medicare) in 1970s
• introducing Medicare in the 1980s
• expanding the nurse practitioner profession in the early 2000s
• allowing pharmacists to perform vaccinations in the 2010s
• allowing pharmacists to prescribe certain prescription medicines in the 2020s.

It’s no surprise, then, that doctors’ lobby groups oppose the government’s current push to limit patients’ out of pocket costs to see a specialist. It’s also no surprise medical specialists dominate the Australian Taxation Office’s list of highest paid professions.

Some of the doctors’ opposition to health policy had constitutional implications.

The 1946 social services referendum

The Medical Society of Victoria challenged the introduction of the PBS in the High Court in the 1940s. It won because there was nothing in the Constitution giving the federal government power to set it up.

The 1946 social services referendum filled the gap in federal legislative power by adding a new provision to the Constitution. This gave the federal parliament power to make laws about

the provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances.

The limit on preventing civil conscription was introduced into parliament by Liberal Opposition Leader Robert Menzies. He told parliament that without those words, the new power might allow the federal government to “nationalise” health care by “making all doctors and dentists members of one government service which had a monopoly on medical and dental treatment”.

As set out in the official “yes” pamphlet during the referendum, those words “mean that doctors and dentists cannot be forced to become professional officers of the Commonwealth under a scheme of medical and dental services.”

The PBS was reintroduced after the referendum passed.

Constitutional challenges by doctors

Doctors have tried various constitutional challenges in the High Court. They have usually lost.

In 1949, the British Medical Association (as the Australian Medical Association called itself at the time) challenged rules that said prescriptions could only be written on government-supplied forms. It won. The High Court seemed to suggest civil conscription might go so far as to mean “any compulsion of law requiring that men […] perform work in a particular way.”

The High Court took a different view in later cases. In 1980, the General Practitioners Society challenged laws setting out conditions that had to be satisfied before Medicare benefits would be paid for pathology services performed by doctors. It lost.

The High Court said there was a difference between regulating the manner in which medical practice was carried out and compelling a medical practitioner to perform medical services. Only the latter would be unconstitutional civil conscription.

In the most recent challenge in 2009, doctors complained that laws making compliance with professional standards a condition of being eligible to receive Medicare subsidies were unconstitutional. They lost.

The High Court again emphasised the distinction between laws regulating how medical services are performed and laws forcing doctors to perform medical services.

So what about current laws on doctors’ fees?

Specialists’ incomes and fees are already partly regulated by federal law. The Fair Work Commission’s Medical Practitioners Award governs the wages and conditions of specialists who are employees rather than self-employed.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) administers a suite of laws putting limits on the way specialists set their fees. Nobody thinks any of this is unconstitutional.

Other professions are subject to maximum fees. For example, legislation in Victoria says that lawyers cannot charge fees that are more than “fair and reasonable”, and for some categories of legal service the law sets out maximum dollar amounts lawyers can charge their clients. Lawyers do not complain these laws conscript them to work at the behest of the government.

What’s next?

Butler says a parliamentary inquiry will explore various options for capping specialists’ fees. There will be administrative and practical pros and cons for various options.

Options the inquiry might explore include:

• simply capping fees
• making eligibility for Medicare subsidies conditional on not exceeding a maximum fee
• imposing an income tax surcharge on specialists who choose to not comply with caps
• getting the states to legislate the caps, which would avoid the constitutional question altogether.

Regulating private sector prices is different from civil conscription in the sense of compulsion to perform a professional service. So unless the government gives in to political pressure, specialists’ fees look set to be capped one way or another.

Luke Beck is a member of the Australian Labor Party.

Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire three weeks ago. The violence, however, hasn’t stopped.

In recent days, Israeli airstrikes have killed at least 40 people and the military has issued evacuation orders for residents of ten villages and towns in southern Lebanon, where it has established a security buffer zone.

According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this zone is needed to protect Israel from future attacks by the Hezbollah militant group. He said it is “much stronger, more intense, more continuous, and more solid than we had previously”.

Critics, however, contend Israel is adopting the “Gaza playbook” in this buffer zone, mirroring its actions in Gaza after a fragile ceasefire was agreed to last October.

Militarily, Israel is hitting an already-weakened Hezbollah as hard as it can to deplete its capabilities and force it out of its southern Lebanon stronghold.

Israel calls this strategy “mowing the grass”. It has long viewed this strategy as the best way to establish a level of deterrence against Hamas and Hezbollah, which cannot be defeated through conventional military means.

Like it did in Gaza, Israel is also aiming to make the buffer zone uninhabitable for residents. In late March, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared:

All houses in villages near the Lebanese border will be destroyed, in accordance with the model used in Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza, in order to permanently remove the threats near the border to northern residents.

As part of this, Israel has destroyed all the bridges across the Litani River, effectively isolating southern Lebanon from the rest of the country. It is also systematically destroying or severely damaging towns, villages and infrastructure in the region.

This “Gaza playbook” has come with a significant human cost. Since this latest conflict with Hezbollah began in early March, Israel’s attacks have killed more than 2,600 Lebanese and displaced another 1.2 million from their homes.

---

Read more: Israeli threats to occupy or annex south Lebanon dust off a decades-old playbook

---

Netanyahu is becoming trapped

Yet, despite achieving many successes against Hezbollah, Netanyahu is in danger of overreaching in his claims to be able to defeat one of Israel’s nemeses.

For decades, successive Israeli governments, particularly those headed by Netanyahu, have convinced the Israeli public that Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in an existential struggle.

Many Israelis now expect Netanyahu to deliver on his promise and finally rid them of this threat forever.

In a recent poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, 80% of respondents supported continuing the fight against Hezbollah irrespective of any possible peace deal between the US and Iran, and even if this created tensions with the Trump administration.

This poses a political threat to Netanyahu as he faces becoming trapped between two opposing realities.

Delivering on a false promise

The first centres on the “mowing the grass” strategy. This strategy has long served as good propaganda and as an exemplar of the government protecting its people. But it was never intended to completely defeat the threats posed by Hezbollah or Hamas.
When it comes to Hezbollah, Israel’s military simply cannot completely defeat a resistance movement that is so embedded in the social, political and cultural fabric of Lebanon. This would require not just a military victory, but the subjugation of its supporters and the delegitimisation of its ideology.

The intention of the “mowing the grass” strategy is to manage the threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, not destroy them.

If Israel is able to cause substantial damage to their political and military capabilities – in addition to destroying local infrastructure – the groups are then forced to focus on survival and revival, rather than on threatening Israel.

From Israel’s perspective, this provides some breathing room until the threat reemerges and it is time to “mow the grass” again.

From a political perspective, this strategy also allows Israel to justify its continuous military operations. This has been the cornerstone of Netanyahu’s political revival since the Hamas attacks of 2023, allowing him to maintain a constant sense of crisis that requires ever-increasing levels of violence.

But Netanyahu has changed the narrative, shifting from just “managing” Israel’s conflict with both Hezbollah and Hamas, to “dismantling” the groups and “finishing the job”.

It is clear the Israeli public wants Netanyahu to deliver on this promise.

Trump forcing his hand

The second reality facing Netanyahu is the potential that US President Donald Trump will agree to a permanent ceasefire with Iran that forces Israel to cease its hostilities against Hezbollah.

Since the tentative ceasefire between the US and Iran, Netanyahu has been trying to separate Israel’s conflicts with Iran and Hezbollah. This would allow him to continue the military’s operations against Hezbollah and claim a key strategic victory.

But Iran is demanding that any ceasefire it reaches with the US include Hezbollah.

This places Netanyahu in a bind. If he does agree to a permanent peace deal, this would leave a severely wounded but not-yet-destroyed Hezbollah in place. With Hamas and the Iranian regime also still intact (albeit severely wounded), this would represent a triple disaster for Netanyahu.

The backlash is already starting. Last month, Israeli opposition leader Yair Golan accused Netanyahu of lying:

He promised a historic victory and security for generations, and in practice, we got one of the most severe strategic failures Israel has ever known.

Criticism like this could have a huge effect on the Israeli elections, due before the end of this year.

Netanyahu is desperate to win these elections to forestall his long-running corruption trial. As such, he would be loath to risk breaking with the Israeli public on his promise to finish Hezbollah. However, that may mean breaking with the US and its essential military, political and diplomatic support.

While the “mowing the grass” strategy gave Netanyahu new political life after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, his failure to match his rhetoric to actual results may now prove to be his Achilles’ heel.

Martin Kear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

China’s latest national accounts show the economy grew by about 5% through 2025 and into the first quarter of 2026, pointing to resilience despite ongoing trade tensions.

But the underlying picture is weaker: growth slowed last year and, while it has stabilised, it remains below pre-COVID levels.

China used to regularly report GDP growth rates above 10% before 2010 and around 6-8% after 2010. So, what’s behind the slowdown from those growth rates?

Weak consumption, uncertain exports

Household spending growth remains modest, while exports are growing more slowly amid global uncertainty and the Iran war.

Together, these trends point to softer growth, weak domestic demand and more fragile external support.

China has long been seen as an economy needing to shift from heavy reliance on exports and investment spending towards stronger domestic demand.

To understand whether this shift is actually happening and whether these recent patterns are temporary, or part of a deeper shift, we examined what has been driving China’s growth over the past decade or so. Our results do not suggest that consumer spending has yet become a stronger supporter of China’s growth.

A shift in the drivers of growth

In a recent paper, we compare the sources of growth across two periods: 2012–2017 and 2017–2022.

From 2012 to 2017, China’s growth was relatively strong, with real gross domestic product (GDP) rising by more than 40%, supported by solid consumption, robust investment and steady trade expansion.

Between 2017 and 2022, however, the picture weakened: GDP grew by about 30% – one quarter less than in the earlier period. While the pandemic played a role, trade tensions and deeper structural changes were also important, with slower import growth, weaker domestic demand, and a smaller contribution from exports.

At the same time, demographic trends turned less favourable, with slower population growth, fewer working-age people, and falling labour force participation and employment rates, all of which added further downward pressure on growth.

What has caused this change?

The charts above show a clear shift in China’s growth pattern after 2017. To understand why, we used an economy-wide model to identify the main drivers of growth in each period.

In both periods, productivity was the biggest contributor to China’s growth. But before 2017, foreign demand, a shift towards domestic sourcing and stronger business investment all supported growth. Together, these factors generated relatively balanced expansion.

After 2017, the picture became less favourable. The contribution from foreign demand fell, although it remained positive. The contribution from domestic consumption growth also turned slightly negative.

China’s workforce is shrinking as the population ages, and this demographic shift has become a more significant drag, reducing growth by 3.8 percentage points after 2017.

With demographic pressures intensifying and both household consumption and foreign demand weakening markedly, China’s growth has become increasingly reliant on productivity improvements.

A shrinking population and slowing productivity

This helps explain the slowdown in growth in recent Chinese data. Demographic change is a larger drag, and productivity growth has slowed.

Looking ahead, demographic pressures are set to intensify. China’s population began to decline in 2022, and the pace of decline is expected to accelerate. The working-age population is shrinking even faster than the total population.

Population projections suggest China’s working-age population could fall to less than one-third of its 2014 peak by the end of the century.

Other traditional supports for growth also look weaker. Total public and private investment growth has weakened in recent years, with fixed-asset investment turning negative in 2025.

At the same time, slowing global demand amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty is proving challenging for exports. Trade patterns are also shifting as higher US tariffs on Chinese goods have encouraged diversification to other markets.

What this means for the future

Our central finding is straightforward. China’s growth is now being increasingly shaped by two forces: slower productivity growth and a drag from demographic change.

This is not to say the demand side of the economy does not matter. But in our analysis, changes in consumer demand, investment and trade make only limited direct contributions to GDP growth. Their significance lies more in what they reveal about the broader structure of the Chinese economy.

In particular, both the 2017-2022 period and recent data show little evidence of a shift towards consumer spending playing a larger role in supporting growth.

What this means for the rest of the world

Looking ahead, the main question is whether productivity growth can remain strong enough to offset the effects of a shrinking workforce.

Our results suggest some caution on that front. The scope for continued rapid growth by adopting and adapting existing technologies from more advanced economies is narrowing. Population ageing is likely to place continuing downward pressure on the supply of workers. Although China is investing heavily in automation and robotics, these advances may not be sufficient to fully offset these headwinds.

The international implications are harder to predict. Slower growth in China would weaken demand for goods and services that are exported from countries like Australia.

But it could also create new opportunities for other developing economies. This is already evident in the shift of some manufacturing investment to Southeast Asia, partly in response to rising costs and trade tensions.

The effects are therefore likely to differ across countries and industries. What is clear is that the character of China’s growth is changing, and that change will matter well beyond China itself.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Do you remember the very early days of the pandemic, before the freedom rallies, before even the vaccinations, when we were spraying boxes of muesli bars with Glen-20 in case that was how the germs were getting to us?

In those days, there was a feeling these lockdowns could perhaps save us from all the things wrong with the world. Emissions were way down. People were creating spontaneous collective musical experiences on the balconies of apartments. The canals of Venice ran clear. Maybe all it took was a deadly virus to make us change?

In the end, everything actually got worse and has continued to get worse. But that spirit is what animates Romy Ash’s eco-fiction novel, Mantle: the idea that a pathogen might make us wake up to ourselves; make us stop, think and change course.

What if we abandoned the idea of our separateness from nature? What if we embraced our porousness – “our bodies are hosts; we’re always living communally” – and treated ourselves as ecosystems, rather than individuals?

Bad – but beautiful

When she published her first novel, Floundering, in 2012, 31-year-old Ash was touted as the next big thing, with photo spreads in Women’s Weekly and a swag of prizes, including shortlistings for the Miles Franklin, Commonwealth Book Prize and Prime Minister’s Literary Awards. This second novel brings depth, humour and wryness, gained in the life she’s lived in between.

Ursula, her main protagonist, is 50, single and childless. She and her mother, Delores, are the last remnants of their family. Ursula works as an academic in Melbourne, but she’s taken a break to spend a little time with her mother, who lives alone in a self-built home where “the windows are actually shower screens”, in the far south of Lutruwita/Tasmania. It overlooks the salmon farms made infamous by Richard Flanagan’s Toxic.

Ursula has come because she needs some quiet time to work on a geology paper, but she discovers her mother is dying and the paper is quickly forgotten. Are the growths in Delores’ lungs cancer?

Delores is independent, fractious, deeply embedded in the intricacies of small-town Tasmanian life. She has a landline phone and a composting toilet. She “bought here because it was the cheapest place to buy land, and this was the cheapest block”.

As death approaches, Delores declines any treatment and focuses instead on making sure Ursula has all the information she needs: the Corolla is serviced at the BMW mechanic with the mossy cars out front, the best lemons come “from the driveway with one goat” and “there is a list of businesses in town that are not be frequented under any circumstances”.

Ash’s understanding and representation of life in the southern reaches of the Huon Valley, particularly for a writer from “the mainland”, is exquisitely accurate: “Small slight, large grievance, long held. This is the fabric of the town.”

Delores leaves Ursula with a house full of hoarded junk and a rash, which turns out to be widespread among the locals – and entirely untreatable. In the throes of grief, Ursula hooks up with Toby, a diver at the salmon farms. She wakes the next morning to find their bodies connected by fine, sticky threads, “pale, translucent, a soft earthy white”, in the places where their skin was touching. It’s a new fungal pandemic.

The borders close. News trickles in from the mainland. Whatever it is, it’s bad. But at the same time, it’s also beautiful: as they spend night after night together and wake each morning, ever more stuck, Ursula finds herself dreaming Toby’s dreams, learning new skills, losing her fear of the deep ocean. Then her body starts to fruit.

No easy binaries

Mantle is set in a near future, just far enough from now that Ursula can “stare out into the night, hoping for the flash of a swift parrot, even in the dark; even knowing they are extinct”. Unlike many contemporary eco-fiction novels, Mantle has no easy villains (not even, really, the salmon farms). It doesn’t let the reader feel self-righteous about their own environmental stance.

Ash takes a nuanced, exploratory approach to conservation ethics and to our individual roles in the broader crisis of extinction, wildlife depletion and climate change. She introduces us to an old fisherman, Ernie, who has been breeding and planting endangered giant kelp; Ursula laughingly calls him a greenie.

‘I wouldn’t sit next to a greenie at the pub,’ he continues, ‘but I know giant kelp is a bloody nursery, and I know its disappearance is one reason why we aren’t pulling any lobster out of the sea.’
‘I’m a greenie,’ I say. ‘It’s that and the salmon farms.’
‘You’re not a greenie; you’re a city slicker.’
I laugh. ‘Latte drinker,’ I say.

Delores’ best friend Joc tells Ursula:

I don’t eat meat. I do no harm. This is my philosophy. Those men who know the ocean is going to hold them, they’ve got a dive bag with a knife in it, they’ve got a spear gun, but they are also appreciating the wonder.

Ash rejects the easy binaries that can come with seeing “the environment” theoretically, and investigates the ethics that develop among people who live among, and off, other animals. She recognises the complexities that occur when a place has high unemployment and low education, and where the best jobs can be found at the salmon farms; where being a “greenie” is a privilege attached to class.

Next big thing

Ursula is middle-aged, grumpy, horny, an expert in her field, scared of the ocean – and not, in any way, a nature lover or an outdoors type. She is far from your typical eco-fiction narrator, and her perspective welcomes in all kinds of readers.

The novel is also replete with food, because while Ursula stops thinking about her profession – mudstone geography – almost as soon as the book begins, she never stops thinking about the joys of cooking and eating. Ash is a former food blogger and columnist for The Guardian: Mantle is crying out for an accompanying recipe collection (albeit one that’s mushroom-heavy).

This is a novel that explores connection, porousness, the possibilities offered by permeability. “It asks for a numb heart, the patriarchy,” says Joc. Mantle asks, what if we could ask for the opposite; what if we could let ourselves feel?

Jane Rawson was once at Varuna with Romy Ash.

In both the Redbridge and Freshwater polls, Anthony Albanese’s net favourability has jumped eight points since late March to -9. In Redbridge, the Coalition rebounded from a low of 17% in March to 22%.

The Liberals have easily held the Victorian state seat of Nepean at a byelection on Saturday. In Tasmanian upper house elections also on Saturday, a left-wing independent is likely to gain the seat of Huon from a conservative independent.

Redbridge poll

A national Redbridge and Accent Research poll, conducted April 24–30 from a sample of 1,014, gave Labor 31% of the primary vote (down one since the previous Redbridge poll in late March), One Nation 27% (down two), the Coalition 22% (up five), the Greens 13% (steady) and all Others 7% (down two).

By respondent preferences, Labor led the Coalition by 54–46, a one-point gain for Labor. Labor led One Nation by 55–45, a two-point gain for Labor. By 2025 election preference flows, Labor led the Coalition by 53–47, a two-point gain for the Coalition. The March poll’s respondent preferences were likely too weak for Labor.

Albanese’s net favourability jumped eight points to -9. Angus Taylor was up one point to -2, Pauline Hanson up two points to -1, Nationals leader Matt Canavan up one point to -2, Greens leader Larissa Waters down one point to -4 and Energy Minister Chris Bowen down two points since December to -16.

US President Donald Trump had by far the worst net favourability with Australians, down three points since March to -58.

In a three-way preferred PM question, there was no change, with Albanese at 33%, Hanson 23% and Taylor 14%.

Combining the issue scores of Labor and the Greens against the Coalition and One Nation, the right led by 37–30 on cost of living, 33–28 on housing, 53–22 on immigration, 41–26 on national security and by 42–30 on economic management. The left’s one lead was on healthcare, by 35–31.

Freshwater poll

A national Freshwater poll for News Corp, conducted April 28–30 from a sample of 1,046, gave Labor 32% of the primary vote, One Nation 25%, the Coalition 23%, the Greens 12% and all Others 8%, with no changes since the late March Freshwater poll. By respondent preferences, Labor led the Coalition by 53–47, a two-point gain for Labor.

Albanese’s net favourability jumped eight points to -9, Taylor’s was down four points to +10, Hanson’s was down five points to +5 and Canavan debuted at +4. Albanese led Taylor as preferred PM by 44–38 (42–36 previously).

Cost of living was rated the most important issue by 44%, with housing the only other issue in double digits at 12%. By 47–32, respondents were dissatisfied with the government over the rise in fuel prices, a big improvement from 59–18 dissatisfied previously.

By 37–33, respondents were dissatisfied with the government’s response to the Iran war (33–31 previously). By 37–34, they were dissatisfied with the response to the Bondi terrorist attacks. By 41–27, they were dissatisfied with the response to the rise in antisemitism. By 38–31, they thought the government was enforcing the social media ban on children under 16 poorly.

By 63–31, respondents were aware of the government’s plans to cut the NDIS. By 47–25, they supported the NDIS cuts.

Liberals retain Nepean at Victorian byelection

A Victorian state byelection occurred in Liberal-held Nepean on Saturday after the resignation of MP Sam Groth. Primary votes were 38.5% for Liberal Anthony Marsh (down 8.5% since the 2022 election), 24.7% One Nation (new), 21.7% for teal independent Tracee Hutchison (new), 9.3% Greens (up 0.5%) and 2.9% Legalise Cannabis (new). Labor did not contest after receiving 32.6% at the 2022 election.

The electoral commission selected Marsh and Hutchison as its final two candidates. Marsh defeated Hutchison by 63.5–36.5 (56.7–43.3 to the Liberals against Labor in 2922).

Although One Nation has a 3.0% primary lead over Hutchison, The Poll Bludger’s projections have Hutchison beating One Nation into second by 30.6–28.3 on Greens’ preferences. Even if One Nation remains second, the Liberals will still win easily.

This was a good result for the Liberals in easily beating both One Nation and a teal independent. The last Victorian Resolve poll suggested the Coalition is the favourite to win the late November state election, but One Nation could win enough seats to hold the balance of power.

Tasmanian upper house elections

The 15 members of Tasmania’s upper house have rotating six-year terms. Every May, two or three of the 15 seats are up for election. On Saturday, elections occurred in Huon (held by conservative independent Dean Harriss) and Rosevears (held by Liberal Jo Palmer). Analyst Kevin Bonham has profiles of the candidates.

Only primary votes were counted on Saturday, with the winners to be determined by a full distribution of preferences when nearly all votes are counted. Most postal votes won’t be included until Thursday.

In Huon, Harriss won 30.4% of the primary vote, left-wing independent Clare Glade-Wright 27.8%, Labor 16.5%, the Greens 15.3% and two other independents a combined 10.0%. I expect Labor and Greens preferences to help Glade-Wright, and she is likely to gain Huon from Harriss.

In Rosevears, Palmer won 42.6% of the primary vote, Labor 24.7%, the Greens 16.8% and independent Susan Monson 16.0%. Postals are likely to further assist Palmer. Greens’ preferences will flow strongly to Labor, but Palmer is far ahead on primary votes, and Labor would also need a strong flow on Monson’s preferences. The Liberals are very likely to hold Rosevears.

The current upper house has three Liberals, three Labor, one Green and eight independents. If the results in Huon and Rosevears are as expected, there would be no change in party standings, but a left-wing independent would replace a conservative independent. Bonham says Labor has voted with the Liberals in the upper house more often than any other member.

Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Depending on which side of the argument you listen to, the recently signed New Zealand-India free trade agreement represents either a huge economic opportunity for New Zealand or a risk to its economic sovereignty.

In an election year, we can expect political positioning over something as significant as this deal, given the broader context. India is a huge market of 1.4 billion people, migration is a burning issue globally and economic growth has been elusive during a period of inflation, war and fuel price hikes.

Broadly, the agreement reduces barriers to trade in goods, services, capital and skilled labour. It’s not surprising exporters are excited about the opportunities. India is projected to grow at 6.5% this year and the next – faster than New Zealand’s other existing trade partners.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s national interest analysis estimates trade, output and real wages will increase due to the market access for New Zealand goods in the deal.

The economic benefits projected by 2050 may even be conservative estimates, given higher-than-modelled gains were seen once the New Zealand-China free trade agreement was in place.

But the India deal goes beyond trade in goods and encompasses services and investment liberalisation, which was where the most political opposition was faced.

First, it was feared New Zealand could be penalised for not investing enough in India. Second, according to NZ First’s Shane Jones, the agreement opens a door to “unfettered immigration”, displacing local jobs.

The hyperbole notwithstanding, then, what does the text of the agreement tell us about the likely economic impact of the deal on New Zealand?

Can NZ be penalised for not investing enough?

The major sticking point for the Labour Party – whose support for the deal was needed because government coalition partner NZ First opposed it – was concern that New Zealand businesses would be legally obligated to invest NZ$33 billion dollars in India over 15 years.

A close reading of the chapter on investment promotion and cooperation, however, reveals the figure is not legally binding or subject to formal dispute settlement. It is to be mutually achieved through a “review, reporting and three-tier government-to-government” consultative process every five years.

As Trade Minister Todd McClay put it, the $33 billion figure is “aspirational”. It is based on a longer-term projection of India’s economic growth over the next 15 years.

Investment will be facilitated by a dedicated desk within India’s Invest India agency. For example, it will include investment partnerships such as the Bioeconomy Science Institute Maiangi Taiao’s initiative to give expert support to India’s developing kiwifruit industry.

If New Zealand businesses don’t achieve their investment targets after 15 years, there will still be a three year grace period, with avenues for discussion and consultation.

Failing that, India has reserved the right to impose proportionate remedial measures by rebalancing tariff concessions. No specific details are mentioned, but they are intended to be temporary and will end once the investment objective is achieved.

These measures reflect the fact that India has given greater tariff concessions to New Zealand exporters than vice versa.

Focus on temporary labour mobility, not immigration

If anything, the bigger concern has been that the free trade agreement will establish an “open border” for Indian migrants into New Zealand, potentially undercutting local wages and putting even more pressure on an already strained housing market.

In reality, the agreement negotiates temporary cross-border movement for contractual service suppliers in both directions between New Zealand and India. It also allows for working holiday visas (with clear time limits) aimed solely at alleviating short-term skill shortages.

The agreement also allows temporary employment entry for some specific professions on New Zealand’s skill shortage list, all restricted to a non-renewable visa for three years.

Annexes to the agreement explicitly state:

This applies to a natural person of India, including a skilled worker, into the territory of New Zealand, in order to work under a fixed term employment contract concluded pursuant to the law of New Zealand, without the intent to establish permanent residence.

Furthermore, the agreement makes it clear these visas can only be granted for temporary travel for that specific employment purpose:

For greater certainty, these qualifications must be recognised by the appropriate New Zealand authority where under New Zealand law such recognition is a condition of the provision of that service in New Zealand.

This would mean qualified doctors, for example, can come to work in New Zealand for three years under temporary employment visas. But they will still be required to comply with local qualification and training requirements.

The intention is clear: such labour mobility provisions will only allow skilled professionals from India to provide specific services for a finite time, complementing local jobs, not displacing them.

The proof, of course, will be in the implementation of the agreement and its overall impact on trade, investment and economic growth. For now, perhaps, it is time to move beyond politics and give New Zealand businesses a chance to tap the long-term opportunities offered by this deal.

Rahul Sen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.